Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ScreenTinker c71c4016ca feat(email): Microsoft Graph send + alert spam protection + preferences UI
Replaces the unused EMAIL_WEBHOOK_URL stub with a real Microsoft Graph
Mail.Send pipeline via @azure/msal-node client-credentials flow. Prior
state on prod: every alert email was logged to journalctl and never
sent (21 fallback log lines per hour for the chronic-offline devices).

Four coordinated changes shipped as one commit since they're all part
of making email delivery actually work responsibly:

1. services/email.js (NEW): Graph send via plain HTTPS (no SDK), in-memory
   MSAL token cache (refresh 60s pre-expiry), graceful stdout fallback
   when GRAPH_* env vars absent. Drop-in replacement for the old webhook.

2. services/alerts.js refactored: sequential await around sendEmail (was
   parallel fire-and-forget; first run hit Graph's MailboxConcurrency 429
   ApplicationThrottled on a 30-device backlog). Sequential at ~250ms per
   send takes 5-8s for the full backlog, well within the 60s tick. Also:
   24h long-offline cutoff to stop nagging about chronic-offline devices
   (the 20,000+ minute ones); 2-hour dedup window (was 1h) via a generic
   shouldSendAlert(type, id, windowMs) helper that future alert types
   (payment_failed, plan_limit_hit, etc.) can reuse.

3. Preferences UI: single checkbox in settings.js Account section bound
   to users.email_alerts. Saved via the existing Save Profile button. PUT
   /api/auth/me extended to accept email_alerts. requireAuth middleware
   SELECT now includes email_alerts so it propagates via req.user.

4. Dev safety net: GRAPH_DEV_RESTRICT_TO env var as an allow-list. When
   set, only listed recipients reach Graph; everyone else is suppressed
   with a log line. Prevents local dev (which often runs against fresh
   prod DB copies) from accidentally emailing real prod users. UNSET on
   prod systemd unit so production fans out normally.

Also: package.json scripts use --env-file-if-exists=.env so local dev
picks up .env automatically (Node 20.6+ built-in, no dotenv dep). Prod
runs via systemd ExecStart and is unaffected. server/.gitignore added
to keep .env out of git.

Smoke verified end-to-end:
- Sequential send pattern verified (a prior parallel-send tick had hit
  Graph's MailboxConcurrency 429 on 30 simultaneous sends; sequential
  at ~250ms each completes the same backlog without throttling)
- 24h cutoff silenced 20/21 prod devices on the next tick
- Dev restrict suppressed the 1 within-24h send
- User-preference toggle flipped via UI -> DB -> alert path silently
  continued before reaching even the suppression log
2026-05-12 18:16:40 -05:00
ScreenTinker 2954fd1a84 Phase 2.1: tenancy middleware, permission helpers, JWT workspace context, frontend + backend role-rename compat 2026-05-11 20:02:00 -05:00
ScreenTinker 772ead28a2 Fix reset-admin.js: honor recovery token in requireAuth
scripts/reset-admin.js signed a JWT with a synthetic id ("recovery-XXX")
and instructed the operator to paste it into localStorage. But the
requireAuth middleware always SELECTs the user row by id, so every
authed API call under the recovery token returned 401 "User not found"
and the recovery flow was effectively dead.

Fix:
- reset-admin.js now sets a `recovery: true` claim on the JWT.
- requireAuth / optionalAuth short-circuit the DB lookup when
  decoded.recovery === true and synthesize a req.user record in
  memory (role: admin, plan_id: enterprise). The synthetic user is
  never persisted, so FK-constrained writes that expect a real
  user (creating devices, etc.) will still fail — which is fine,
  recovery is only meant to let the operator reset a password or
  create a fresh admin via the Settings UI.

Security: a recovery token still requires the jwtSecret to sign,
so only someone with filesystem access to the server can mint one.
Token TTL remains 1h.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-21 19:08:49 -05:00
ScreenTinker afbe113acf Security audit remediation: auth, IDOR, XSS, hardening
- Device WebSocket authentication: devices get a device_token on
  registration, must present it on reconnect. All WS events require
  prior auth. Timing-safe token comparison.
- IDOR fixes: ownership checks on schedules (device, week), layouts
  (all CRUD, zones, duplicate, device assign), video-walls (content,
  device-config).
- XSS prevention: shared esc() helper in utils.js, fixed 13 innerHTML
  injection points across 9 frontend files.
- OAuth hardening: no longer silently overwrites auth_provider on
  accounts with local passwords (returns 409).
- JWT pinned to HS256 for sign and verify.
- Password policy: change endpoint now requires 8 chars (was 6).
- HSTS header enabled (max-age 1 year, includeSubDomains).
- Stripe webhook rejects unsigned payloads when no secret configured.
- Screenshot size validation (max 2MB base64).
- Rate limiting on exports, imports, content operations.
- Content file serving checks playlist_items instead of old assignments.
- Content ownership verified in device-groups assign-content.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-11 22:48:07 -05:00
ScreenTinker 1594a9d4a4 Initial open source release
ScreenTinker - open source digital signage management software.
MIT License, all features included, no license gates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 12:14:53 -05:00