The #placementCard / #layoutView elements that agency-portal.js's reactive
loadLayoutForPlaylist() renders into. Was built with the card logic but never folded into a
commit; without it the size-guidance card has nowhere to render. Pure markup, no behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Investigation found zone placement is a DEVICE property (device.layout_id), not a playlist
property: a normal playlist has no derivable layout (zone_id is NULL unless set in the
device-assignment flow), so a playlist-scoped zone grant can't reach the normal flow. The
right model: placement belongs to the device (same playlist can be full-screen on one screen,
a zone on another); the agency just gets whole-playlist grants + size-guidance.
Removed the zone-grant machinery (security-adjacent dead surface is a liability, not dormant
convenience): api_token_target_zones (schema + a DROP migration for the dev DB where the
short-lived CREATE ran), resolveGrantedZone, grantableZoneIds, buildZoneGrantRows, the
create/PUT zone validation, GET /api/playlists/:id/zones, getPlaylistZones, the settings
zone-picker + its i18n, and the zone-grant bite-test.
KEPT (model-agnostic, good): the reactive per-playlist size-guidance card - GET
/api/agency/playlists/:playlistId/layout (router.param-confined) now reports the zones the
playlist actually feeds (where/what-size content lands), or full-screen when it has no layout.
Whole-playlist grants = today's working model. 147 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Issuance (on the proven seam):
- tokens.js create + PUT /:id/targets accept per-playlist zone grants (target_zones), inserted
into api_token_target_zones inside the same transaction as the playlist grants (FK requires
the parent, so order matters and is correct).
- Issuance validation (the mirror of runtime confinement): grantableZoneIds() - can grant ONLY
a zone the playlist's layout actually feeds; can't grant one it doesn't have or one from
another playlist's layout. Bite-tested. PUT re-designate stays atomic: delete parent rows ->
zone grants cascade out (no manual child delete).
- settings.js: checking a designated playlist reveals its grantable zones (GET
/api/playlists/:id/zones, JWT); leave unchecked = whole-playlist. i18n across all 5 locales.
Card:
- GET /api/agency/playlists/:playlistId/layout (rides router.param - confined; a non-
designated playlist -> 403, asserted). "Your zone" = the GRANTED zones. Retired the
token-wide /layouts (the per-playlist card replaces the disconnected lump).
- Portal card reacts to the playlist selector: pick a playlist -> its layout renders, the
granted zone highlighted with px size, siblings as context.
Full suite + agency bite-suite green (154).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Placement-as-grant, replacing the inferred auto-place idea. api_token_target_zones is an
ADDITIVE second table (does NOT touch the proven api_token_targets), structurally anchored:
a composite FK to api_token_targets(token_id, playlist_id) makes a zone grant orphan-
impossible and cascade away when the playlist grant is revoked - "narrow" is structural, not
conventional. zone_id FK -> layout_zones cascades on zone/layout delete.
Confinement (lib/agency-targets.resolveGrantedZone, called in the item-add): grants exist ->
the item MUST land in a granted zone (a body zone_id picks among grants, never escapes them);
none -> whole-playlist/full-screen as before. The item-add stamps the granted zone_id.
Bite-tested (6, all proven incl. neutralize->red on the confinement): granted YES; non-
granted/cross-playlist/ambiguous blocked; orphan-grant rejected by the FK; cascade on
playlist-grant revoke, on playlist delete, on zone/layout delete; and foreign_keys=ON
asserted (a cascade that no-ops because FKs are off is the trap). 153 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reuses the existing scheduler + sendEmail infra (no new scheduler). The agency endpoint
enqueues one agency_notifications row per item added; a 15-min flush groups unsent rows per
token+playlist+action and sends ONE digest per group to the workspace owner/admins + the
playlist owner (deduped via UNION). Draft -> "added N items, awaiting approval"; published ->
"updated <playlist>".
