Third review pass. It confirmed the crash wrapper holds (~13,000 hostile requests,
no fourth crash), the SSRF rewrite holds (77 vectors, every CIDR boundary proven),
the rate-limiter rewrite closed the login brute-force bypass, and /sso/claim rejects
every wrong token kind. It also found that two things I built yesterday did not do
what they claimed.
THE 8-HOUR LIMIT DID NOT BOUND SQUATTING
Pressing Verify on an expired claim REISSUED it in place, renewing the clock — so one
request per window held a domain forever, through the endpoint meant to enforce the
limit. Worse, a renewal was not a new claim, so the operator was notified exactly once,
on day zero: a tenant could sit on a company's domain for a year off a single stale
alert. A lapsed claim is now RELEASED. Re-adding it is an ordinary new claim: new
token, and the operator is told again. Squatting is not impossible; it is loud.
A DELEGATED PROOF NAME COULD FORGE A DOMAIN
A TXT lookup follows CNAMEs, and RFC 4592 means a wildcard `*.victim.com` synthesizes
`_screentinker-verify.victim.com` too — so a wildcard CNAME let whoever controls its
target prove a domain they do not own, turning an ordinary subdomain takeover into
every `@victim.com` login. A reviewer did this against a real authoritative zone. The
proof name is now refused if it is a CNAME, which is stricter than ACME's dns-01, and
the comment that claimed wildcards "cannot be mistaken for a proof" — true only for
wildcard TXT — has been corrected.
MY VERIFY BUTTON REPORTED FAILURE ON SUCCESS
`await load()` — the loader is `loadSso()`. The ReferenceError went into a bare catch,
so a correct DNS proof showed "Could not verify that domain" and left the card stale.
On the expired branch the admin kept publishing a token the server had already rotated.
ALSO FIXED
- deleting a provider stranded its verified domains (no FK, UNIQUE, never expires) so
the domain was blocked for EVERY org forever with no in-product recovery, and its
users could neither sign in nor reset. Delete now releases the domains and returns
the accounts to local, in one transaction; a cascade FK backstops it.
- isOrphanedFederated read absence-of-config as proof-of-deletion, so unsetting
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID made every Google account password-resettable instance-wide, and
irreversibly. Restricted to org-provider slugs.
- `email_domains: null` (not undefined) took the destructive branch and deleted every
DNS proof an organization had.
- unbounded domain lists: 400 domains sent 401 emails; now capped at 50, one digest
per save, and /api/organizations is rate-limited at all for the first time.
- login and register responses carried password_reset_hash and email_verify_hash —
live account-takeover credentials handed to the browser. One sanitiser now.
- trailing-dot hostname (`https://localhost./`) slipped the SSRF guard.
- asyncRoute's own catch could throw and kill the process it exists to protect.
- a legacy DB whose typed domains were never verified now says so LOUDLY at boot
instead of silently locking every federated user out.
TESTS
Two of the previous round's tests passed against the code they were named after: one
asserted UNIQUE against the test harness's own CREATE TABLE rather than the shipped
schema, the other used two different domains so no ordering was exercised. Both
replaced and confirmed load-bearing. Seven mutations now turn the suite red, including
removing the CNAME refusal, the verified_at filter, and the expiry itself.
1598 tests pass. Delete-release, lapse-release and the leak fix verified against a
running server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bvjey4FNam49MN7ybjcq6A
A second review pass, run against the previous commit, found four blockers — two of
them introduced by the fixes in that commit. It also confirmed the original account
takeover is closed: a hostile IdP with real TLS, discovery, JWKS and RS256 driving the
real routers now stops at domain_not_allowed, and all 16 bypass variants are refused.
DOMAIN OWNERSHIP (the root cause, not the symptom)
A claimed domain used to mean "nobody else claimed it". It now means the organization
published a record in that domain's own DNS — TXT or CNAME, at a dedicated
_screentinker-verify name rather than the apex, where an edit would sit beside SPF.
- an unverified domain routes NOBODY and cannot be asserted; it reserves the name
- an unverified claim LAPSES after 8 hours, so a domain cannot be held against its
real owner, and lapsing rotates the token so a record left over from an abandoned
attempt cannot satisfy a later claim
- a verified domain never expires — re-proving on a timer would log a customer out
over a DNS edit made months later
- routing and confinement read the VERIFIED set only, never the typed column
- configuring SSO now requires a verified email address
- platform admins are emailed when a domain is claimed; nothing is ever sent to the
claimed domain, which would let any tenant make this product email third parties
Instance-wide providers are exempt from all of it: they are the operator's own
configuration and keep the trust they have always had.
BLOCKERS FROM THE REVIEW
- two unauthenticated remote crashes, both one request, both "async handler throws
before its try": `Cookie: st_oidc_tx=%` (unguarded decodeURIComponent) and the
fail-closed secret added last commit, which turned a JWT_SECRET rotation into a
permanent crash loop. Fixed the CLASS with asyncRoute() rather than the instances.
- the SSRF guard was bypassable via IPv4-mapped IPv6 ([::ffff:127.0.0.1]) and also
refused every host beginning "fc"/"fd" (fcm.googleapis.com). Addresses are now
parsed and compared by RANGE. 42 cases verified.
- the takeover fix had NO test — the test named after it asserted two struct fields
and passed with the guard deleted. The decision is now a pure function and four
mutations were confirmed to turn the suite red.
- the PUT path never received the TOCTOU fix, so two orgs could end up holding one
domain and forEmail handed routing to the attacker's older row.
ALSO
- linking compared slugs, so an org could never rotate its own IdP, and fell open on
an empty auth_provider. It now asks which ORGANIZATION owns the slug.
- an account stranded by a deleted provider can be reclaimed by password reset —
proof of the mailbox, which is stronger than the IdP assertion that created it.
- /sso/claim accepted a pre-TOTP mfa_pending token and returned the full user row;
it now takes a purpose-built 120s claim token with a pinned algorithm and typ.
- the rate limiter keyed on a caller-controlled path, so a trailing slash bought a
fresh bucket — a real login brute-force bypass.
- domain_not_allowed and account_exists_other_provider rendered as "please try
again", advice that can never work.
- malformed asserted addresses are refused rather than trimmed into shape.
- dead config (microsoftTenantId defaulted to 'common', which the provider code now
refuses) and the orphaned google-auth-library dependency removed.
1591 tests pass. Domain lifecycle verified end to end against a running server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bvjey4FNam49MN7ybjcq6A
Five reviewers went at the two SSO commits. Three of them independently
demonstrated a full account takeover, and it was the same defect each time.
TAKEOVER. An org admin supplies the issuer and client_id, so they control that
identity provider completely and can mint an id_token asserting ANY email with
email_verified:true — including a platform_admin's. Every cryptographic check
passed honestly, because the attacker IS the issuer. upsertFederatedUser then
re-pointed the existing account at whichever provider spoke last, because the
only guard was `password_hash IS NULL` — and every SSO-created account has a
null password. Sessions were issued as the victim, and the victim's own login
then failed forever with subject_mismatch.
The rule came from the old Google handler, where it was safe: only the operator
could add a provider. Making providers customer-configurable turned it into a
takeover primitive and the assumption was not re-examined. Now an org provider
may only assert emails inside the domains it registered, and may never adopt an
account another provider established.
REMOTE CRASH, unauthenticated. The state comparison guarded on UTF-16 character
length while Buffer.from produces UTF-8 bytes, so a state of 43 characters
containing one multi-byte character reached timingSafeEqual with mismatched
buffers and threw — inside an async handler, which Express does not catch, which
server.js turns into process.exit. One request per restart killed any instance
with SSO enabled. Compared as bytes now, and /api/auth/oidc gained a rate limit.
LOGIN CSRF. The callback returned the session token in the URL fragment, so a
crafted link installed an ATTACKER'S token and silently signed the victim into
their account. The token now goes in a one-shot httpOnly cookie exchanged at
POST /sso/claim, which a link cannot forge.
