A never-visited org had no cached white-label, so brand-prime fell through to the
ScreenTinker default baked into the static index.html and flashed it before
branding.js fetched the org brand. Now the /app route injects the resolved
instance / custom-domain branding into the shell as a <meta name="ssr-brand">
(CSP blocks inline <script>, so a meta carries it), and brand-prime applies that
as the fallback when the per-workspace brand is not cached yet - so the page
paints the configured brand on first load instead of ScreenTinker.
- server.js: /app resolves branding (publicBranding strips internal columns) and
injects the HTML-escaped JSON as a meta tag; falls back to plain sendFile on
any error so branding can never break the app shell.
- brand-prime.js: read meta[name=ssr-brand] when there is no rd_branding_<ws>.
Verified: the meta carries the resolved brand (default ScreenTinker and a
platform-default white-label), internal columns do not leak, 66 unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- .github/workflows/release.yml: on a v* tag - verify the tag matches VERSION
(fail-fast guard), run tests, build a source tarball + the unsigned Tizen .wgt
and publish a GitHub Release with generated notes, and build+push a multi-arch
(amd64 + arm64) image to ghcr.io/screentinker/screentinker:<version> + :latest.
The Release (artifacts) and the docker push are independent jobs, so an
arm64/QEMU docker failure does not block the GitHub Release and is re-runnable.
Nothing deploys to prod. APK-build-in-CI left as a TODO (keystore secret).
- Dockerfile + .dockerignore: multi-stage node:20-slim image with server +
frontend + VERSION + scripts; DATA_DIR=/data volume for db/uploads/jwt-secret.
Verified to build, boot, serve the dashboard + web player, and persist state.
- docker-compose.example.yml: /data volume, SELF_HOSTED, a node-fetch healthcheck
against /api/status, and an admin-lockout recovery note (reset-admin.js).
- server.js: resolve the OTA APK from DATA_DIR first (a container can mount one
at /data/ScreenTinker.apk), fall back to the legacy in-repo path, 404 gracefully.
- ci.yml: bump checkout/setup-node to v6 (clears the Node-20 action deprecation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- server/version.js: shared version helper that reads the root VERSION file once
(fallback 0.0.0). Replaces the stale hardcoded 1.2.0 / 1.5.1 / 1.0.0 fallbacks
in /api/version, /api/update/check, and /api/status.
- config.js: DATA_DIR / DB_PATH / UPLOADS_DIR / CERTS_DIR env overrides for the
db, uploads, and certs/jwt-secret locations. Unset resolves to exactly the
legacy in-repo paths, so existing installs (including production) are
byte-for-byte unchanged. Guarded by test/config-paths.test.js.
- package.json: rename remote-display-server -> screentinker (+ lockfile name).
- scripts/bump-version.sh: one-shot bump across VERSION, package.json (+lock),
android (versionName and versionCode + 1), and the tizen widget version; makes
one commit plus an annotated tag; prints the push command, never pushes.
- .gitignore: global *.db / *.db-wal / *.db-shm / *.db.* so no database file
(including .db.devbak backups, at any path) can be committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Image generation reused the single (text-endpoint) API key, which breaks the
common 'local LLM with no key + OpenAI for images' setup. Add an optional
image_api_key (encrypted, write-only, never returned); generate-design uses it
for image calls and falls back to the main key when blank (all-OpenAI setups).
Local sd.cpp / ComfyUI still need no key. Schema column + migration.
A prompt now produces a full sign: the LLM writes the design AND image prompts,
the server generates the images and composites them with the crisp text layer.
- lib/image-gen.js: text-to-image with 3 BYO/self-hostable backends, all behind
the SSRF guard: 'sdcpp' (local stable-diffusion.cpp OpenAI-compatible server,
exact small sizes that fit VRAM), 'openai' (cloud / OpenAI-compatible, snapped
sizes), 'comfyui' (prompt/history/view API).
- ai.js: prompt asks for a background_prompt (preferred — full-bleed atmosphere)
and an optional foreground image element; after the design is normalized, the
bg + fg images are generated best-effort (a failed image never fails the sign)
and returned as data URLs. New image_* settings (provider/base_url/model),
image_provider whitelist, schema column + migration.
- designer.js: AI-images section in settings; generate applies the background
image; publish bakes the background image into the HTML so it survives.
- server.js: raise JSON body limit to 12mb for embedded image data URLs.
Verified end-to-end on local Vulkan SDXL (RTX 5090): prompt -> bg+fg images on
the canvas -> publish creates a widget with the images embedded. 63/63.
Note: prod (not self-hosted) requires a PUBLIC image endpoint (e.g. OpenAI); the
SSRF guard blocks localhost there. Follow-up: upload generated images to the
content store and reference by URL to avoid multi-MB widget configs.
Models sometimes stacked text lines at the same y (unreadable) and emitted accent
shapes after text, so a band could hide the words.
- deoverlapTexts: push a line down only when it also overlaps horizontally
(leaves side-by-side text alone), with conservative line-height clearance so
real rendering doesn't re-overlap; shift the stack up if it ran past the bottom.