Two robustness rules, both tested:
- Queue never balloons when SMTP is off: the endpoint skips enqueue when !isConfigured(),
and the flush drains-and-discards unsent rows as a backstop.
- sent_at is stamped ONLY after a successful send, so a failed send retries next cycle
instead of silently dropping.
Wired into boot via startAgencyDigest(). 147 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
So the agency can size/place content: returns the canvas size + zone positions/sizes for the
layouts its designated playlists feed, marking which zones are theirs. DEVICE-FREE BY
CONSTRUCTION - the query path is playlist_items.zone_id -> layout_zones -> layouts and never
touches devices/groups/schedules, so device names/locations/IPs/topology are structurally
absent, not filtered. Geometry only - no sibling-zone content. layout.name included (admin's
canvas name); thumbnail_data omitted (could render other zones' content).
Confinement query in lib/agency-layouts.js, bite-tested: own layout YES, a non-designated
playlist's layout NO, response has NO device fields (asserted on a db where a location-named
device exists), and neutralizing the t.token_id filter goes red. 142 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
api_tokens.auto_publish (DEFAULT 0 = draft, the fail-safe). Admin sets it at token creation
in the designate UI (checkbox, agency scope only). The agency endpoint reads it from the
TOKEN ROW via req.apiToken (apiTokenAuth attaches it) - NEVER from req.body, so an agency
can't opt itself out of approval. 0 -> markDraft; 1 -> the shared publishPlaylist path.
Tests (integration): draft is the default; a draft token with auto_publish:true IN THE BODY
still lands draft (body ignored); an auto-publish token goes live; manual publish still works
(extraction regression). i18n across all 5 locales. 141 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /:id/publish snapshots items into published_snapshot (what devices consume) + pushes
to devices. Extracted that into publishPlaylist(id, req) so the agency auto-publish path can
call the IDENTICAL logic - a "published" playlist that wasn't snapshotted would be live on no
screen. The manual endpoint now calls it; behavior-preserving (suite green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agency-facing. A self-contained page at /agency (NOT the dashboard SPA - the agency has no
JWT, only the token). Entry: paste access key -> sessionStorage (cleared on tab close, not
localStorage) -> sent as Bearer. Flow: list designated playlists -> upload (shared ingest =
first-class content) -> date-bounded item on a chosen playlist (lands as draft for admin
re-publish). Graceful failure: any 401/403 resets to the entry screen with "key invalid,
paste it again" - never a wall of 403s. Blast radius of a leaked key stays bounded by the
narrow scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admin-facing. Extends the existing API-token UI: an 'agency' scope option reveals a
playlist picker (the workspace's playlists); creating the token binds the checked ones as
its allowlist (target_playlist_ids). The token list shows each agency token's designated
playlists (tokens GET now returns targets for agency-scoped tokens). i18n keys added across
all five locales (parity test).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The portal needs to show an agency which playlists it may post to. New read surface on the
security primitive, built with write-path rigor: the confinement query lives in
lib/agency-targets.js (own token + bound workspace only) and is bite-tested four ways -
own targets yes; another token's, outside the allowlist, and cross-workspace all NO;
neutralizing the t.token_id filter makes it go red. Real-path wiring + the portal's
graceful 401 trigger asserted in the integration suite. No :playlistId, so router.param
doesn't apply - the query is the seam.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agency capability behind the proven off-ladder/agencyGate primitive:
- agencyGate is now SCOPE-only at the mount; the per-target check is router.param
('playlistId') in routes/agency.js - it fires WITH the param before the handler, so no
:playlistId route can skip it (drift-proof). A mount-level target check was silently
bypassed (Express populates req.params only at route match); the integration bite-suite
caught it - this is the fix.
- routes/agency.js: POST /content (shared ingest) + POST /playlists/:id/items (date-bounded
#74/#75 item; lands as draft so the admin's re-publish is the approval gate).
- tokens.js: issue scope='agency' tokens bound to a non-empty in-workspace playlist
allowlist (atomic); PUT /:id/targets re-designates (JWT-only -> can't self-widen).