FRONTEND, dead on arrival twice over. login.js used `await` in a non-async
function — a SyntaxError that takes the WHOLE app down, since app.js imports it
statically and there is no bundler. And `esc` was never imported, so the org-SSO
button could never render; the ReferenceError was swallowed by the catch written
for network failures. Both slipped through because `node --check` parses these
files as CommonJS and exits 0 on a broken module. The correct check is
`node --input-type=module --check`, and all four frontend files now pass it.
PUBLIC EMAIL DOMAINS cannot be claimed. A tenant had claimed gmail.com in
review, after which every Gmail user typing their address was offered "sign in
with your organization" pointing at that tenant's infrastructure — phishing from
this product's own login page. server/lib/public-email-domains.js.
MICROSOFT multi-tenant is refused rather than silently broken. `common` metadata
advertises the literal template {tenantid}, so the issuer never matches and
every login already failed; and loosening that check is nOAuth. A tenant GUID is
now required, with a loud warning at boot.
SSRF: https only, loopback/RFC1918/link-local refused, redirects not followed,
and the test endpoint no longer echoes upstream status for a caller-supplied
jwks_uri (it was a readable internal port scanner).
Also: an omitted email_verified was accepted (the comment already said it should
not be); the domain-uniqueness check raced an 8s network call before its insert
and is now inside the transaction; same-org duplicate domains were allowed and
made routing depend on table-scan order; routing is now ordered; a client secret
that cannot be decrypted fails closed instead of silently downgrading to a public
client; SSO audit rows were writing the org id into the deviceId column; and
/sso/start was capped at 10/min per IP, which would 429 the 11th employee behind
a corporate NAT.
Adds per-provider editing in the org admin UI (replace-only secrets — never
returned, blank means keep, explicit clear) and a Test button that checks
discovery, endpoints and signing keys while stating plainly that it cannot
verify the client ID, the secret, or the redirect URI registration.
⚠️ STILL MISSING: domain-ownership verification. A claimed domain means "nobody
else had claimed it", not "they own it". DNS TXT proof is the remaining control.
1582 tests pass. New regression tests cover the takeover confinement, ordering,
fail-closed secrets, the Microsoft refusal and the public-domain blocklist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bvjey4FNam49MN7ybjcq6A
Instance-wide providers belong to whoever runs the server. These belong to a
CUSTOMER: an organization points ScreenTinker at its own identity provider from
Settings → Single sign-on, with no environment variable and no restart.
The login flow is unchanged. An org provider is resolved through the same
oidc-providers.get(slug) the env ones go through, so there is one authorization
request builder, one token exchange and one verifier — not a second, less
tested path for tenants. That seam is why Phase 1 put provider lookup behind a
single function.
⚠️ An org provider is NEVER published. It is not in /api/auth/providers, because
listing a customer's IdP would both offer it to people it does not belong to and
leak the customer list from the login page. It surfaces only when someone types
an address at one of that organization's domains; otherwise the instance-wide
buttons are what you get.
The discovery endpoint answers with a BOOLEAN and nothing else — no slug, no
display name. Returning "yes, Acme Corp SSO" would turn a guessed domain into
confirmation that Acme buys this product, and the slug would hand out a working
entry point to their tenant. POST /sso/start repeats the lookup server-side and
redirects, so the browser never learns which provider it is being sent to until
the provider says so, and the address travels in a body rather than in a URL
that lands in history, proxy logs and a Referer. Both endpoints rate limited to
10/min.
Other properties, each with a test:
- slugs are RANDOM, not chosen, so two customers cannot collide on or guess
each other's URL
- a domain may be claimed by ONE organization; a second claim is refused, so a
tenant cannot capture another company's logins
- the issuer is verified by live discovery BEFORE the row is written, so a
typo is caught at configuration rather than by a user staring at a failed
login
- client secrets are optional (PKCE), stored AES-256-GCM via lib/secretbox,
never returned; an absent secret on update leaves the stored one alone,
which is how a settings form that cannot show it avoids blanking it
- cross-org access answers 404, not 403, so an outsider cannot confirm that an
organization id exists
- signing in through an org provider grants membership of that organization,
but never changes an existing member's role
Verified live end to end: creation against a real issuer, domain normalisation
(`@Acme.CO.UK` → `acme.co.uk`), boolean-only discovery, a rejected domain
squat, a rejected bad issuer, and 404 for a foreign organization.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bvjey4FNam49MN7ybjcq6A
Server side of the inverted capture path. The host half is not here — see the
end of this message.
Every other player is TOLD to capture: the server emits device:screenshot-request
over the device socket and the page photographs itself. A BrightSign cannot
photograph itself. Video decodes onto a hardware plane the DOM cannot read, so
an in-page canvas returns a frame with the content missing — which is why that
platform has been answering screenshot requests with a card explaining that the
video is uncapturable. Only the host, through the player's own DWS, can get a
real frame.
The obvious way to ask the host is through the page, and it does not work. On an
XT245 (BOS 9.1.93.2) page->host messaging is dead after load: instrumenting the
host to echo the `reason` of EVERY roHtmlWidgetEvent produced nothing at all
while the page was posting, though the boot-time probe round-trips. The registry
is not an alternative either — a running BrightScript does not observe registry
writes made by anyone else, proven by writing the key externally through the DWS
and watching the host ignore it.
What the host CAN do is HTTP; it already fetches its own package updates that
way. So the direction is inverted: the request waits here and the host collects
it. The image comes back over a plain POST, which means a capture will work even
when the page is wedged — exactly when an operator most wants to see the screen.
Held in memory on purpose. A capture request is worthless a minute after it was
made — someone clicked a button and is watching for the result — so persisting
it would only add a way to deliver a stale screenshot after a restart. Bounded
and TTL'd so a fleet going offline mid-request cannot grow it, and a repeat
request REPLACES rather than queues so a 1fps stream builds no backlog.
Authenticated with the same device_id + device_token pair the socket uses.
/api/brightsign/package is public because a player fetches it before it has any
identity; a screenshot is a picture of a customer's screen and belongs to one
display.
deviceSocket now exposes ONE ingestScreenshot() used by both the socket handler
and the HTTP route, so a BrightSign screenshot reaches the dashboard by exactly
the route every other player's does rather than becoming a second, subtly
different feature. Note those exports must be attached AFTER
`module.exports = function setupDeviceSocket`, which reassigns the object —
attaching above it silently wipes them, which cost a debugging round.
NOT INCLUDED, deliberately: the host-side poll. Adding it to autorun.brs's main
loop kills the BrightScript script within seconds of boot — the page keeps
playing, because the widget outlives the script, so from the dashboard it looks
healthy. Cause unidentified; BrightScript runtime faults do not reach
/api/v1/logs, so there is no error text to read. Half a feature that silently
takes down the host is worse than none, so the server waits for a host that can
safely ask.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014skWYXJUWhF73EvNPgB2AS
Ingest-time thumbnail generation is best-effort by contract, so a row that
misses it stays bare forever: video uploads on a host without ffmpeg (a
SYSTEM dependency nothing surfaced), or content from before thumbnails
existed. Operators read that as "thumbnails don't work".
Two additions. A [MEDIA] startup diagnostic (async probe, cached) states
loudly whether ffmpeg/ffprobe were found, mirroring the [EMAIL] block. And
a once-per-boot sweep re-derives metadata for local image/video rows with
no thumbnail — serial, paced, delayed past boot, unref'd. The sweep's row
UPDATE re-checks that thumbnail_path is still empty so it never clobbers a
thumbnail written concurrently by the replace flow, removes its just-written
file when the row vanished mid-derive, salvages probed dims/duration even
when the thumbnail itself failed, and stops after 25 failures per boot so a
library of undecodable clips can't turn every restart into subprocess churn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0131RYmVh8ePEhparD3mXBhU
Two faults that are live on 1.9.29, both silent, both ending in a dark screen.
