3 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
screentinker	9a1a82a100	Run the ScreenTinker server on the player it serves (#288) ... * Make a BrightSign say what it is running, and what it is plugged into A panel on a wall could not answer three questions an operator asks first: which version am I, which page am I running, and which screen is that. All three had answers already travelling over the socket; nothing was reading them. VERSION. device_info.app_version was the literal '1.1.0-web' for every web player, BrightSign included — the same string as PLAYER_VERSION, which already travels separately as client_version. So the column carried no information at all: a panel provisioned this morning and one running a year-old host reported identically. app_version is now the ON-DEVICE host package, the artifact OTA replaces and the only one here that can be stale, and PLAYER_VERSION is stamped at serve time from VERSION rather than being a constant nobody bumped for the whole 1.x line. No '-web' suffix: client_version is only compared for equality today, but X.Y.Z-web is a semver PRERELEASE that sorts BELOW X.Y.Z, and this project has been bitten by exactly that before. The host version arrives asynchronously and can land after the page registers, so register sends what it has and the heartbeat corrects the record — which also catches the version changing under a live page, which is what a self-update is. THE CARD SHOWED FOR NOBODY. The Info tab's version card sat inside the block gated on android_version && !startsWith('Web/'). A BrightSign registers as "Web/<ua>", so the panel that most needed a version never displayed one. THE PAD THAT COULD NOT BE CLICKED. System View was gated on tier === 2. tier is an Android device-owner concept, NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, written only by the APK — so a BrightSign or Tizen panel sat at 0 forever and rendered HOME, BACK, POWER, the D-pad and OK permanently pointer-events:none, for keys those players genuinely handle. Greying an Android gate over a working control is the "button that cannot work" the capability system exists to prevent, inverted. Only Recents (KEYCODE_APP_SWITCH) and Settings are truly Android-only; those are now the only things hidden. THE PACKAGE POINTED AT THE WRONG SERVER. autorun.zip carried the committed default, so a player self-updating from alpha or a self-hosted box was handed a config pointing at screentinker.com — which surfaces as a pairing bug, miles from the packaging code that caused it. It is now stamped with the URL it was fetched from. The bytes therefore vary per origin, so the cache is keyed by origin and BOTH routes derive it identically: the manifest checksum and the served bytes must come from one buffer or every player downloads, fails verification and retries forever. EDID. getEdidIdentity() answers seven questions and cannot answer any others — manufacturer, EDID version, physical size, gamma and the mode lists exist only in the raw block, which getEdid() returns as 2048 bytes. The player ships those on the register (identity, not a reading: it changes when someone swaps the screen) and the SERVER parses them. That split is the point: a new field becomes a server deploy instead of a bridge update behind a 4h CDN plus an OTA for the host. Verified against real hardware — an XT245 with a CX101 decodes to RTK / 0x1010 / serial 1 / 2020w26 / 22x13cm, preferred 1920x1200@62, matching the player's own DWS field for field. The odd-looking 62 is right: 168.5MHz over 2200 x 1245 is 61.5Hz, and rounding it to a nicer 60 would contradict the panel. Also corrects two comments that had outgrown their reasoning: the BrightSign capability baseline still explained its exclusions with "a canvas cannot read the video plane", which native capture made obsolete, and player-parity.md claimed the bridge is "always current" when a zone-wide Cloudflare Browser Cache TTL had been rewriting its no-cache to max-age=14400 for months. Every new guard is mutation-tested — the fix was reverted in the source and each test confirmed to fail. 1676 -> 1714 tests, all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014kfhrUPit5MCqxeTQyqr56 * Run the ScreenTinker server on the player it serves A BrightSign XT245 now downloads, installs and runs the server itself, with the display showing what it is doing until it is up. WHY IT NEEDED A NEW SHAPE BrightSignOS cannot open a large autorun.zip. The 73MB build failed at boot with "ZipArchive error at line 91", and the OS renamed it autorun.zip_invalid - which is how a device that had already unpacked once came back up with no autorun at all. The identical package cut to 32KB and five files boots fine; paths (182 chars) and depth (8) are unremarkable, so the limit is in the boot-time reader, not the archive. BrightSign's own notes acknowledge package size as a problem and point at webpack; that route needs the dynamic requires in scripts/ removed first, so instead autorun.zip carries only what starts the process and the payload arrives over HTTP into a Node that has no such limit. The payload can also be updated without re-provisioning the device. WHY roNodeJs AND NOT THE WIDGET The first version ran the server inside an roHtmlWidget with nodejs_enabled. That is a Node context inside an Electron renderer, and it is not Node. Four separate boot failures came out of it, each invisible to a local test because a local test runs on real Node: - shebangs are not stripped, so any `#!/usr/bin/env node` file dies with "Failed to construct 'ContextifyScript': Invalid or unexpected token". Note it names no token - "#" is not one. An ESM file compiled as CJS says "Unexpected token 'export'" instead, which is how the two are told apart. - require() of an ESM-only package is unsupported, which plain Node 24 handles. uuid 14 is ESM-only and 21 files import it. - setInterval is the DOM's and returns a NUMBER, so setInterval(...).unref() throws. Two call sites were unguarded; sixteen more were written defensively and had been silently not unreffing. - worker_threads cannot create a thread at all. BrightSign's dev-cookbook is explicit: roNodeJs "for long running processes like ... running a web server", roHtmlWidget "for browser-based apps". Their cra-template examples do exactly this - server in roNodeJs, widget pointed at localhost. It also fixes the lifecycle problem that was the original argument against a server on this hardware: in a widget the server dies with the page, taking an open SQLite WAL with it. The shims for the first three are kept in