- server.js: AGENCY_ROUTERS mounted bearerAuth + resolveTenancy + agencyGate.
Full bite-suite (test/agency.test.js) GREEN and re-proven to bite on the SHIPPING path:
neutralizing the router.param check makes non-designated->403 go red. Four assertions at
three seams: target (router.param), off-ladder (tokenScopeGate), can't-widen (tokens
JWT-only), issuance cross-workspace (create validation). 139 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
routes/content.js POST / processing (thumbnail/dimensions/duration) + insert moved to
lib/content-ingest.js so the agency router produces byte-identical first-class content.
content.js POST / is now a thin caller; behavior-preserving - the 52 content regression
tests (api/operator-permissions/config-paths) pass unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The capability/target-restricted token model for the agency portal (#73 option B),
proven before any endpoint sits on it:
- 'agency' scope value is OFF the read/write/full ladder, so the existing tokenScopeGate
rejects it on every public router by construction (auto-confinement, no new code).
- api_token_targets join table: which playlists an agency token may act on.
- agencyGate: THE single seam - agency-scope-only + (playlist in this token's allowlist
AND in the bound workspace), one query enforcing target + cross-workspace isolation.
- AGENCY_ROUTERS category in config/api-surface.js (mounted with agencyGate, not
tokenScopeGate) - declared; router/mount land with the endpoints.
Both bite-tested: spine (agency 403s on tokenScopeGate; read/write still pass) and the
gate (non-designated/cross-workspace/non-agency/JWT -> 403; neutralizing the target check
goes red). NARROW - not the general capability-scope system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review caught the encrypted TOTP secret riding in the login/verify response body:
issueSession receives a SELECT * user row and only destructured out password_hash, so
totp_secret_enc (and the internal replay counter totp_last_step) leaked. Encrypted, so
not catastrophic, but it regresses the API work's "secrets never in responses" rule.
Strip both in issueSession (covers /login and /totp/verify); add an assertion that a
verify response carries no totp_secret_enc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unit: the mfa_pending BITE (db-injected so removing the rejection goes red), lockout, replay,
recovery-hash, decrypt-null graceful. Integration: enrollment, login->mfa_required, route-level
bite, recovery single-use, API-token bypass, verify lockout. Key-rotation: enroll under key A,
reboot under key B -> recovery still works, TOTP fails cleanly (no 500).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two-token login: /login returns an mfa_pending token when TOTP is on; requireAuth/optionalAuth
REJECT mfa_pending (tightening #1 - else password-alone is a session). /totp/verify exchanges
it + a TOTP or recovery code for a full session (per-user lockout; recovery checked
independently of the decryptable secret). Enrollment: setup -> enable (confirm-then-enable) ->
recovery codes shown once; disable/regenerate require re-auth; regenerate replaces atomically;
status surfaces codes-remaining (tightening #3). API tokens + SSO bypass TOTP by construction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
app.use('/api/auth/login', rateLimit(...)) etc. keyed on req.path, which Express strips to
'/' for mounted middleware - so /login, /register, /totp/verify shared ONE per-IP counter
(coupled limits; the new /totp/verify brute-force limit was not actually independent). Key
on originalUrl instead. Also adds the /api/auth/totp/verify 10/min limit (tightening #2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
lib/totp.js: otplib wrapper; secret stored via secretbox (must be reversible to recompute
codes); recovery codes SHA-256-hashed (api_tokens discipline); verifyCode returns the
matched step and blocks intra-window replay via totp_last_step; decrypt failures return
null (no throw). lib/totp-lockout.js: per-user lockout for /totp/verify (#87 model).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
users.totp_secret_enc (secretbox-encrypted, reversible) + totp_enabled + totp_last_step
(replay guard), and the totp_recovery_codes table (SHA-256 hashed, single-use). Migrations
default everything off so existing accounts are untouched. otplib pinned ^12 (v13 is a
breaking plugin-rewrite with no authenticator/checkDelta).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
After the OTA installs, PACKAGE_REPLACED kills the old process and nothing brought
MainActivity back, so updating screens dropped to the launcher (the 1.9.0 fleet bug). Add a
MY_PACKAGE_REPLACED receiver that relaunches via a shared Relauncher cascade (extracted from
BootReceiver so boot + post-update share one path):
1. overlay-direct startActivity (SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW) - legal on all versions when granted
2. full-screen-intent notification - auto-launches <14; on 14+ (USE_FULL_SCREEN_INTENT
revoked) degrades to a VISIBLE, tappable "tap to resume" prompt - fail loud, never a
silent dark screen
Emulator-proven on Android 16: MY_PACKAGE_REPLACED -> Relauncher[update] -> overlay-direct
(BAL_ALLOW_SAW_PERMISSION) -> MainActivity on the new version. Accessibility re-binds across
the package-replace (Service connected fires post-relaunch), so sequential OTAs keep their
auto-confirm.