A missing upload answered 200 OK with Content-Type: text/html and 15KB of the
dashboard, under the immutable/30-day header the mount sets before it knows
whether the file exists. Every downloader here treats 200 as success, so a panel
stores the page AS the video and caches it for a month; Android validates the
byte count, not the type, so a correctly-sized page passes integrity and is
promoted as a valid asset. Reachable exactly when it hurts — a replace writes a
new random filename and unlinks the old one. Now a 404, with the cache header
removed.
And the service worker treated an empty playlist as "keep nothing". But
`assignments: []` is what the server sends for a device between playlists, for a
playlist never published, and from the catch when a snapshot fails to parse — so
a message that means nothing of the sort deleted every byte of media the panel
held. Only survivable while the uplink is up, i.e. exactly when the cache is
worthless.
Both regression tests drive the whole server or the real worker, because both
bugs live in the relationship between two pieces that are individually correct:
the order of two mounts, and the difference between "needs nothing" and "did not
arrive".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
#236: the wall canvas was secretly framebuffer space rather than the wall as
the audience sees it. Invisible while every panel is the normal way up, and
actively misleading the moment one isn't — two portrait-mounted panels standing
side by side had to be STACKED VERTICALLY in the editor, with a pre-rotated copy
of every video, before the output came out right. It worked, but only after
trial and error, and it meant a portrait wall could never reuse content as-is.
Each panel now carries a mounting rotation (0/90/180/270 clockwise, the same
convention as the per-device orientation setting), the canvas means the physical
wall, and the player works out the mapping. The geometry lives in one place,
server/lib/wall-geometry.js, because four players have to agree on it to the
pixel across a seam.
Existing walls need no migration and do not move. Every wall in the field is
rotation 0, and that case takes the original expression verbatim on all three
players rather than the algebraically-equal centre-based one — the two differ in
the last float bit, and a float's worth of disagreement between two panels is a
hairline seam down a wall that was aligned yesterday. Pinned by the first test
in wall-geometry.test.js and by wall-payload.test.js.
While a display is in a wall its panel rotation replaces its own orientation:
both describe the same physical fact, so honouring both turned the content twice.
#235: a wall replaced its members' cards, so one dead panel of a four-panel wall
was invisible from the dashboard, and inspecting a single screen meant pulling it
out of the live wall and putting it back. The wall screen now lists its panels
with live online state, a per-panel screenshot request, and a link to each
device's page; the dashboard wall card carries per-member status chips that track
socket updates.
Tests: wall-geometry.test.js re-simulates the CSS box independently and asserts
each panel's viewport maps onto exactly its own rect of wall space, for every
rotation, plus a mixed wall and the Tizen player's hand-ported copy executed
against the canonical rule. Full server suite green (1260).
Not verified here: the Android and Tizen renders on real hardware. Kotlin
compiles clean; the maths is shared/tested, the view plumbing is not.
Found deploying 1.9.29 to production. A worker's scope defaults to its own
directory, so /player/sw.js could only control /player/ and below; the fix was to
request a wider scope and permit it with Service-Worker-Allowed. That works right
up until something between the origin and the browser does not pass the header
on. Cloudflare served a CACHED response for that path across the deploy —
headers and all — and the registration failed outright.
A rejected registration is worse than a narrow one: the player runs with no
worker at all, on every URL, and nothing about it is visible from the server. The
origin was sending the header correctly the whole time; a cache-busted request
proved it. It self-heals when the edge entry expires, which is precisely the kind
of fix nobody should have to know about.
Served from /, the default scope is already the whole origin and no header has to
survive the trip — through Cloudflare, through whatever a self-hoster puts in
front of it, or through a corporate proxy we will never see. /player/sw.js keeps
serving for players still asking for it, and the header is still sent where it
does survive.
Verified in a real browser: all three of /player, /player/ and /player/index.html
are controlled from root scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
Found by QA against a real browser, not by any test in the suite: the bug lived
entirely in the relationship between a URL and a header.
A service worker's default scope is its own directory, so /player/sw.js could
only ever control /player/ and below — which does not include /player itself.
The player is served at all three of /player, /player/ and /player/index.html,
and /player is the one that gets used: it is what the dashboard shows and what
gets typed into a panel. On that URL registration SUCCEEDED, logged "Service
Worker registered", and then controlled nothing. No shell cache, no content
cache, no offline playback, no error. Every web and BrightSign panel served at
/player has been running with its offline story switched off.
Registration now asks for scope '/' and the server sends Service-Worker-Allowed
to permit it. Both halves are required — without the header the registration
does not narrow, it fails outright.
Also: revision-keyed sweeping could not reclaim a replaced asset's predecessor.
A replace writes a NEW randomly-named file, so the superseded copy lives at a
different path entirely and nothing keyed on the asset path can find it; it
would sit there until the quota evicted it. The player now declares the complete
set of media it needs — the raw assignments, so multi-zone items are included
and a prune cannot delete something a zone is still playing — and the worker
drops everything else.
QA results this pass: web player 18/18 against a real browser (cold start with
no network renders a cached video at readyState 4); Android 12/12 on a device
including a replace round-trip that re-fetched 6MB and then dropped it for the
new bytes, and a cold start with the server stopped that played from disk;
Tizen 11/11 for the no-storage path, which must degrade to streaming and must
not claim a capability it cannot honour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
Reported as "rotation doesn't work correctly". It is a geometry bug, not a
rendering one, which is why it reads as mysterious.
#playerContainer is pinned `inset: 0`. Rotation set width:100vh, height:100vw and
rotate(90deg) — leaving the box in the TOP-LEFT corner and spinning it about its
own centre rather than the viewport's. On a 1920x1080 panel the content landed at
x -420..1500, y 420..1500 against a viewport of 0..1920, 0..1080: correctly
rotated, wrongly placed, cropped on two edges.
Tizen already did this correctly — top/left 50% plus translate(-50%,-50%) — and
Android does the equivalent with translationX/Y of (w-h)/2. The web player was
the odd one out, and BrightSign inherited it on top of its own hardware-plane
problem.
The rule now lives in server/lib/orientation-style.js, served to the player from
its single source, with the arithmetic pinned by tests that compute where the
rotated box actually lands on 16:9 and 5:4 panels. Three things those tests hold
that are easy to get wrong: the translate must come BEFORE the rotate (transforms
apply right-to-left, so reversing them rotates the correction too), 180 must NOT
swap dimensions (the box already fits; swapping letterboxes it), and landscape
must clear EVERY property the rotated state set (a half-reset leaves the
container stuck at 100vh wide, so rotation appears to persist after switching
back).
1074 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
Muting was implemented three times and agreed nowhere. A YouTube item is a
cross-origin iframe, so `el.muted` reaches nothing; only the IFrame API can
touch it. Both browser-family players got this wrong, in opposite directions:
web playerVars.mute was `userHasInteracted ? 0 : 1` — autoplay policy and
NOTHING else. An item an operator muted in the admin console played
WITH SOUND, a wall follower blared alongside its leader, and the
real-time device:mute-changed toggle only ever touched `<video>`.
onReady then unmuted unconditionally, and the click-to-unmute overlay
appeared on deliberately-muted items and undid the operator's setting.
tizen the embed URL hardcoded `mute=1`, so YouTube there was PERMANENTLY
silent: the per-item flag was never read and nothing could unmute it.
device:mute-changed did nothing at all, because it dereferenced a
<video> that is null for a YouTube item.
Android was already correct and is unchanged — it is the reference here.
The rule now lives once, in server/lib/media-mute.js, served to the web player
from its single source the same way schedule-eval.js is, and mirrored in Tizen
(which ships inside the .wgt and cannot import it). The ORDER is the substance:
a wall follower is always silent (one wall, one audio source) > autoplay policy,
which is a hard constraint rather than a preference because unmuted playback
without a gesture is refused outright and costs the VIDEO > a live operator
toggle, who is looking at the screen > the item's stored flag.
shouldOfferUnmute() exists so the prompt only appears when a gesture is the ONLY
thing in the way. Prompting on a muted item trains viewers to click a button
that undoes an operator's decision.