- Order shapes before text in the output so accent bands always render behind the
words.
Verified: 0 text-on-text overlaps across multiple prompts (Playwright DOM check);
unit test asserts overlapping lines get separated + shapes precede text. 63/63.
Text could run off the edge (long/large headlines, nowrap) and shapes placed at
the far edge (e.g. a bottom band at y=100) spilled over.
- Server-side fit pass on every generated element: shrink text fontSize so it
fits the canvas width (chars*fontSize*0.075, tuned for bold/uppercase
headlines) and height (incl. line-height), then nudge x/y within 4% margins;
clamp shapes so x+width<=100 and y+height<=100. Deterministic - doesn't rely on
the model getting layout right.
- Designer preview: vw -> cqw (+ container-type on the canvas) so text scales to
the canvas, not the browser window. The preview was overstating size vs what
actually publishes; now it matches. Published widget keeps vw (scales on the
player).
Verified: Playwright DOM check shows zero elements overflowing the canvas after
generation; unit test asserts long text is shrunk + repositioned in-bounds. 62/62.
- POST /api/ai/models lists the configured endpoint's models (OpenAI-compatible
/models) so the settings modal can populate a 'Load models' dropdown instead of
requiring users to type the model name. Combobox (datalist) so they can still
type a custom one. Admin only; same SSRF guard; uses the posted or saved key.
- Bump generate-design timeout 120s -> 180s for slow local endpoints.
Competitor pressure (Mandoe 'AI Magic Create'): prompt -> signage. We answer it
in a way that's actually BETTER for signage and costs the operator nothing.
Key idea: don't generate raw images (AI garbles text - fatal for menus/promos).
The LLM returns a STRUCTURED design spec (headline, supporting text, accent
shapes, palette) that the existing Designer renders with real fonts - crisp and
fully editable. Reuses the whole Designer.
BYOK, fully under the customer's control: each workspace configures its own
OpenAI-COMPATIBLE endpoint + key - OpenAI cloud OR self-hosted (Ollama / LM Studio
/ llama.cpp). Operator bears zero AI cost/liability.
- server/lib/secretbox.js: AES-256-GCM for the key at rest (never returned).
- routes/ai.js: GET/PUT /api/ai/settings (admin; key write-only) + POST
/generate-design (editor+). Output is strictly validated/normalized (cap count,
clamp ranges, px->%, strip HTML, validate colors) - never trust the model.
SSRF guard: hosted instances block private/internal targets; self-hosted (the
whole point of local AI) may point at localhost/LAN.
- Designer: an 'AI generate' panel (prompt + Generate) + a settings modal.
Verified end-to-end against local Ollama (llama3.1:8b): prompt -> editable design
on the canvas. Unit tests cover normalization + the SSRF guard. Suite 61/61.
Phase 2 (next): AI background images (OpenAI images / AUTOMATIC1111).
After uploading, content thumbnails were blank until the item was added to a
playlist/widget. The public /api/content/:id/thumbnail (and /file) endpoints are
reference-gated (an anonymous player with a UUID must not pull arbitrary tenants'
media), and a plain <img> can't send a Bearer token - so a just-uploaded item 403'd.
- Backend: add an authenticated bypass - a logged-in user who can access the
content's workspace (verified from the Bearer token) may view its file/thumbnail
even when unreferenced. Anonymous players still hit the reference gate.
- Frontend: the content library lazy-fetches thumbnails/previews WITH the token
and swaps in an object URL (IntersectionObserver keeps it under the rate limit;
the URL is revoked after load).
Verified: unreferenced thumbnail now 200 with a bearer token, still 403 anonymous.
Saving a layout grew its zone count on every server restart. Root cause: the
editor saved zones with a per-zone delete-then-POST loop, and POST /zones minted
a NEW uuid for every zone - so each save replaced the seeded ids (z-sh-1, ...)
with fresh uuids. schema.sql re-seeds template zones via INSERT OR IGNORE on every
boot, so the next restart re-added the now-missing canonical zone alongside the
renamed copy -> a 2-zone template became 4, 6, ... (worse for self-hosters who
rebuild often).
Fix:
- PUT /api/layouts/:id now accepts a zones[] and replaces them atomically in one
transaction, REUSING each zone's id when supplied. The editor sends the full
set in a single call, so the layout ends up with exactly those zones and ids
stay stable (also fixes fit_mode not persisting, and stops device->zone
assignments being orphaned by id churn).
- One-time dedupe migration removes positional-duplicate template zones, keeping
the canonical 'z-...' seeded id so the re-seed stays an idempotent no-op.
Verified: 2 atomic saves keep count + ids stable with fit updated; dedupe restores
a polluted 4-zone split template to its 2 canonical zones. Suite 56/56.
The boot summary counted any non-throwing statement, so UPDATE/index migrations
(which always succeed) made a healthy DB report 'applied N new column migration(s)'
every boot. Count only a successful ALTER ... ADD COLUMN (genuinely new), so the
line appears only when a column was actually added.