Unattended OTA requires accessibility (auto-confirm the install) + overlay (relaunch); the
setup wizard grants both. A device where they're skipped degrades to the visible prompt.
Closes#96.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
UpdateChecker.tryPackageInstaller built the INSTALL_COMPLETE status PendingIntent with
FLAG_MUTABLE and an implicit intent. On Android 14+ (target SDK 34) that combination is
disallowed - getBroadcast() throws, the inner catch swallows it, and the PackageInstaller
session is never committed. Result: every OTA silently fails to install on a 14+ device
(download succeeds, version never changes). Make the intent explicit via setPackage(),
keeping FLAG_MUTABLE so PackageInstaller can still write EXTRA_STATUS back.
Emulator-proven on Android 16 (API 36): "Package installer session committed" and the
update applies. Distinct from the relaunch bug - this is install-on-14+.
Part of #96.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The OTA was invisible server-side: /api/update/check and /download/apk returned without
logging, which is part of why the 1.9.0 auto-relaunch failure went unseen. Log every
version check (client version vs latest, update_available, whether an APK is staged) and
every APK download (a device actually applying an OTA), keyed on the CF-aware getClientIp
so production logs show the real per-device IP behind Cloudflare, not the edge.
Observability for the #96 auto-relaunch work (this is how we'll watch the OTA fire during
the relaunch testing). Part of #96.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 6-digit pairing code is generated client-side, so the server can't raise its entropy
without a player change. Instead, harden server-side (no client change):
- lib/pair-lockout.js: lock an IP out of POST /api/provision/pair after 5 failed claims
(15-min lockout), and expire stale provisioning codes after 15 min so a code is not
claimable indefinitely. A successful claim resets the IP.
- /pair enforces both. Only an UNKNOWN code (404) counts toward the lockout (a real guess);
an EXPIRED code (410) is a legitimate-but-stale code and does NOT count, so a slow bulk
rollout from one shared-NAT IP can't lock itself out. getClientIp is Cloudflare-aware
(CF-Connecting-IP validated against a trusted edge peer), so the lockout keys on the real
per-client IP, never a shared edge.
Unit-tested deterministically with injected time, incl. the bulk-rollout-never-locks case.
Closes#87
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/provision was a second pairing endpoint that paired a device by code but,
unlike POST /api/provision/pair, did NOT assign a workspace, enforce checkDeviceLimit, or
emit device:paired / dashboard:device-added - a silently-diverging duplicate that no
client ever called. It now returns 410 Gone and points callers at /pair, so
/api/provision/pair is the single, fully-protected pairing endpoint. The mount stays in
the JWT-only partition, so a Bearer st_ token still gets 401 (requireAuth) before the 410.
Closes#90
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The non-security gaps named in the public-API self-review:
- gap-fix: zone_id (playlist items) + layout_id (device PUT) accepted and returned on read,
INCLUDING the cross-tenant rejection (the is_template OR workspace_id guard - the
security-relevant one).