Tizen gains enablejsapi + a postMessage bridge so a live toggle flips the embed
without reloading it — reloading would restart the video from zero every time
someone touched the control.
11 new tests pinning each precedence step separately; 1055 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
Two gaps that both end the same way — a panel nobody can fix without a van.
OFFLINE. Content bytes were never persistently cached. The service worker
skipped /uploads/content/ and leaned on the browser's HTTP cache, which is
reasonable on a desktop and is not a documented-persistent store here:
BrightSign guarantees survival across reboots for IndexedDB, localStorage and
SQLite, and their own answer for offline video is to cache the bytes explicitly.
A panel could come back from a power cut with its playlist intact — that lives in
localStorage — and no media to play it with.
The reason content was skipped is real, and player-cache-policy.js is what makes
intercepting it safe. Seeking video issues range requests, and naive caching is
worse than none: storing a 206 as the whole file means every later full request
gets a fragment, and answering a range request with a 200 makes some media stacks
fail outright. So only complete 200s are stored, and ranges are served by slicing
the stored body into a correct 206. The content cache survives shell
re-versioning, or every deploy would re-download the playlist over a link that may
be exactly what is broken.
SELF-UPDATE. The package can replace autorun.brs, so a truncated file is a dark
panel with no app underneath. The safety is the ordering: download to .part,
verify sha256 AND size, then delete the .done marker, rename, reboot. Marker
first is not stylistic — leaving it makes the next boot skip the archive and the
update silently never happens. A failed extract parks the zip as .bad instead of
retrying every boot, which would be a loop indistinguishable from a hardware
fault. sha256 because that is what roMessageDigest can compute; a checksum the
player cannot verify is an unverifiable package.
The decision lives on the server and is unit-tested, and the host only executes
it — re-implementing the version comparison in BrightScript would put the
prerelease trap somewhere untestable. That trap is honoured directly: a player on
1.9.29-rc1 is running something semver-OLDER than 1.9.29, so an opted-in player
HOLDS a prerelease of its own core rather than being pulled off the build it was
given to test. Narrowly — a newer core still lands, so opting in never means
never updating again.
Both loop conditions are closed by construction. The manifest and the download
come from one buffer hashed once, so a checksum cannot describe bytes we are not
serving. And the version is stamped into autorun.brs at build time by both
builders, so the script reports the version it actually is — otherwise the player
applies the update, still reports the old version, and is offered the same
package forever.
Failure always degrades to "keep running the old version": an unreachable
manifest, a missing checksum, a failed verification, a full attempt counter and
an unbuildable package all resolve to skip.
998 tests pass (was 954).
st-sync.js wraps SyncManager, the native protocol. Three properties drove the
shape of it. It repeats the sync broadcast at 1Hz so a player powered on late
still joins, which means acting on every repeat would reload the video once a
second forever — on screen that reads as a stutter, not as a sync fault, so the
id dedupe is mandatory rather than an optimisation. The leader starts from its
OWN broadcast rather than at announce() time, or it runs ahead of the group by
the width of the network. And attachVideo refuses an element with no
setSyncParams instead of half-syncing it.
offline.html is the local fallback the host falls back to after three failed
loads. It names the server, keeps probing with capped backoff so a site full of
panels cannot storm a server that is coming back, and asks the HOST to restart
the player when it answers — never navigating itself, for the same reason the
player never reloads itself here.
The resolver now models multicast reach. All-BrightSign groups spread across
subnets no longer get native sync: each subnet would sync neatly within itself
while drifting from the others, and the dashboard would show a healthy group
throughout. The IP comparison is a heuristic so it is used in one direction
only — differing networks are evidence against, matching ones are never proof
for, and unknown addresses block nothing.
st-sync.js is served from its single source like the bridge, and the SD card
deliberately carries neither: the player pulls both from the server so a stale
copy on a card can never skew from the player using it.
948 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
The bridge and the host existed but nothing loaded them. Now the player does.
restartPlayer() replaces every location.reload() call site. On BrightSign a
page-initiated reload does not reliably bring the roHtmlWidget back, so the page
asks the host to rebuild it and only falls back to reload() when no host is
there to take the request. That covers the deploy path, the operator refresh,
the service-worker activation and the manual reset.
Identity now round-trips through the registry, which outlives localStorage on
this platform: getConfig() adopts a registry identity when local storage comes
back empty, instead of re-pairing and spawning a second row for a panel that is
already provisioned. The operator reset clears the registry too — otherwise it
would clear localStorage, get the same identity straight back on the next boot,
and reset nothing.
Registration reports platform 'brightsign' rather than "Chrome 120", which is
what sync-backend.js resolves native-vs-ours from, plus model, OS, serial and
which output this widget paints.
Dual output needed a collision fix: autorun.brs gives the second HDMI output its
own widget, and both widgets share an origin, a registry and one SD
storage_path. Un-namespaced, output 2 would read output 1's config, install salt
and device id and the two would collapse into a single device row. Storage keys
and registry keys are now suffixed per output; screen 1 keeps the bare names so
nothing existing moves.
The bridge is served from its single source so the copy the player loads can
never skew from the one on the SD card next to autorun.brs, and it is served to
every player rather than gated on a user agent — a panel reporting an unexpected
UA would otherwise silently lose restart-instead-of-reload.
Two test harnesses extract player functions and run them in an isolated scope,
so they now supply SCREEN_SUFFIX; one gained a case proving two outputs of one
player get distinct identities. 927 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
1.9.26's opt-in was passive: it stopped a sideloaded build being reverted, but there was still one
APK slot and latest_version was the server's own VERSION, so a beta had to be installed by hand on
every display. This makes it a real channel.
- apk-cache tracks two slots. ScreenTinker-beta.apk is optional and reaches only displays with
ota_beta = 1.
- A beta must DECLARE its version in a sidecar ScreenTinker-beta.apk.version. The server cannot
infer it — stable's version is the server's own constant because the two ship together, and
reading it from the APK means parsing binary AndroidManifest.xml on the request path. If the
sidecar is missing or unparseable the channel does not activate at all and opted-in displays keep
getting stable. Failing closed matters: advertising a version that does not match the bytes served
is the OTA-loop condition this fleet has been bitten by before.
- The check and the download resolve the channel identically and fall back to stable identically, so
apk_size always describes the bytes actually delivered. No APK change was needed — the client
already fetches whatever download_url it is handed, so displays in the field can be moved between
channels from the dashboard today.
Switching back needed care. Stable is semver-OLDER than the beta it replaces, so the ordinary
"never offer a downgrade" rule stranded the display and unticking the box would have been another
silent no-op. The first attempt returned any non-opted-in display running a pre-release — which
broke a #144 test, correctly: that would have dragged every existing pre-release tester back to
stable the moment their server upgraded, the exact harm the opt-in exists to prevent. So the return
now requires evidence we actually served that display the beta channel (devices.ota_channel_served,
written once on change, not per check). A tester ahead of the server on their own build is left
alone exactly as before.
Documented in the README, including the constraint that makes the switch-back physically possible:
beta builds must carry a versionCode no higher than the stable they branch from, because Android
refuses to install a lower one. Equal numbers install in both directions.
Verified end to end against a live server with two real signed APKs: stable serves 1.9.26, beta
serves 1.9.27-rc1, an unknown channel falls back to stable, removing the version file deactivates
the channel, and the full opt-in -> serve -> switch-back lifecycle produces offer / up-to-date /
channel-return in order. 859 server tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
Handing someone a test build was a trap. A prerelease sorts BELOW its own release — 1.9.25-fix234d
is semver-older than 1.9.25 — so a sideloaded display asked "anything newer?", was correctly told
yes, and updated itself straight back off the build we had asked someone to test. Same versionCode,
so Android installed it without complaint. Silent, and within minutes.