Self-hosters rebuilding could end up schema-behind-code, failing only at runtime
(a missing users.must_change_password locked out all logins). Two root causes:
1. The migration loop swallowed EVERY error (catch {}), so a real ALTER failure
was indistinguishable from the benign 'duplicate column' on an already-migrated
DB. Now only 'duplicate column'/'already exists' is treated as a no-op; any
other error is logged loudly, and a one-line summary reports how many new
column migrations actually applied this boot.
2. Nothing verified the schema after migrations. Added lib/schema-check.js:
verifyAndRepairSchema() checks the tables + columns the request path REQUIRES,
idempotently repairs missing repairable columns (logging each), and if anything
required is STILL missing, prints a loud FATAL block and exits - failing fast at
boot instead of at the first authed request.
Note: the reported 'audit_log missing' was a misdiagnosis - the code uses
activity_log (0 refs to audit_log), created by schema.sql on every boot.
Tests: healthy (no-op), auto-repair of must_change_password, missing-table report.
Platform admins can now cleanly remove a customer org (account ends) or a stray
workspace from the UI, instead of raw SQL that risks orphaning resources.
The tenant cascade isn't pure DB CASCADE - workspace-scoped tables (devices,
content, playlists, ...) are NO ACTION and must be purged before the workspace.
Extracted that logic out of deleteUserCascade into shared deleteWorkspaceCascade /
deleteOrgCascade helpers (one tested implementation; deleteUserCascade now reuses
the purgeWorkspaces extraction).
Backend (platform-admin only): GET /api/admin/orgs (list + owner + counts +
workspaces), DELETE /api/admin/orgs/:id, DELETE /api/admin/workspaces/:id.
UI: an Organizations section in Admin listing every org/workspace with a
type-the-name confirmation before the irreversible delete.
Tests: org/workspace cascade (real FKs) + endpoint gating/404. Suite 53/53.
MSPs onboarding customers as separate orgs had no way to create one with
AUTO_CREATE_ORG_ON_SIGNUP=false (the only path was signup auto-org). Add a
platform-admin 'Create organization' action.
POST /api/admin/orgs (requirePlatformAdmin) creates the org + its first 'Default'
workspace. organizations.owner_user_id is NOT NULL, so an org can't be ownerless;
the creating admin becomes org_owner + workspace_admin (mirrors the signup
bootstrap in routes/auth.js) - which also surfaces the org in their switcher.
Customer users are then added via the existing Add User / manage-memberships flow.
UI: 'Create organization' button + single-field modal in the Admin area (gated).
Tests: create (201 + memberships + audit), empty-name 400, non-admin/operator 403.
Multi-zone videos/images were cropped: every template zone inherited fit_mode
'cover' (fill+crop) and the layout editor had no control to change it, so a
landscape video in a tall split zone showed only a center strip. The player
already honors fit_mode (web object-fit, Android scaleType) - the gap was the UI
and the default. Add a per-zone Fit selector (Contain/Cover/Stretch) to the layout
editor, and make 'contain' (show the whole frame) the default for new zones, the
schema column, and the save fallbacks. Existing built-in templates are migrated
separately.
Follow-up to the layout cache. On a cold start with a cached playlist but no cached
layout yet (first run after shipping, or cleared cache), the player still rendered
fullscreen and flashed before the payload arrived. Now gate the optimistic cached
render on the layout being KNOWN (cache key present — null=fullscreen vs object=
zoned, both fine); if unknown, wait ~1s for the payload to drive the first render.
Eliminates the fullscreen flash on the very first pass too.
The player cached only the playlist, not the layout. On cold start it restored the
playlist and rendered immediately with layout=null -> fullscreen, then re-rendered
into zones once the server payload arrived (the 'fullscreen first, then split'
flash). Cache the layout alongside the playlist and restore it before the first
render; cleared on reset.
A widget (e.g. directory board) assigned to a 'content' zone rendered as a black
zone: showZoneItem gated the widget branch on zone.zone_type==='widget', so the
widget was skipped and (mime_type null) nothing else matched either. Key off the
assignment's widget_id instead - matching the Android ZoneManager, which is why
the same layout worked on the APK but not the web player.
The render had no Cache-Control. A copy cached before the X-Frame-Options fix keeps
showing blank, and widget data (clock/weather/rss/directory) is dynamic anyway, so
mark the render no-store. Pairs with the X-Frame-Options removal.
The web player embeds widget/kiosk renders in a sandboxed (allow-scripts, no
allow-same-origin) iframe = a null origin. The global helmet X-Frame-Options:
SAMEORIGIN refuses that (null != same-origin), so every widget rendered blank in
the web player (video worked since it isn't an iframe). Drop X-Frame-Options on
just the /render endpoints - the sandbox, not X-Frame-Options, is what isolates
the widget from the dashboard (it still can't read the JWT). Dashboard keeps its
clickjacking protection. Verified: directory board now renders in a sandboxed
iframe with no refusal.
