Commit graph

7 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ScreenTinker 0b9aa56e75 Phase 2.2m: schedules.js scoped to workspace_id; schedule.workspace_id inherited from target (device/group); fixes 6 pre-existing cross-tenant leaks (POST content/widget/layout/playlist accepted with no check, PUT verifyOwnership rewrite across all 6 polymorphic targets) 2026-05-11 23:03:54 -05:00
ScreenTinker 2954fd1a84 Phase 2.1: tenancy middleware, permission helpers, JWT workspace context, frontend + backend role-rename compat 2026-05-11 20:02:00 -05:00
ScreenTinker c105a5941e Security: fix IDORs, XSS, rate limits, SSRF validation
HIGH 1 (teams IDOR): POST/DELETE /api/teams/:id/devices now require the
caller to own the device before assigning or detaching it. Without this
check, any team member could pull any device into their team via UUID
guess and gain remote-control access.

HIGH 2 (schedules IDOR): PUT /api/schedules/:id now re-verifies
ownership of every changed target field — device_id, group_id,
content_id, widget_id, layout_id, playlist_id. Previously only the
schedule owner was checked, letting users fire arbitrary content on
victim devices via update.

HIGH 3 (filename XSS): file.originalname captured by multer bypassed
sanitizeBody. New safeFilename() wraps every INSERT path (multipart
upload, remote URL, YouTube). Frontend sinks now go through esc() in
content-library.js, device-detail.js, video-wall.js. Web player gets
an inline escHtml helper for its info overlay where filenames, device
name, and serverUrl land in innerHTML.

HIGH 4 (kiosk public XSS): config.idleTimeout is now coerced via the
existing safeNumber() helper at both interpolation sites. A crafted
value with a newline can no longer escape the JS line comment to
inject arbitrary code into the public render endpoint.

HIGH 5 (folder DoS): POST /api/folders enforces a per-user cap of 100
folders (429 on overflow). Superadmin exempt.

MED 1 (SSRF): ImageLoader.decodeUrl rejects any URL scheme other than
http(s) so a malicious remote_url can't read local files via file://.
On the server, validateRemoteUrl() is extracted and now also runs on
PUT /api/content/:id remote_url updates — previously the SSRF check
only fired on POST.

MED 2 (fingerprint takeover): the WS device:register fingerprint
reclaim path now rejects takeover while the target device is online or
within 24h of its last heartbeat. A leaked fingerprint can no longer
hijack an active display.

MED 3 (npm audit): bumped uuid 9.x -> 14.0.0 (v3/v5/v6 buffer bounds
CVE; we only use v4 so not exploitable, but clears the audit). path-
to-regexp resolved to 0.1.13 via npm audit fix. 0 vulns remaining.

MED 4 (folder admin consistency): ownedFolder() and the content.js
folder_id move check now both treat only superadmin as privileged,
matching GET /api/folders. Previously a plain "admin" could rename
or delete folders they couldn't see, and could move content into
folders they couldn't list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 14:37:18 -05:00
ScreenTinker 52dd44a3e8 Add group-level scheduling, group playlist assignment, and persist audio unlock
Phase 4 group scheduling: schema migration adds group_id to schedules with
CHECK constraint, scheduler evaluates group+device schedules with priority,
group deletion converts schedules to per-device copies. Dashboard gets
playlist assignment dropdown and current playlist label on group headers.
Player persists audio unlock state in localStorage so version reloads
don't lose audio on unattended displays.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 20:22:42 -05:00
ScreenTinker afbe113acf Security audit remediation: auth, IDOR, XSS, hardening
- Device WebSocket authentication: devices get a device_token on
  registration, must present it on reconnect. All WS events require
  prior auth. Timing-safe token comparison.
- IDOR fixes: ownership checks on schedules (device, week), layouts
  (all CRUD, zones, duplicate, device assign), video-walls (content,
  device-config).
- XSS prevention: shared esc() helper in utils.js, fixed 13 innerHTML
  injection points across 9 frontend files.
- OAuth hardening: no longer silently overwrites auth_provider on
  accounts with local passwords (returns 409).
- JWT pinned to HS256 for sign and verify.
- Password policy: change endpoint now requires 8 chars (was 6).
- HSTS header enabled (max-age 1 year, includeSubDomains).
- Stripe webhook rejects unsigned payloads when no secret configured.
- Screenshot size validation (max 2MB base64).
- Rate limiting on exports, imports, content operations.
- Content file serving checks playlist_items instead of old assignments.
- Content ownership verified in device-groups assign-content.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-11 22:48:07 -05:00
ScreenTinker 19a08ef5bc Phase 2: schedules accept playlist_id, scheduler overrides device playlist
Schedule CRUD now includes playlist_id field. List queries join playlist name.
Scheduler tracks active overrides per device and reverts to original
playlist/layout when no schedule is active.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-11 22:07:36 -05:00
ScreenTinker 1594a9d4a4 Initial open source release
ScreenTinker - open source digital signage management software.
MIT License, all features included, no license gates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 12:14:53 -05:00