That is what happened on #234: the reporter installed the fix, tested for an evening, and reported
nothing had changed. They were right. Their tablet was running the old code again by then, and I had
told them it was fixed without ever checking what the device reported.
Adds a per-display opt-in (devices.ota_beta, default 0, checkbox next to the OTA toggle). When set,
the display keeps a prerelease of the CURRENT core instead of being pulled back to its release.
Deliberately narrow in one direction and deliberately wide in the other:
- Narrow: it only holds a prerelease of the core already installed. A plain release, a -patchN
build, an upgrade to a newer core, and a display ahead of the server all behave exactly as before,
and the flag defaults off so a fleet that never sets it is unaffected.
- Wide: an opted-in display is exempted from the superseded-prerelease guard. That guard would
otherwise pin a tester on an old test build permanently — an older-core prerelease is never
offered anything, so they would have to notice and sideload their way out. Writing the test is
what surfaced that; opting in must never mean never updating again.
9 tests covering both directions, including that shipping a newer release pulls a beta display back
onto the release line. 845 server tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
A player stands down from self-updating when another device owner manages the panel,
on the assumption that the MDM distributes packages instead. That assumption does not
always hold: an operator may run an MDM for policy alone and still want ScreenTinker's
OTA to own the player. Until now there was no way to say so — the stand-down was a
client-side decision with no operator input.
OTA_ALLOW_MANAGED_DEVICES=1 makes the server advertise `allow_managed: true` in
/api/update/check, and players skip the stand-down. Default off: the safe behaviour
stays the default, and only an explicit opt-in changes it.
Absence is not consent. The client parses the field with a false default, so a newer
player against an older server that has never heard of it still stands down; and the
server always emits the key, so a player can tell "the operator said no" from "this
server has no opinion". Config parsing is strict for the same reason — only 1/true
enable it, and anything else, including a plausible typo like "ture" or "yes", lands
on the safe side rather than riding JavaScript truthiness.
This deliberately does NOT grant silent install. Off device-owner, and without
DELEGATION_PACKAGE_INSTALLATION delegated by the MDM, Android still raises a confirm
dialog somebody has to accept, so the override alone will not fix a fleet whose
installs are failing at that dialog — delegating the scope is the real fix there. The
README says so at the point of use, because reaching for this flag is the natural
mistake.
Only reachable because the stand-down now runs after the version check rather than
before it; it needs the server's answer in hand to consult.
The auth limiters are app.use middleware that return 429 before the handler
that writes activity_log, so a rejection left no trace anywhere — the limit
suppressed the record of itself. Four production IPs sit at exactly ten logins
a minute and there was no way to tell whether that is one attacker or an office
whose staff share an egress address, which is the difference between the
limiter working and the limiter locking out customers.
The rejection count does not answer that. The number of distinct accounts per
IP does: one account hammered is the limiter doing its job, several accounts
each denied a few times is a shared egress. Both are now recorded, and a
platform-admin-only endpoint reads the tally back.
Identifiers are salted-hashed with a per-process salt and only ever counted, so
this cannot accumulate into a roster of a customer's addresses. Memory is
bounded per key and overall, and says when a count was capped rather than
silently undercounting.
Behaviour is unchanged: same status, same body, and the recording is wrapped so
telemetry can never break the limiter. A test asserts ten through then 429 with
the identical response shape, since a diagnostic that alters what it measures
is worse than none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
Until now the only ways back into an account were an admin setting your password for you
or shell access to run scripts/reset-admin.js. A self-hosted operator who forgot their
password had no path at all, and the admin-reset route explicitly refuses to reset a
platform admin's password — so a single-admin instance was unrecoverable without a shell.
The per-account login lockout added recently makes that sharper: a user who forgets their
password will hit the lockout and see the same generic error, with no way out.
Two unauthenticated endpoints (they must be — the user cannot log in):
POST /api/auth/forgot-password { email } -> always the same 200
POST /api/auth/reset-password { token, password } -> 200 / 400
The properties that matter, each covered by a test:
- NO ENUMERATION. The request endpoint answers identically — same status, same body —
for a real address, an unknown one, an SSO identity with no local password, and a
malformed string. The frontend shows the same confirmation even on a network error,
so the client cannot leak what the server refused to.
- NO MFA BYPASS. Completing a reset does NOT issue a session; the user signs in
afterwards, so a TOTP-enabled account still clears its second factor. Returning a token
here would turn "read one email" into a full session without the second factor.
- SINGLE USE, SHORT LIVED. 32 random bytes, stored only as a SHA-256 hash (same
discipline as email verification, recovery codes and API tokens), 1h TTL, and the
redeeming UPDATE is conditioned on the hash still being present so concurrent
redemptions cannot both win.
- LOCAL ACCOUNTS ONLY. SSO identities have no local password; no token is minted.
- IT ACTUALLY UNBLOCKS YOU. A completed reset clears the per-account login lockout and
must_change_password, otherwise someone who locked themselves out would reset and still
be locked out.
Rate limited: 5/min on the request (it sends mail to a caller-supplied address), 10/min
on the redeem. If no email transport is configured the response is unchanged — no oracle —
but the server logs loudly, because the user will otherwise wait for mail that cannot
arrive and the generic response cannot tell them.
Frontend: a "Forgot your password?" link on the sign-in card, a request card, and a
new-password card. app.js had to learn #/reset-password explicitly — the auth guard
rewrites any unauthenticated hash to #/login, which would have discarded the one-time
token in the emailed link and made it silently do nothing.
Migration adds users.password_reset_hash / password_reset_expires: additive, nullable,
idempotent; a code-only rollback leaves two dead columns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A screen that was still connected and still displaying its pairing code could not be
paired. Reloading the player produced the same code, and the on-screen instruction
("restart the display to get a new code") could not help.
devices.created_at is written once, at first registration, and the row is never recreated:
a player persists its device_id and its pairing code in local storage and re-registers
with them forever. Expiry was measured from created_at, so 15 minutes after first boot the
row became permanently unclaimable while the device kept heartbeating — and a restart
reused the stored identity and reproduced the same code, so there was no way out.
Observed in production: an unclaimed web player, still online and heartbeating, whose row
was created 4 days 20 hours earlier and had been unpairable for all but its first 15
minutes. Prod is carrying several such rows; alpha has some 13 days old.
Key expiry on last_heartbeat instead, falling back to created_at for a row that has never
checked in. That answers the question the operator actually has — is this screen still
there showing me this code? — while keeping the property the expiry exists for: a device
that has genuinely gone away still expires.
Trade-off, taken deliberately: a code stays claimable while its screen is connected rather
than for a fixed 15 minutes. That is what the product implies, since the code is on the
screen the whole time, and guessing is bounded by lib/pair-lockout (5 failures per IP per
15 min) and the 5/min route limit rather than by this TTL.
SERVER-ONLY. The player's device:registered handler reads only device_id and device_token
and has no way to display a server-issued code, so reissuing one would have left fielded
players showing a stale code — strictly worse. This fix needs no player update and
un-strands every already-affected device in the field on deploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The on-device settings PIN (devices.settings_pin, minted at pairing) and the pairing code
assigned to imported devices both came from
`Math.floor(100000 + Math.random() * 900000)`.
Math.random is not a CSPRNG. V8 implements it as xorshift128+, whose internal state is
recoverable from a handful of consecutive outputs, and every call in a process draws from
that one shared stream. Both values are also observable by ordinary users — settings_pin
is returned in device API responses today — so a user who collects a few outputs could
predict the values minted around them, including for other tenants.
lib/numeric-code.sixDigitCode() uses crypto.randomInt, which is CSPRNG-backed and
rejection-samples so the distribution stays uniform. Range is 100000..999999 inclusive,
identical to the old expression, so codes are still exactly six digits with no leading
zero — the on-device keypad and pairing UI are unchanged.
Deliberately NOT converted, because neither gates access: the image-generation seed in
lib/image-gen.js, and the anti-burn-in pixel jitter inside generated widget HTML.