Mirror of the Android fix. The web player showed only the FIRST assignment per
zone (playlist.find) and an image zone set the GLOBAL advanceTimer->nextItem, so
the whole layout re-rendered on one global tick instead of each zone cycling its
own content. Now each zone groups its assignments (by zone_id, sorted), renders
the first, and advances on its OWN timer (images/widgets/youtube: duration;
videos: on end; single-item zones loop). Cleared in teardown. Also render zones
before the single-item 'renderable?' bail so an empty current item can't blank
the screen.
- Server (deviceSocket buildPlaylistPayload): when a device's layout has <2 zones
(single or none), strip leftover zone_id from assignments. After switching a
device from multi-zone back to fullscreen, content was stuck bound to a gone
left/right zone_id and never played; nulling it lets both players fall back to
the default fullscreen renderer.
- Web player: render multi-zone zones BEFORE the single-item 'renderable?' bail,
so an empty/placeholder current rotation item can't blank the whole screen.
The public, CSP-exempt widget render (GET /api/widgets/:id/render) inlined
config values straight into <style>/CSS and (for the text widget) raw into the
same-origin document. A workspace editor could store `}</style><script>...` in a
color/background/size field (bypassing the UI pickers via the API) → stored XSS
executing in the app origin for anyone who opens the render URL (JWT theft).
- safeCss(): allow colors/gradients but reject CSS breakout / url() / @import /
expression / javascript:. Applied to background/color across clock, weather,
rss, social renders.
- safeNumber(): coerce font_size / scroll_speed / max_items to a finite number
so they can't smuggle markup.
- Text widget keeps its intentional raw HTML/CSS feature, but it now renders
inside an <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts"> (NO allow-same-origin) - scripts run
in a null origin that can't reach the dashboard's localStorage/JWT.
Tests: test/widget-render-xss.test.js (breakout rejected, numbers coerced, text
isolated, legit colors/gradients preserved). Full suite green.
Five low-risk, high-value fixes surfaced by the security review:
#3 Branding lockdown — `custom_domain`/`custom_css` (which feed the PUBLIC,
pre-auth branding resolver and the login-page <style>) are now settable only
by platform admins; a workspace_admin can no longer hijack the platform login
page by claiming its domain. The public /api/branding (+ /domain) now return
only presentational fields via publicBranding() (no id/user_id/workspace_id/
custom_domain/timestamps leak).
#6 Strip device_token — the device WS auth secret (validated with
timingSafeEqual) was returned in device list/get/update + pairing responses
(SELECT d.* / *). New lib/device-sanitize.js strips it everywhere; prevents
device impersonation by any workspace user.
#7 must_change_password enforced server-side — was a frontend-only redirect, so
a provisioned temp password worked indefinitely via the API. requireAuth now
403s every route except GET/PUT /api/auth/me (the password change, which
clears the flag) and logout while the flag is set.
#8 XSS — escape user data interpolated into innerHTML in teams.js, kiosk.js,
layout-editor.js (team/page/layout/zone names, member name/email, kiosk
config fields). scriptSrcAttr 'unsafe-inline' made these exploitable via
injected event handlers, not just markup.
#9 Thumbnail IDOR — /api/content/:id/thumbnail had no auth/scope gate (any UUID
served any tenant's thumbnail). Now mirrors the /file route's playlist/widget
workspace-scoped reference check.
Tests: new test/security-fixes.test.js (device strip, publicBranding field
allowlist, must_change_password gate). Full suite 41/41. Verified live against a
prod-data copy: device_token absent from /api/devices, /api/branding trimmed.
Not addressed here (tracked for follow-up): Android OTA signature verification
(Critical), public widget-render XSS, token revocation/logout, pairing-code
strength, validateRemoteUrl hardening, import quota.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
White-label is stored per-workspace (white_labels.workspace_id); unbranded and
new workspaces - and the login page - fell back to hardcoded ScreenTinker. Add a
single platform default that everything inherits beneath the per-workspace layer.
Resolution (lib/branding.js): workspace row -> custom-domain match -> platform
default -> hardcoded ScreenTinker. Row-level override: a workspace with its own
row keeps it (current behavior); only row-less workspaces inherit the default,
so editing the default propagates instantly (no row-copying at creation).
The platform default is a white_labels row with a FIXED id ('platform-default'),
not a "workspace_id IS NULL" sentinel - legacy pre-multitenancy rows can also
have a null workspace_id, which would be ambiguous.
- routes/admin.js: GET/PUT /api/admin/branding (requirePlatformAdmin) to read/
upsert the single platform-default row; audit-logged.
- server.js: public GET /api/branding (domain match -> platform default ->
hardcoded) for pre-login/pre-workspace contexts.
- routes/white-label.js: authed GET now falls back to the platform default
(was hardcoded) for row-less workspaces.
- Frontend: login page resolves + applies branding (logo, name, colors, favicon,
custom CSS) pre-auth; Admin page gets a "Default branding" form.
Tests: resolver order incl. legacy null-ws safety; admin GET/PUT (single row,
upsert, platform-admin-only 403). Full suite 37/37. Verified end-to-end:
public + authed + login-page all inherit the platform default; per-workspace
override preserved.
