Commit graph

4 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ScreenTinker 56da64d0cd feat(workspaces): rename via switcher dropdown - new PATCH /api/workspaces/:id route, per-row pencil affordance in switcher (visible only when caller can_admin), small rename modal with name + slug fields, validation (name <=80 chars, slug ^[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$ <=60 chars, blank slug -> NULL), 409 on per-org slug collision. Permission gating via new canAdminWorkspace(db, user, ws) helper in lib/permissions.js - reused-ready for future Phase 3 admin actions. /me query now joins organization_members to compute can_admin per accessible_workspaces entry. Drive-by fixes surfaced: (1) activityLogger method filter was missing PATCH, added; (2) routes that operate on a target workspace by URL param need to stamp req.workspaceId from the param so activityLogger captures the right tenant attribution - documented in the route. Smoke fixture: switcher-test@local.test is workspace_admin of Studio A and workspace_editor of Field Crew (no org_owner) so the can_admin true/false split is exercised in one login. 2026-05-12 11:06:55 -05:00
ScreenTinker 88d91b10af activity_log: stop the bleeding - writer-leak fix on 3 sites (activityLogger middleware, alert service, login route) + one-time backfill of 548 NULL-workspace rows via device.workspace_id or workspace_members lookup; activity.js route migration deferred to its own slice tomorrow.
KNOWN REGRESSION (Phase 3 fix): platform_admin / superadmin no longer has cross-workspace 'see everything' view. Every route migrated tonight (2.2a-2.2m) deliberately removed the role-based bypass per design doc - cross-workspace visibility will come via dedicated admin endpoints in Phase 3, not magic role bypasses. Until Phase 3 ships, platform admins must switch-workspace to see other workspaces' data.
2026-05-11 23:14:06 -05:00
ScreenTinker 45a6800621 fix: log real client IPs through Cloudflare instead of CF edge
Express's req.ip was resolving to a Cloudflare edge address (e.g.
172.70.x.x) for any request fronted by Cloudflare, because trust proxy
was set to '1' — that trusts the immediate hop, which IS Cloudflare.
All activity_log rows from API paths captured the proxy, not the
client. The WebSocket path was unaffected and recorded the real IP.

Two layers of defense:

1. trust proxy now lists Cloudflare's published v4 + v6 ranges plus
   loopback / linklocal / uniquelocal (config/cloudflareIps.js). With
   this list req.ip resolves to the original client when fronted by
   CF, and X-Forwarded-For from any non-trusted source is ignored —
   so the value can't be spoofed.

2. New getClientIp(req) helper in services/activity.js prefers the
   CF-Connecting-IP header but only honors it when the immediate TCP
   peer is itself a trusted address. Same gate as trust proxy, so a
   visitor who hits the origin directly with a forged header is
   logged at their real address.

Routed all five activity-log call sites (auth login success/failure,
admin password reset, generic activityLogger middleware, and the
in-memory rate-limiter key) through the helper.

Logging-only change. No schema changes. Existing rows are not
modified — fix applies to new entries going forward.

Verified locally:
- Bare loopback hit logs 127.0.0.1 (not a proxy address).
- Helper unit cases including an untrusted peer (203.0.113.7) sending
  a forged CF-Connecting-IP correctly fall back to the real peer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 15:26:37 -05:00
ScreenTinker 1594a9d4a4 Initial open source release
ScreenTinker - open source digital signage management software.
MIT License, all features included, no license gates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 12:14:53 -05:00