Also unchanged: the settings_pin backfill in db/database.js, which uses SQLite's random()
— that is ChaCha20 seeded from OS entropy, not a weak PRNG.
This is the generator half of the finding only. The separate half — that settings_pin is
returned to every workspace member, including read-only roles — is a response-shape change
and waits on the consumer enumeration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /api/devices/:id/screenshot returns a live picture of what a screen is showing, but
it was still authorized pre-tenancy: `device.user_id !== user.id`, with a role bypass
listing 'admin'/'superadmin'. Three consequences, all now covered by tests:
- `device.user_id &&` SHORT-CIRCUITED. A device with no user_id — never paired, or its
owner deleted — skipped the ownership test entirely, so any authenticated account on the
instance could read it. An unpaired panel displays its pairing code on screen, so that
image is also a route to claiming the device (AUTH-10, out of scope here but connected).
- 'platform_admin' was absent from the bypass list. #14 renamed 'superadmin' to
'platform_admin', so an actual platform admin fell through to the ownership test and was
denied unless they happened to own the row.
- Workspace members other than the owner were denied a device they administer through
every other endpoint.
Now uses accessContext() against the device's workspace — the same helper routes/devices.js
uses — which covers direct membership, org-level access and platform staff in one call. A
device with no workspace is denied outright rather than defaulting open.
Deliberately unchanged: the ?token= query-parameter mechanism on this route, which is a
separate finding with its own blast radius.
No response shape change: still 200 / 401 / 403 / 404 with the same bodies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Uploaded files are served from the SAME ORIGIN as the dashboard, so how a browser
interprets them is a security boundary. Two things decided that interpretation, and
both were caller-controlled: the stored extension came from
`path.extname(originalname)`, and the only type check read `file.mimetype` — a request
header. A caller could therefore choose to have their bytes served as an active
document from the app origin.
Two independent invariants now hold the boundary:
1. INGEST — lib/upload-sniff.js sniffs magic bytes after multer writes a neutral
`.part` file (diskStorage names the file before any bytes exist, so the sniff cannot
happen there), maps the result through a hardcoded mime->extension allowlist, renames
accordingly, and stores the sniffed mime. Unsupported bytes are refused with a 400.
2. SERVING — upload responses carry `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox`, so if a response
is ever treated as a document it lands in an opaque origin with scripts disabled.
Anything outside the inline-safe extension set is additionally forced to download.
This holds regardless of how a file reached disk, so a future gap in (1) is contained
rather than exploitable.
Applied at every instance of the pattern, not just the first: lib/content-ingest.js,
the /replace route, the four content-serving paths across server.js and routes/content.js
(the latter pair currently shadowed by mount order, which is not a guarantee), and the
ZIP-import path in routes/status.js, which took its extension from the archive entry.
SVG stays accepted and stays inline: white-label logos are SVG, and octet-stream +
nosniff makes <img> fail. Scripts in an SVG never run in an image context, and the
sandbox CSP covers the one case where they would — a direct navigation. SVG is also no
longer handed to sharp, which removes the librsvg path where the open libvips CVEs live.
Existing rows are untouched — no migration. The four upload fixtures in agency.test.js
uploaded `Buffer.from('x')` declared as image/png; that is the exact "declared type is a
lie" case this closes, so the fixtures now use real PNG bytes. No assertion changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Six places verified a session JWT inline instead of going through requireAuth,
each repeating a slightly different subset of its checks. Introduce
resolveSessionUser() in middleware/auth.js as the single definition of "this
token is a usable session, and here is whose it is", and route all of them
through it: the three /api/status token routes, the screenshot route, the
content-reference gate, and the /dashboard socket handshake. requireAuth is now
a thin wrapper over the same helper, so the two cannot drift.
Also:
- Give the pre-TOTP token a distinct audience so it is redeemable only through
verifyMfaPendingToken (POST /api/auth/totp/verify). verifyToken refuses any
token carrying an audience, so a token minted for one purpose cannot be
redeemed on another path.
- The dashboard socket handshake now takes userId/userRole from the live users
row rather than from the token claim, so role changes take effect on the next
connection instead of riding the token's remaining lifetime.
- Add test/session-token-resolution.test.js covering all six surfaces,
including the socket handshake.
Every call site keeps the status code and error body it returned before.
Net query cost: the content-reference gate and the socket handshake each gain
one users-by-id lookup (the same one requireAuth already does per request); the
other four are unchanged or replace an equivalent lookup.
In-flight pre-TOTP tokens are invalidated by the audience change; they live 5
minutes, so the window is a re-login at worst.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add Device modal now shows the server URL and full Smart TV player URL
- Smart TV note changed from bare /player to full URL (dynamic via JS)
- /download/apk error page now includes a download link to GitHub Releases
- i18n keys added in en + es, old smart_tv_note removed
Three features from this session, full server suite green (535/535).
TOTP 2FA (#100) — backend shipped without a UI; add it:
- Login: mfa_required -> 6-digit challenge (recovery codes accepted) -> /totp/verify.
- Settings > Account: enable (QR + confirm -> recovery codes once), regenerate,
disable; SSO accounts see "managed by your identity provider".
- /totp/setup returns a server-rendered qr_data_url (bundled qrcode dep). keyuri
folds the request Host into the issuer so multi-instance accounts are
distinguishable in the authenticator app.
Email verification on signup — hosted HARD-block / self-host SOFT-nudge:
- email_verified column; existing users asked on first login (SSO + platform
admins grandfathered); single-use 24h tokens (SHA-256 hashed).
- Gate engages only when email is configured (never locks out a no-mail instance).
GET /verify-email + POST /resend-verification (generic, no account enumeration).
- Client: "confirm your email" flow + resend, verified/error toasts, self-host
banner; onAuthSuccess refuses a tokenless response (defensive).
Tizen SSSP URL-Launcher install — Fusion-style one-URL native install:
- Server hosts /tizen/sssp_config.xml (dynamic <size>, always matches the served
.wgt) + /tizen/ScreenTinker.wgt + a human landing. lib/wgt-cache.js resolves the
signed .wgt (/data mount wins, mirroring the APK).
- build-wgt.sh also emits a static sssp_config.xml for CDN hosting.
- Retail panels require a Samsung Partner cert; dev-mode is SDB self-signed only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Compositor panel-ring board scroll (smooth on Blink+Gecko, no blank-on-refresh), a per-device frame-rate diagnostic widget + dashboard card, and web/Android/Tizen device-id passthrough to widget render URLs.
Follow-up to #195. The CORP fix there landed on routes/content.js `/:id/file`, but that
handler is SHADOWED: server.js registers a public `app.get('/api/content/:id/file')`
(and `/thumbnail`) BEFORE the auth-gated content router, and that public route (gated by
playlist/widget reference) is what actually serves widget logo/background images. So the
header never changed on the wire — origin still returned CORP: same-origin and the player's
sandboxed (opaque-origin) widget iframe kept getting NS_ERROR_DOM_CORP_FAILED / 0 bytes.
Set Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * + Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: cross-origin on the real
public routes in server.js: /file, /thumbnail (local), and the remote-thumbnail proxy.
Revert the now-dead content.js edit so the fix lives only where the bytes are served.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(widgets): add directory-search widget
An interactive, walk-up search view of an existing directory-board. It
references a source board by id (no data copy), so a venue can run the
scrolling board on a main screen and a search view on a tablet, letting
people find an entry instantly.
Server (routes/widgets.js):
- register 'directory-search' + renderDirectorySearch(): resolves the source
board, inlines its categories as one \u003c-guarded JSON blob, renders all
text via textContent (XSS-safe), live case-insensitive filter over
identifier/name/subtitle (debounced), grouped results, available styling,
optional touch on-screen QWERTY keyboard that drives the same filter path.
- missing / non-directory-board source -> friendly full-page fallback, not a 500.
- live-sync while open is out of scope; left a // TODO for a poll hook.