Closes#15.
The Workspace column on the platform Users page could only move a 0/1-workspace
user and showed a dead "N workspaces" label for multi-membership users. Replace
it with a "Manage workspaces" modal that handles the full picture.
Backend (routes/admin.js, requirePlatformAdmin):
- GET /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces list memberships (+org/ws names, role)
- POST /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces add to a workspace (upsert role)
- PUT /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces/:wsId change role in a workspace
- DELETE /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces/:wsId remove (last one allowed -> unassigned)
Roles validated against WORKSPACE_ROLES; each mutation writes an audit row.
Frontend:
- Workspace cell is now a summary (Unassigned / <name> / N workspaces /
"Platform (all)" for staff) + a Manage button.
- New admin-user-workspaces-modal: lists every membership with an inline role
dropdown + Remove, plus a type-to-filter "Add to workspace" picker (org-grouped,
excludes current memberships) with a role select. Staff get a note that they
already have platform-wide access. Refreshes the table on close if changed.
- Removed the old single-select inline move control (superseded by the modal).
Tests: 6 added (add to multiple workspaces, per-workspace role change, upsert,
remove incl. last->unassigned, validation 400/404, non-platform-admin 403).
Full suite 33/33. Verified headless: Manage opens, lists memberships, filtered
picker, add/role-change/remove round-trips persist (throwaway user, cleaned up).
The #18 user-delete bug was the first symptom of a broader gap: 13 tables
reference workspaces(id) (and activity_log also organizations(id)) with NO
ACTION, so deleting a workspace or organization fails the same FK wall once it
holds any content. SQLite can't ALTER an FK action, so this migration rebuilds
each table (the create-copy-rename pattern the assignments/schedules migrations
already use), changing only the tenant FK clause:
workspace_id -> ON DELETE CASCADE (resources belong to the workspace)
activity_log.workspace_id / organization_id -> ON DELETE SET NULL (keep audit)
user_id FKs are intentionally left as-is - user deletion stays handled app-side
by lib/user-deletion.js (the #18 fix).
- lib/tenant-cascade-migration.js: pure, idempotent core (table-existence
guarded; transforms the stored CREATE text, copies rows verbatim, recreates
indexes; fixes activity_log's AUTOINCREMENT sequence; baseline-vs-after
foreign_key_check so pre-existing orphan rows don't abort it but a botched
rebuild does).
- db/database.js: boot wrapper owns the pre-migration snapshot + process.exit
on failure, matching the other heavy migrations.
Tests (node:test): reproduces the workspace-delete FK failure, applies the
migration, verifies FK actions (CASCADE / SET NULL), index recreation, data
preserved, and that workspace/org delete now cascades (activity_log preserved).
Full suite 27/27. Verified on a copy of a real DB: 13 tables rebuilt,
integrity_check ok, workspace delete cascades, no new FK violations.
DELETE /api/auth/users/:id ran a bare `DELETE FROM users`, but 23 columns
reference users(id) and only 4 cascade, so with foreign_keys=ON the delete
fails the moment the user is referenced anywhere - and a real user always is
(owns an org, created a workspace, has login activity). Reproduces on a fresh
DB, exactly as reported.
The schema also lacks cascades from workspaces -> tenant resources, so the DB
can't clean up on its own. New lib/user-deletion.js resolves every reference in
one transaction (defer_foreign_keys=ON for forgiving order; table-existence
guard for resilience):
- Refuse (409) if the user OWNS an organization that has other members -
don't nuke a shared tenant; transfer ownership first.
- Hard-delete the organizations they SOLELY own (workspaces + all contents).
- In orgs they don't own, PRESERVE resources: SET NULL the nullable
creator/inviter columns, and reassign the NOT NULL legacy creator user_id to
the resource's org owner (fallback: the acting admin).
- Memberships (organization_members/workspace_members/team_members/
content_folders) cascade on the user delete; pending invites they sent and
legacy teams they own are removed.
The handler now 404s an unknown id and 409s the shared-org case.
Tests (node:test): reproduces the FK failure, then verifies provisioned-member
delete (resources preserved + unlinked/reassigned), solo-org-owner cascade,
shared-org refusal (409), self-delete 400, non-superadmin 403, unknown 404.
Full suite 22/22. Verified end-to-end on a copy of a real DB: deleted a user
owning 2 solo orgs, foreign_key_check clean.
Closes#18.
Adds a "Workspace" column (after Plan) to the platform Users admin table so a
platform_admin can see and reassign a user's workspace inline, alongside the
Role/Plan dropdowns. Single-workspace move/assign model.
Backend:
- GET /api/auth/users (platform branch): one aggregate query adds
workspace_count and, for exactly-one membership, the workspace id/name + org
name (no N+1).
- PUT /api/admin/users/:id/workspace (requirePlatformAdmin - operator excluded):
move (1 membership) or assign (0) into the chosen workspace, default role
workspace_viewer, in a transaction; no-op if already there; REFUSES (400) a
user with >1 membership (manage in the members view). logActivity
admin_set_user_workspace.