- docs serving: /openapi.yaml serves the spec, /docs returns the Redoc page.
- i18n drift-guard: apitoken.* keys have full parity across en/es/fr/de/pt (a key missing
in one locale fails CI).
- token lifecycle branches: token-create workspace-membership validation and last_used_at
stamping (integration), plus the must_change_password gate (unit test via the in-memory
DB injection - cross-process WAL visibility is unreliable for that branch in-process).
119 tests total (was 108), all in the existing node --test job.
Closes#92
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-review follow-ups, kept as a separate commit so the review trail is honest.
- Spec drift: POST /widgets/preview was documented scope 'read' but the method-based
tokenScopeGate enforces 'write' for any POST, so a read-token integrator following the
published docs would hit a surprise 403. The code is right; fix the SPEC to match it.
- Guard it forever: test/openapi-contract.test.js cross-checks every spec operation's
x-required-scope against the enforcement rule, and that every documented path is a
public (token-reachable) router - both derived from the same config/api-surface.js.
Adds js-yaml (devDep) to parse the spec. Spec/enforcement drift now fails CI.
- Vendored Redoc: add frontend/vendor/README.md (library, version 2.3.9, source, update
steps) and drop the dangling //# sourceMappingURL line so /docs doesn't 404 in devtools.
Remaining (non-security) test-coverage gaps tracked in #92.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated public-API suite (boots the real server as a subprocess) so CI green proves
the token layer, not just the pre-existing tests:
- Partition firewall, derived from the SAME config/api-surface.js server.js mounts from:
every JWT-only router 401s a token; a public-surface snapshot fails if any router is
added to the token door; known-privileged routers asserted JWT-only.
- Threat model: role-strip gates, workspace-binding both directions (token ignores
X-Workspace-Id, JWT honors it), the scope ladder, the render bypass, token lifecycle,
and JWT no-regression.
- Device WS round-trip via socket.io-client (added as a devDep): valid device_token
registers + receives its playlist; wrong token rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- docs/openapi.yaml: the public, token-reachable surface only, with the auth model
(Bearer st_) and a per-operation x-required-scope (read<write<full). JWT-only routers
are excluded by design.
- Serve /openapi.yaml + /docs (Redoc via a vendored standalone bundle, no CDN so it
works air-gapped; /docs is CSP-exempt). docs/ is bundled into the release tarball.
- CI: redocly lint + a public-only guard that fails loudly if a JWT-only path ever leaks
into the spec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- playlists: accept zone_id on item create + update, validated against a template or a
layout in the playlist's workspace (no cross-tenant zone reference).
- devices: accept layout_id on PUT /api/devices/:id (symmetry with the layouts route),
validated the same way; null clears it. Both are already returned in the GET SELECTs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- routes/tokens.js: create (returns the full secret once), list (never the secret),
revoke. Mounted JWT-only via api-surface.js so an API token can never mint, list or
revoke tokens - no self-escalation.
- Settings "API Tokens" section: create form (name + read/write/full scope), one-time
secret reveal with copy, token list, revoke; i18n across en/es/fr/de/pt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce the public API's token layer and make the router partition data-driven.
- api_tokens table: SHA-256 hashed secret, st_ prefix, workspace-bound, read/write/full scope.
- middleware/apiToken.js: bearerAuth front door (Bearer st_ -> token auth, else the
unchanged requireAuth); apiTokenAuth acts as the owner with platform powers stripped
to 'user' and the workspace binding made authoritative (X-Workspace-Id ignored);
tokenScopeGate (read=GET, write=mutations) + requireScope('full') for commands.
- config/api-surface.js: single source of truth for the PUBLIC (token front door) vs
JWT-ONLY (requireAuth) router partition. server.js mounts from these lists so the
mount list and the partition firewall test cannot drift.
- device-groups: operational group commands (reboot/shutdown) require the full scope.