Frontend editor (views/widgets.js): type + magnifier icon, source-board
dropdown (from loaded widgets, filtered to directory-board), title, logo
(reuses the board's picker), placeholder text, theme, on-screen-keyboard toggle;
getConfigFromForm case. i18n: widget.dirsearch.* + type keys in en/es/it/de/pt/fr.
docs: openapi widget_type enum. Tests: server/test/directory-search.test.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(widgets): live-sync for directory-search (poll source board, no reload)
Reflect directory-board edits on an open directory-search page without a reload.
- New public GET /api/widgets/:id/data.json returns { categories } for a
directory-board (404 for missing/wrong-type so the page keeps last-good data
on a transient miss). CORS-open (ACAO:*) + no-store so a null-origin sandboxed
widget iframe can read it; exposes only data already public via /render.
Exempted from CSP + auth in server.js alongside /render.
- directory-search page inlines its source_widget_id and polls the board's
data.json every 30s via a relative URL (works behind a proxy/base path and
from a null-origin iframe). Only rebuilds + rerenders when the data actually
changed, so a mid-search view isn't disturbed; skips while document.hidden;
keeps last-good data on any fetch error. Flatten logic factored into
buildFlat() and reused by the poll.
Tests: data.json feed (categories, CORS header, 404s) + poll wiring in
directory-search.test.js (13/13). Verified live in a browser (page.clock
fast-forward): editing the board updates the search page with no reload.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(android): let player WebViews take touch focus for interactive widgets
directory-search is served through the existing generic widget path
(loadUrl <server>/api/widgets/:id/render), so it already renders on Android
with JS + DOM storage + mixed-content enabled, same-origin (so its live-sync
fetch of the source board's data.json works), and no touch blocking.
Add isFocusable/isFocusableInTouchMode to the shared WebView config so the
search field reliably takes a tap/cursor inside the kiosk lock-task WebView.
Harmless for passive widgets (board/YouTube have no focusable inputs); the
widget's own on-screen keyboard still drives the filter when the system IME
is suppressed. Verified with :app:compileDebugKotlin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a pluggable email transport so self-hosters without Azure/M365 can send
mail through any standard SMTP server (Postfix, Gmail, Mailgun, SendGrid, corp
relay). Graph stays the default; behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged when
EMAIL_TRANSPORT is unset or "graph".
- config: EMAIL_TRANSPORT ("graph"|"smtp", default graph) + SMTP_HOST/PORT/
SECURE/USER/PASSWORD/FROM.
- services/email.js: branch by transport behind the SAME public sendEmail()/
isConfigured() surface. SMTP via nodemailer (lazy-required, like MSAL).
Shared across both transports: the "[ScreenTinker] " subject prefix (unless
rawSubject), the GRAPH_DEV_RESTRICT_TO allow-list, html-from-text derivation,
and the never-throws contract (failures log + return sent:false). SMTP_SECURE
true=implicit TLS(465)/false=STARTTLS(587). Auth optional (unauthenticated
relay ok); SMTP_USER without SMTP_PASSWORD is flagged. SMTP_FROM parses
"Name <addr>". New emailConfigStatus() for startup diagnostics.
- server.js: startup logs the transport and a LOUD error when the selected
transport is partially configured (some fields set, others missing) or when
EMAIL_TRANSPORT is invalid (falls back to graph). A fully-unset transport
stays a silent stdout fallback (unchanged dev behavior).
- nodemailer ^6.9.16 added as a production dep (bundled in the Docker image).
- .env.example + README: SMTP config section, Gmail example, transport table.
- test/email-transport.test.js: 15 tests — transport selection, config
validation (missing/partial/invalid), SMTP message building (from/prefix/
fromName override/text alt), sendEmail routing (mocked nodemailer), rawSubject,
dev-restrict on smtp, and the smtp_error never-throws path.
462/462 server tests pass. Boot verified for all four states (configured,
misconfigured, invalid, default).
Closes#173
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
express.static runs with index:false, so a bare /integrations/ fell through to the
SPA catch-all and rendered the dashboard login instead of the integrations hub — the
top-nav "Integrations" link, the canonical, and the sitemap entry all dead-ended at
login. Add an explicit route (like /agency, /sitemap.xml): /integrations/ -> the hub's
index.html, and /integrations -> 301 /integrations/. Spoke pages are real .html files
already served by static. Folded into a re-cut of v1.9.6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(dashboard): version indicator + GHCR update check with admin panel
- Add server/lib/ghcr-check.js: GHCR tag poller (36h cache, semver filter)
- Extend /api/version with latest_version and update_available
- Add POST /api/admin/check-update (force GHCR poll)
- Add POST /api/admin/trigger-update (Docker compose or manual instructions)
- Sidebar footer: version label + amber badge when update available
- Admin > System: version comparison card with Check/Update buttons
- 14 new tests (10 unit + 4 integration), 68/68 passing
Closes#163
* fix(dashboard): gate trigger-update to platform-admin + add GHCR fetch timeout
Review follow-up on #165 (the two blockers):
- trigger-update runs `docker compose up -d` on the HOST via docker.sock
(root-equivalent) but was behind requireAdmin, i.e. reachable by any
workspace-level admin. On a multi-tenant host that's a customer, not the infra
operator. Gate it with requirePlatformAdmin (DOCKER_UPDATE_ENABLED still gates
it further). check-update stays requireAdmin — it's a read-only GHCR poll.
- ghcr-check.checkNow had no fetch timeout. Node's global fetch has no default
timeout, so a hung GHCR connection never settled — leaving `inFlight` set
forever (the finally never ran), which wedged the background poller AND hung
any awaited checkNow (/api/admin/check-update). Add a 10s AbortController
timeout on both requests so the try/catch/finally always fire.
All 405 server tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: ScreenTinker <hello@screentinker.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lets an operator (or an MDM) own updates instead of the app self-installing, which
on managed panels shows a self-install confirm dialog over customer content
(#155). Three layered controls:
- GLOBAL (server): config.otaEnabled from OTA_ENABLED (default on). When off,
/api/update/check returns update_available:false, reason:ota_disabled_global —
the whole instance stops offering updates.
- PER-DEVICE (server + dashboard): new devices.ota_enabled column (default 1). When
0, that device is never offered an update (reason:ota_disabled_device). A
"Self-update (OTA)" toggle in the device settings flips it via PUT /api/devices/:id.
- AUTO-DETECT (Android): UpdateChecker stands down entirely when a foreign device
owner (an MDM/DPC) manages the panel — detected via getActiveAdmins() + not being
device owner ourselves. Pure client-side, errs safe, needs no server change.
The two server gates are enforced server-side so they cover EVERY client version,
not just ones with the client-side stand-down. When OTA is off the device still
reports its version (dashboard sees state); the MDM/operator owns the actual update.
For an MDM-managed fleet (e.g. Pivot/MAXHUB), turn OTA off and let the MDM push the
APK — the install-dialog race disappears from every angle.
Tests: +2 (per-device gate + a real OTA_ENABLED=false server for the global gate);
full server suite 393 pass; Android compiles.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove stray brace that broke compilation (MainActivity line 985)
- Server generates unique 6-digit PIN per device during pairing
- PIN stored in encrypted SharedPreferences (ServerConfig.settingsPin)
- Fallback: generate random PIN locally if server doesn't send one
- Include settings_pin in device:paired on pair + reconnect
- DB migration: settings_pin column on devices table
- Hint changed from hardcoded 0000 to generic 'PIN' string
* fix(preview): replace srcdoc with server-side preview sessions to bypass CSP
Widget previews (clock, weather, etc.) were rendered via iframe.srcdoc,
which inherits the dashboard CSP script-src 'self'. This blocked the inline
scripts widgets need (setInterval for clock, fetch for weather), causing
previews to show blank/static content.