Frontend (admin.js):
- Editable <select> only for a 'user' with 0/1 membership; multi-membership ->
read-only "N workspaces", platform staff -> read-only "Platform (all)".
- Options grouped by org via <optgroup>, built ONCE from /me's
accessible_workspaces (same source as the Add User picker) and reused per row.
- Picking "Unassigned" or the same workspace is a no-op so a stray pick can't
strip a membership. Success -> toast + refresh. EN i18n only.
Tests: 4 added (single-membership move 200 + changed, zero-membership assign
200, multi-membership 400 refused, non-platform-admin/operator 403). npm test
16/16. Verified headless: column renders, selected value correct, "Platform
(all)" for staff, and a dropdown move persisted (throwaway user, cleaned up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bug: #13 added 'platform_operator' to the frontend role dropdown
(PLATFORM_ROLE_OPTIONS) but #14's PUT /api/auth/users/:id/role whitelist
(ASSIGNABLE_PLATFORM_ROLES) only listed ['user','platform_admin'], so
selecting "Platform operator" returned 400 "Invalid role" - the role was
unassignable via the UI.
Fix: add 'platform_operator' to ASSIGNABLE_PLATFORM_ROLES. One line; the
self-demote guard is intentionally left untouched (a platform_admin still
cannot self-assign the non-owner operator role and lock themselves out).
Tests (node:test, isolated in-memory DB injection - no DB_PATH change):
- admin-users.test.js: platform_admin can PUT role=platform_operator on a
target user -> 200 and the row persists as platform_operator (regression
guard for the whitelist gap).
- operator-permissions.test.js (new): verify-then-test of the highest-blast
-radius deny. Operator CAN update/delete a workspace-scoped content row
(cross-org write works) but is denied (403) updating or deleting a shared
(workspace_id IS NULL) row - proving the separate PLATFORM_ROLES gate in
content.js's checkContentWrite still holds after canWrite was broadened to
isPlatformStaff.
Verified read-only (no leak): the other shared-asset write sites keep their
PLATFORM_ROLES gate that excludes operator - kiosk.js:57, widgets.js:110,
folders.js:31, layouts.js:59/117/133.
cd server && npm test -> 12 pass / 0 fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds server/test/admin-users.test.js and a `npm test` (node --test) script.
No DB_PATH override: the suite mounts the real routers against an isolated
in-memory better-sqlite3 instance injected into the require cache, seeded by
the test itself. Node v20 built-ins only (node:test, node:assert, fetch).
Covers: Add User success (response omits password/hash, hash stored not
plaintext, membership written, hosted lifecycle sentinels stamped, audit row
without the password), duplicate-email 409 (no overwrite), non-admin 403,
platform_operator denied (403), org_admin scoped to their own org only,
input validation, and the must_change_password lifecycle (set on create,
surfaced on login, cleared on PUT /api/auth/me).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
MSP-style deployments want self-service signups created WITHOUT a personal
org, so an admin/operator can assign them into an existing customer org
afterward.
- config.autoCreateOrgOnSignup (AUTO_CREATE_ORG_ON_SIGNUP env), default
true - single-tenant and the hosted self-service flow are unchanged.
- ensureDefaultOrgForUser gains { allowCreate }: an existing membership is
always returned (idempotent); the MINT path is gated. allowCreate=false +
no membership -> returns null (user created org-less).
- register accepts a per-request createOrg flag overriding the deployment
default; the first-ever user is always given an org (never headless).
login / Google / Microsoft pass allowCreate from the global config, so an
org-less user is not silently given an org on next sign-in.
Edge case: a non-platform user with zero workspaces now lands on a "no
workspaces yet" empty state (new no-workspace view) instead of being bounced
into onboarding (whose pairing step needs a workspace). route() redirects
them there, and refreshCurrentUser() redirects once /me reveals zero
accessible_workspaces (covers the first-load race). The workspace switcher
already rendered an empty placeholder and resource routes already return []
for a null workspace, so nothing crashes in between.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds POST /api/admin/users so an admin can create a user directly with a
known password and assign them to a workspace + role - for self-hosted
instances with no outbound email, where invites never deliver.
Server (routes/admin.js, mounted /api/admin with requireAuth + activityLogger):
- Gated by canAdminWorkspace(db, req.user, targetWorkspace): 404 if the
workspace is missing, 403 if not an admin of it. This scopes org_admins
to their own org and excludes platform_operator (no user/role mgmt, #13).
- Validates email (invite-create regex), role in WORKSPACE_ROLES, password
min-8 (the /me rule). 409 on duplicate email - never overwrites.
- One transaction: global users row (auth_provider 'local',
bcrypt.hashSync(pw,10), must_change_password from the flag) + a
workspace_members row written inline (same footprint as an accepted
invite; accept-invite left untouched).
- Explicit audit row admin_create_user; never logs the password; response
excludes password/hash.
- HOSTED_INSTANCE: never calls sendSignupEmails and stamps both
welcome_email_sent_at / activation_nudge_sent_at, so an admin-created
user gets no welcome email and never enters the activation-nudge sweep.
must_change_password (frontend-first enforcement, per spec):
- Migration adds users.must_change_password INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
surfaced via requireAuth + /me + login responses.