the packager for now rather than removed in the same change that moves the container, so that if something breaks it is the move and not four simultaneous removals. CHANGES THAT ARE NOT BRIGHTSIGN-SPECIFIC db/database.js, routes/status.js fs.copyFileSync does not merely copy bytes: it fchmods the destination to match the source. exFAT has no permission bits, so the pre-migration snapshot failed with EPERM and the failure path called process.exit(1) - which inside a widget also killed the page, leaving a black screen and no diagnostic. The guard was right; the copy was wrong. lib/fsutil.js copies without touching mode. db/wal-checkpointer.js the module already degraded correctly when its worker died or could not be respawned, but the FIRST spawn was not wrapped, so a host that cannot make threads lost the whole server rather than falling back to inline autocheckpoint. db/sqlite-compat.js a better-sqlite3 facade over node:sqlite. With it the bundle contains no native code at all, which is what lets an x86_64 laptop build a package for an aarch64 player. 1719/1719 tests pass on Node 24 through this shim. The packager refuses to build if a source file is untracked (git ls-files decides what ships, and lib/fsutil.js reached a player without shipping alongside the code that required it), if any .node binary is present, if a shebang survives, or if a database, upload, cert or .env is staged - the first build of this package swept up a real 33MB database and 105MB of uploads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014kfhrUPit5MCqxeTQyqr56 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Dan Walters <dan.walters@bytetinker.net>	2026-08-18 15:16:09 -05:00
ScreenTinker	30a71c1319	autorun.zip must be STORED and opened with roBrightPackage ... A BrightSign consultant ran our v1.9.29-rc2 autorun.zip through BSN.cloud's automated deployment. The archive reached the player and then could not be opened — reported as invalid. Two causes, both ours. 1. COMPRESSION. We built with default deflate. The player bootstrap extracts autozip.brs by itself before any script runs, and roBrightPackage supports a specific set of methods, of which "no compression" is the universally safe one. Both builders now store: scripts/build-autorun-zip.sh passes -0, and the server-side package builder used archiver level 9 — maximum deflate — so EVERY self-update package it produced would have failed the same way, silently and in the field. 2. THE UNPACK API. We used roUnzip; BrightSign's own tooling uses roBrightPackage. Converted in autozip.brs and in the self-update path. This is the failure mode worth naming: a compressed package uploads, downloads and deploys perfectly, then fails to open on the player. It reads as a broken deployment rather than a broken zip, so it gets debugged everywhere except where the bug is. Both builders now ASSERT the property rather than trusting the flag — the build script walks `unzip -v` and refuses a compressed member, and a test walks the local file headers of the server-built package checking method 0. Verified by negative control: re-enabling compression fails the test. Also adopted the shipped volume-discovery pattern in autozip.brs — probe USB1:/SD:/SSD:/FLASH: for the archive instead of guessing two volumes. The unit that drove this port boots from FLASH because its card interface is dead, and extracting to a volume that does not exist fails silently. 1056 pass. Reported by giyokun, who was right about both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL	2026-08-05 11:36:18 -05:00
ScreenTinker	8fd6eb75d5	BrightSign: cache content for offline, and let the package update itself ... Two gaps that both end the same way — a panel nobody can fix without a van. OFFLINE. Content bytes were never persistently cached. The service worker skipped /uploads/content/ and leaned on the browser's HTTP cache, which is reasonable on a desktop and is not a documented-persistent store here: BrightSign guarantees survival across reboots for IndexedDB, localStorage and SQLite, and their own answer for offline video is to cache the bytes explicitly. A panel could come back from a power cut with its playlist intact — that lives in localStorage — and no media to play it with. The reason content was skipped is real, and player-cache-policy.js is what makes intercepting it safe. Seeking video issues range requests, and naive caching is worse than none: storing a 206 as the whole file means every later full request gets a fragment, and answering a range request with a 200 makes some media stacks fail outright. So only complete 200s are stored, and ranges are served by slicing the stored body into a correct 206. The content cache survives shell re-versioning, or every deploy would re-download the playlist over a link that may be exactly what is broken. SELF-UPDATE. The package can replace autorun.brs, so a truncated file is a dark panel with no app underneath. The safety is the ordering: download to .part, verify sha256 AND size, then delete the .done marker, rename, reboot. Marker first is not stylistic — leaving it makes the next boot skip the archive and the update silently never happens. A failed extract parks the zip as .bad instead of retrying every boot, which would be a loop indistinguishable from a hardware fault. sha256 because that is what roMessageDigest can compute; a checksum the player cannot verify is an unverifiable package. The decision lives on the server and is unit-tested, and the host only executes it — re-implementing the version comparison in BrightScript would put the prerelease trap somewhere untestable. That trap is honoured directly: a player on 1.9.29-rc1 is running something semver-OLDER than 1.9.29, so an opted-in player HOLDS a prerelease of its own core rather than being pulled off the build it was given to test. Narrowly — a newer core still lands, so opting in never means never updating again. Both loop conditions are closed by construction. The manifest and the download come from one buffer hashed once, so a checksum cannot describe bytes we are not serving. And the version is stamped into autorun.brs at build time by both builders, so the script reports the version it actually is — otherwise the player applies the update, still reports the old version, and is offered the same package forever. Failure always degrades to "keep running the old version": an unreachable manifest, a missing checksum, a failed verification, a full attempt counter and an unbuildable package all resolve to skip. 998 tests pass (was 954).	2026-08-05 10:09:00 -05:00