Replace srcdoc with ephemeral server-side preview sessions:
- POST /api/widgets/preview-session — stores rendered HTML (Map, 5min TTL)
- GET /api/widgets/preview-session/:id — serves the HTML via iframe src,
bypassing CSP like the device render endpoint already does
The old /api/widgets/preview endpoint is unchanged for backward compat.
* fix(preview): add rate limiter for /preview-session route
---------
Co-authored-by: BlazzzPlay <fabianma7@gmail.com>
The dashboard CSP (script-src 'self') blocked Cloudflare's Web Analytics beacon. Add the two exact
entries the beacon needs (both required — script-only loads but silently can't report):
- script-src: https://static.cloudflareinsights.com (beacon script loads)
- connect-src: https://cloudflareinsights.com (beacon POSTs analytics back)
Exact domains, no wildcards. connect-src already had 'wss:'/'ws:' (socket.io) + 'https:' — those stay,
so the dashboard socket is unaffected; the explicit CF domain documents intent and survives any future
tightening of the broad 'https:'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Disable wal_autocheckpoint on the main connection; run PASSIVE checkpoints from a
worker_threads worker with its OWN better-sqlite3 handle, escalating to TRUNCATE on a
size high-water or PASSIVE-starvation. Removes the synchronous fsync-heavy checkpoint
from the event loop. Config: walCheckpointIntervalMs/HighWaterMB/StarvationRuns.
Local only — no bump/tag.
Field-safe SERVER net. A device opening duplicate/rapid sockets (the APK duplicate-socket bug,
separate track) currently churns through evictions during the reconnect-throttle's 30s
post-restart WARM-UP (only the hard ceiling 20 applies then, so an 8-in-9s burst passes
undamped and each new socket evicts the prior). This makes the server absorb it: a thrashing
PAIRED device converges to ONE stable connection and stays online.
- lib/session-settle.js (decision only; bounded, swept): shouldHold(deviceId, incumbentAlive)
— true only when a socket was accepted for this device within SESSION_SETTLE_WINDOW_MS
(config, default 2500ms) AND the incumbent is alive. Warm-up-independent.
- deviceSocket register gate (just before evictPriorSocket): if a LIVE incumbent exists and
we're inside the window, SOFT-REFUSE the new socket (device:throttled reason=session_settle
+ disconnect) and keep the incumbent; else accept + evict + (re)arm the window.
- LIVENESS SAFEGUARD (load-bearing): only hold when the incumbent socket is actually in the
/device namespace — a dead/half-open incumbent is replaced, NEVER stranding the device (max
hold is the 2.5s window from the incumbent's accept, then any new socket is accepted).
- Soft refusal, NEVER a quarantine (reuses patch1's paired-safe philosophy); single-session
enforcement intact for a legitimate move; unpaired/abusive flapping still caught by the
existing limiters. O(1), no loop impact.
Tests (liveness first-class): live incumbent holds + DEAD incumbent replaced (not stranded);
storm of 6 sockets converges to ONE, stays online, not quarantined (during warm-up); single-
session move past the window replaces cleanly; unit decision + bounded sweep. The
evicted-socket-rearm test shrinks its settle window so it still exercises the eviction path.
Suite 336/336.
Item 2: when the heartbeat checker marks a device offline it now also disconnects any socket
it still holds for it, so DB-offline can't diverge from socket-state into a silent half-open
(defensive — the live-socket guard already defers genuinely-live sockets).
Item 3: tighten half-open detection WITHOUT reintroducing the TV-WebKit decode-load risk the
30s pong-timeout was chosen for — lower only pingInterval 30s->15s (probe more often), KEEP
pingTimeout at 30s. Detection = interval+timeout = 45s (was 60s), and the client inherits
these via the handshake so BOTH ends detect a dead peer ~25% sooner. (Deliberately did NOT
drop pingTimeout to ~20s: MAXHUB is a video-playing TV-class device and the code comment
warns tighter timeouts cause spurious drops under decode load.)
Item 4: SO_KEEPALIVE on every accepted connection (lib/tcp-keepalive.js) so a half-open TCP
can't persist indefinitely at the OS layer, independent of the app ping.
Tests: server closes a non-ponging peer within ~pingInterval+pingTimeout while a ponging peer
survives; a device whose transport dies ends offline with its connection torn down; keepalive
applied to each accepted connection (and never breaks setup on error). Suite 328/328.
ROOT CAUSE (hypothesis A, pre-existing — NOT a beta7 regression; server/player/index.html
is untouched since v1.9.2-beta6): handlePlaylistUpdate's "Playlist unchanged" branch blindly
returned. The media re-attach (renderContent) lives ONLY in the content-changed branch, so
if the <video> surface was lost (element detached from the DOM while still decoding — video
gone, audio still playing) a no-new-content refresh never re-attached it. New-content
refreshes were fine because they re-render.
FIX (make the refresh idempotent for the media surface, no flicker on the healthy path):
- server/lib/player-media-health.js (new, UMD + unit-testable, mirrors schedule-eval.js):
needsReattach(state) — re-attach ONLY when playback should be happening but the current
item's surface is actually lost (video null / detached / ended / errored; non-video: no
mounted surface). A healthy attached+live video returns false, so a routine poll stays a
no-op (no re-render, no flicker). Served at /player/player-media-health.js from the single
source; loaded by the player.
- index.html no-change branch: extract the current item's DOM facts and, iff
PlayerMediaHealth.needsReattach, call playCurrentItem() to re-render the current item.
Wrapped so the health check can never break a refresh.
- teardownCurrentMedia: also release currentVideoEl even when it was DETACHED from the
container — a detached-but-playing <video> keeps emitting audio and the container-scoped
querySelectorAll can't find it. This kills the "ghost audio" on re-attach.
- sw.js cache bumped v9 -> v10 so players pick up the new index.html + module.
Tests: test/player-media-health.test.js (6) exercises the branch selection — healthy video
-> no re-attach; detached/null/ended/errored -> re-attach; idle -> never; non-video by
surface presence. Inline player JS syntax-checked; module served + referenced verified on a
booted server. Suite 316/316.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Least-privilege way to read GET /api/billing/usage without requiring platform admin.
Additive + isolated: reuses the existing api_tokens scope system (the off-ladder 'agency'
scope is the precedent) and does NOT touch the shared role/permission checks other
endpoints rely on.
- New off-ladder scope 'billing:read' (routes/tokens.js SCOPES). Like 'agency' it is NOT
on the read<write<full ladder, so tokenScopeGate rejects a billing token on every
PUBLIC_ROUTER and JWT-only routers reject any st_ token -> the scope grants billing-read
and NOTHING else.
- DUAL-PATH gate requireBillingRead (middleware/apiToken.js), written as an EXPLICIT OR:
authorize if (billing:read token) OR (platform-admin session). Admins keep read access
but are NOT required to; the token path doesn't lock out admins or vice versa. Billing
route now mounted with bearerAuth (token OR JWT front door) + requireBillingRead (was
requireAuth + requirePlatformAdmin).
- MINTING is platform-admin only (stricter than read/write/full/agency, which any
workspace member may mint) since a billing:read token grants GLOBAL billing-read. Note:
no finer "owner" tier exists here (#14 collapsed superadmin->platform_admin), so
PLATFORM_ROLES is the top level required.
Tests (5, test/billing-authz.test.js): dual-path positive (token AND admin session both
200) + negative (user 403 / anon 401); scope isolation (billing token 403 on /api/devices,
401 on /api/admin; read token 200 on devices but 403 on billing); minting owner-only
(user + ordinary-admin 403, platform-admin 201); revocation -> 401. Existing token
firewall/partition suite (api.test.js) + billing-endpoint tests unchanged & green. Reused
the exact SHA-256 token-verification path (no bcrypt/new mechanism). Suite 306/306.
NOTE: spec described bcrypt + JSON `scopes` + an analytics:read precedent; this codebase
actually uses SHA-256 + a single `scope` TEXT column + 'agency' as the off-ladder
precedent. Implemented faithfully to the real system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