A Bearer st_ token fails jwt.verify on the JWT-only routers (401), so privileged
surfaces (admin, workspaces, ai, provision, white-label) are unreachable by exclusion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/provision (the routes/provisioning.js router endpoint) pairs a device
by pairing_code with no rate limit - the limit at server.js:287 was bound only to
the /api/provision/pair override. An authenticated user could brute-force 6-digit
pairing codes against the bare endpoint to claim devices in the unclaimed pool.
Bind the rate limit to the /api/provision mount so it covers both pairing paths.
Verified: 6 rapid POSTs to /api/provision now 429 on the 6th (was unlimited);
/api/provision/pair still 429s on the 6th.
Closes#88
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tagging a pre-release (e.g. v1.9.0-rc1) was unsafe. Four fixes:
1. bump-version.sh writes a numeric-only x.y.z to tizen/config.xml (strips a
-rc1/-beta.N suffix) so the .wgt still signs/installs; the full VERSION
(with the suffix) still drives server/Android/package.json.
2. release.yml flags the GitHub Release --prerelease for a -suffix version
(keeps it off "Latest" and out of the /releases/latest API).
3. release.yml moves docker :latest only for final releases - a pre-release no
longer repoints :latest onto untested code.
4. upgrade.sh excludes pre-release tags from its default selection - GNU
`sort -V` ranks 1.9.0-rc1 above the final 1.9.0, so the unfiltered default
would silently pick an RC (which then auto-OTAs to field kiosks). An explicit
`upgrade.sh v1.9.0-rc1` still works.
Verified the strip, tag selection, prerelease/tags logic, and YAML validity in
isolation.
Closes#80
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A multi-zone layout's zone rendered its image from the local content cache
only. If the content wasn't cached yet at first render (first-sync download
still in flight, or the preloader hadn't fetched that zone's content), the
zone drew blank - and a static (single, unscheduled) zone has no rotation
timer to redraw, so it stayed blank until the app was restarted.
Mirror the video branch: when getCachedFile returns null, load the image
straight from the server (the item's remote_url, else /api/content/<id>/file)
instead of leaving the zone blank.
Verified live on a 2-zone layout with two single-unscheduled items and fresh
content: both zones render with no restart, with only one item actually in
the on-device cache (the other displayed via the URL fallback).
Closes#78
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The settings "About" section hardcoded "ScreenTinker v1.4.1", so it never
reflected the running build (#/admin already showed the correct version).
Fetch /api/version in the async settings render — the same unauthenticated
endpoint the admin view uses — and render it (blank-safe on fetch failure).
Closes#83
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
minSdk 26 makes AGP default the v1 (JAR) signature off, so the release APK is
v2-only. Some MDM-managed commercial signage (MAXHUB via the Pivot MDM) silently
removes a v2-only app on the next reboot because its boot integrity check expects
a v1 signature — screens that power-cycle nightly lose the app and fall back to
the setup screen.
`enableV1Signing = true` has no effect at minSdk >= 24 (verified: still v2-only).
Instead, finalize assembleRelease with a `resignReleaseV1` task that re-signs via
apksigner with --v1-signing-enabled true and a low --min-sdk-version, emitting v1
alongside v2/v3. Verified: v1+v2+v3 at min-sdk 19, verifies at API 36, and the
re-signed APK installs and runs on a live API 36 emulator.
Closes#81
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each playlist item can carry schedule blocks (active days, start/end
time-of-day, optional start/end dates). An item plays when the screen's
local "now" matches at least one block; an item with no blocks always
plays. #74 covers time-of-day/day-of-week windows including overnight
wrap; #75 covers inclusive date ranges (auto-expiry). Evaluation is
on-device, so dayparting and expiry work offline.