- route() in app.js forces users with the flag to a #/change-password
screen (new force-password-change view, reuses PUT /api/auth/me) and
blocks every other view until set. The /me update clears the flag.
Frontend: "Add User" button beside "Invite member" in the members view
(admin-only) opening a modal (email, name, password + generate, role,
must-change checkbox); invite and Add User coexist. api.adminCreateUser;
EN i18n only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
platform_operator is cross-org STAFF: it can see and act-as into every
org and read/write workspace-scoped resources (content, playlists,
layouts, schedules, devices, widgets, kiosk) anywhere - but holds NO
owner-level power.
Design is deny-by-default: operator is NEVER added to PLATFORM_ROLES /
isPlatformRole, so every owner capability (billing, org/workspace
deletion, user/role management, shared & template asset curation,
branding, workspace member mgmt/rename) stays denied, and any NEW owner
endpoint added later inherits that denial automatically.
Operator gets power from exactly two levers:
- middleware/auth.js: new PLATFORM_STAFF set + isPlatformStaff(); owner
guards (PLATFORM_ROLES, requireAdmin, requireSuperAdmin) unchanged.
- tenancy.js: accessContext + resolveTenancy treat staff as act-as
capable; new req.isPlatformStaff / req.isPlatformOperator (req.isPlatformAdmin
stays owner-only); accessibleWorkspaceIds + switch-workspace guard use staff.
- permissions.js: canRead/canWrite + canAccessWorkspace (read) grant staff;
canAdmin / canAdminWorkspace / isOrgAdmin / isOrgOwner stay owner-gated.
Read-only edges (per review): operator may VIEW workspace member lists
(canAccessWorkspace) and the unassigned device pool (devices.js), but
cannot mutate either.
Frontend: platform role dropdown adds "Platform operator"; the user-mgmt
view stays isPlatformAdmin-gated so operators can't open it. EN i18n only.
Behaviour identical under HOSTED_INSTANCE set or unset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The legacy /api/auth/users dropdown could write 'superadmin' and 'admin'
role strings that not every code path recognized. Some checks matched only
'platform_admin' (tenancy accessContext/resolveTenancy), so a 'superadmin'
user could list orgs but not act-as into them.
Normalize to the current two-tier platform model (users.role holds the
PLATFORM role only; org/workspace roles live in the membership tables):
- Migration (idempotent, exact-string): superadmin -> platform_admin,
admin -> user. No-ops on rows already in the current model.
- Add isPlatformRole() helper in middleware/auth.js; route the two
superadmin-excluding checks in tenancy.js through it so a stray
'superadmin' is never treated as lower-privileged (fixes act-as).
- Remove the dead/stricter requirePlatformAdmin in permissions.js (bare
=== 'platform_admin'); the single guard is the one in middleware/auth.js.
- Recovery-token default role admin -> platform_admin so emergency
recovery keeps full access once 'admin' no longer implies elevation.
- PUT /api/auth/users/:id/role whitelist -> ['user','platform_admin'];
self-demote guard retargeted via isPlatformRole.
- Frontend: platform user-management dropdown now offers User / Platform
admin only; owner-delete guard and settings highlight use isPlatformAdmin.
EN i18n: add admin.role.platform_admin.
Behaviour is identical under HOSTED_INSTANCE set or unset; the migration
only touches exact legacy strings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A player stuck in a tight loop (playlist with 0-second item durations)
fires device:play-event 'play_start' ~3x/sec, inserting a play_logs row
each time. Three web players doing this generated ~909k rows (99.9% with
duration_sec=0) and grew the prod DB to 265 MB.
Throttle proof-of-play inserts to at most one per device per 2s (in-memory
lastPlayLogAt map). Skipped cycles create no row; the live dashboard
progress event still fires every time, so the UI is unaffected. The
play_end UPDATE only closes open rows, so throttling play_start is safe.
(Junk rows already pruned in prod: 909k deleted, DB 265 MB -> 9.8 MB.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Daily sweep (15:00 UTC) emails a warm, personal "checking in" message
to users who signed up 3-14 days ago and still have no paired screen,
nudging them toward activation. Once per user, reuses the Graph
transport (services/email.js) via the existing fromName/rawSubject
options.
- New service services/activationNudge.js, started from server.js.
Self-correcting daily scheduler (recompute next 15:00 UTC each run;
no node-cron dependency).
- Eligibility (Option B, workspace-aware): created 3-14 days ago,
activation_nudge_sent_at IS NULL, COALESCE(email_alerts,1)=1 (only
an explicit opt-out of 0 is excluded; NULL/unset still qualify), and
ZERO devices owned by the user OR present in any workspace they
belong to. The workspace check avoids nudging engaged team members.
- Idempotency: activation_nudge_sent_at, stamped after send; paired
sentinel-1 backfill so the first sweep can't blast the dormant
legacy base. Only genuinely-new signups become eligible.