- Shared evaluator contract: shared/schedule-vectors.json (39 vectors —
DST US+AU, overnight-wrap anchoring, timezone correctness, date
boundaries). Canonical JS evaluator in server/lib/schedule-eval.js;
Kotlin and Tizen ports kept in lockstep by drift guards (Tizen byte-diff
test, Kotlin JUnit reads the shared JSON, new android-test CI job).
- All three players (web, Android, Tizen) filter by schedule against their
own clock, idle with a "Nothing scheduled" message + 30s re-check when
everything is filtered, and fail open on any evaluator error.
- Editor: per-item schedule modal + row badge in the playlist editor;
client validation mirrors the server; editing marks the playlist draft.
- Part B (behaviour change): device/group schedule overrides now evaluate
in each device's effective timezone instead of server-local time.
- Device detail shows the reported timezone + a clock-skew warning.
- i18n for en/es/fr/de/pt across all new strings (namespaced itemsched.*
to avoid colliding with the device-schedule calendar's schedule.*).
- CHANGELOG documents the feature, the Part B change, the fail-open
guarantee, and the scheduled-single-video re-render tradeoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A socket reconnecting with a device_id that no longer exists in `devices`
(e.g. the row was deleted server-side) hit the device_fingerprints insert
with an unknown foreign key. INSERT OR IGNORE does NOT suppress FOREIGN KEY
violations, so it threw a caught-but-noisy "Fingerprint tracking error" on
every such reconnect. Null out an unknown device_id before the insert; a
genuinely fresh device sends no device_id and was always fine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A never-visited org had no cached white-label, so brand-prime fell through to the
ScreenTinker default baked into the static index.html and flashed it before
branding.js fetched the org brand. Now the /app route injects the resolved
instance / custom-domain branding into the shell as a <meta name="ssr-brand">
(CSP blocks inline <script>, so a meta carries it), and brand-prime applies that
as the fallback when the per-workspace brand is not cached yet - so the page
paints the configured brand on first load instead of ScreenTinker.
- server.js: /app resolves branding (publicBranding strips internal columns) and
injects the HTML-escaped JSON as a meta tag; falls back to plain sendFile on
any error so branding can never break the app shell.
- brand-prime.js: read meta[name=ssr-brand] when there is no rd_branding_<ws>.
Verified: the meta carries the resolved brand (default ScreenTinker and a
platform-default white-label), internal columns do not leak, 66 unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bump-version.sh matched `<?xml version="1.0" ...?>` - the XML format version,
which has a leading space before version= just like the widget attribute - and
rewrote it to the app version, producing invalid XML that breaks the Tizen .wgt
build: 'XML version "X.Y.Z" is not supported, only XML 1.0 is supported'. (CI did
not catch it because the no-Tizen-CLI build path just zips the files without
validating the XML.)
- bump-version.sh: skip the `<?xml` declaration line in the tizen version sed.
- tizen/config.xml: restore the declaration to version="1.0" (prior bumps had
corrupted it to 1.8.2).
The widget version and tizen:application required_version are still updated /
left alone correctly (verified with a dummy bump + an XML parse).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Comparison table (landing + the 3 compare pages): correct cells against each
vendor's current pricing/docs (verified June 2026). Delete the inaccurate
Platforms, Content Designer, and Hardware Lock-in rows; relabel "Remote
Control" to "Live screen view + remote key presses" with an Android/permission
caveat; fix Video Wall, Kiosk, Free tier, White Label and remote cells for
Yodeck, ScreenCloud and OptiSigns. Add an "as of June 2026 / report errors"
footnote with a GitHub issues link.
- Compare pages: drop the false "supports more platforms than X" claims; correct
Yodeck (Windows/ChromeOS, web player, kiosk), OptiSigns (free tier, video wall,
white label, remote); add the same footnote + caveat.
- Mobile fix: .screenshot img now has max-width:100% / height:auto / display:block
so the dashboard preview no longer distorts on phones (no desktop effect).
- CSS bug: restore the dropped @media (max-width:768px) wrapper (braces were
102 { vs 103 }) so the mobile overrides stop leaking to desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