- GATE: HOSTED_INSTANCE=true (positive hosted signal, NOT !selfHosted).
A daily bulk sweep would be far worse to leak than a single email, so
a self-hoster who configured Graph but missed SELF_HOSTED won't blast
their user base. Unset -> neither scheduled nor sent. Documented in
.env.example.
The admin signup-notify recipient was hardcoded to
support@screentinker.com and shipped in the open-source code. Combined
with the opt-out SELF_HOSTED gate, any self-hoster who configured their
own Graph credentials but forgot SELF_HOSTED=true would fire their
users' signup PII (email, IP, country) into our support inbox.
Source the recipient from ADMIN_NOTIFY_EMAIL instead, defaulting to
null. When unset, the admin notification is skipped entirely and logged
("[SIGNUP-EMAIL] admin notify skipped (ADMIN_NOTIFY_EMAIL unset)"); the
user's welcome email is unaffected. Hosted prod sets the env var so its
notifications continue; self-hosters send nothing to us by default, and
the .com address no longer ships in code.
Document ADMIN_NOTIFY_EMAIL (and the related mail/self-host vars) in a
new .env.example.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admin signup notifications were going to dw5304@gmail.com. Route them
to the monitored support@screentinker.com queue instead, so signups
land in the shared inbox rather than a personal account.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every new user now gets a personal welcome email from
"Dan at ScreenTinker" <support@screentinker.com>, and Dan gets an
admin notification, immediately after signup. Fired from all three
signup paths (local /register, Google, Microsoft) via a shared
helper (services/signupEmails.js) at the new-user branch only, so
OAuth logins of existing users don't re-trigger.
- Reuses the single Microsoft Graph transport (services/email.js).
Adds two optional, backward-compatible params: fromName (custom
From display name; address stays support@ so replies route there)
and rawSubject (skip the "[ScreenTinker] " prefix for clean
subjects "Welcome to ScreenTinker" / "New signup: <email>").
- Idempotency: users.welcome_email_sent_at, stamped after the send
block; non-null short-circuits so a user is only emailed once.
Paired backfill stamps all pre-existing users with sentinel 1 so
a future "IS NULL" sweep can't mistake the legacy base for
un-welcomed and blast them.
- Production-only: gated on !config.selfHosted so self-host
operators never emit mail from our domain or CC Dan.
- No retry logic by design (no re-trigger path on existing users);
per-email {sent, reason} is logged so a Graph hiccup is visible.
Admin notification includes workspace org name, email, UTC + Central
timestamp, client IP (CF-aware), CF-IPCountry, and user agent.
The webpage widget's inner iframe previously declared
sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin", which was
functionally stripped to "allow-scripts" by the outer
iframe sandbox added in fe36c8c. This commit makes the
declared sandbox match the actual effective behavior.
Closes the remaining piece of issue #8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses the primary finding from the May 27 security report (issue #8):
the admin widget preview modal (frontend/js/views/widgets.js) and the web
player widget renderer (server/player/index.html, 2 sites) loaded
user-authored widget HTML into unsandboxed iframes. Same-origin scripts
in the widget content could access window.parent.localStorage and
exfiltrate the JWT.
sandbox="allow-scripts" without allow-same-origin sandboxes the widget
into a unique origin: inline scripts (clock, RSS, weather widgets)
continue to work, but parent-origin access and same-origin requests are
blocked. Verified via Playwright probe against all 6 widget types in the
dev DB (clock, rss, social, text, weather, webpage): each renders
correctly under the new sandbox and contentDocument access from the
parent is blocked (opaque-origin enforcement working). Admin preview
unchanged in appearance; player display unchanged.
Webpage widget (server/routes/widgets.js) sandbox tightening (drop
allow-same-origin) is a separate forthcoming commit - needs test against
real embed URLs since some sites rely on same-origin behavior. The
sandbox-attribute intersection rule means today's outer-iframe sandbox
will cascade and strip allow-same-origin from the webpage widget's inner
iframe too; accepted as a narrow cosmetic regression (cookies/localStorage
stripped for embedded sites) until the deliberate inner-iframe handling
ships.
SECURITY.md added with reporting process (GitHub Security Advisories
primary, support@bytetinker.net fallback) and scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Slice 1+3 (c4fbd2b) introduced PUBLIC_URL as the env var name for the
public-facing origin used to construct invite-accept URLs. The README
has long documented APP_URL as the canonical name for this concept
(used for Stripe callbacks in the existing codebase). The new code
should have read APP_URL from the start; PUBLIC_URL was unintentional
naming drift.
Caught during prod-deploy survey on 2026-05-17: APP_URL was set on the
production systemd unit and documented in the README, but read by no
code path on origin/main. PUBLIC_URL was read by slice-1 code but set
nowhere. The bug was masked in 99% of cases by the request-derived
fallback (${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}) which produces the
correct URL when invites are triggered from browsers behind Cloudflare.
It would have manifested for any future non-browser-triggered invite
path.
README updated to note APP_URL covers both Stripe callbacks and
invite-accept URL generation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
