scripts/reset-admin.js mints a JWT carrying `recovery: true`, and middleware/auth.js
accepted that claim on its own with no database involvement. Three consequences:
- NOT REVOCABLE. The only way to invalidate an outstanding recovery token was to rotate
JWT_SECRET, which logs out every user on the instance.
- NOT ENUMERABLE. Nobody could answer "is a recovery token outstanding right now?"
- NOT AUDITED. The synthetic id ('recovery-<nonce>') is not a users row, so every
activity_log insert for it failed the user_id foreign key and was swallowed by a catch —
a break-glass session left no trace at all.
A `recovery_grants` row per minted token turns all three around: DELETE revokes, SELECT
enumerates, expires_at bounds, and used_at + source_ip record when and from where it was
first exercised. The migration is additive and idempotent, so re-running is a no-op and a
code-only rollback just leaves an unused table.
The grant is session-scoped, NOT single-use-per-request. Recovery means many requests —
load the dashboard, list users, reset a password — so consuming the grant on the first
would make break-glass unusable, a worse outcome than the narrow replay window it closes.
Revocation and expiry are the controls; used_at is the audit stamp.
Also fixed, because it is the mechanism that hid this: logActivity now rewrites a
'recovery-*' id to a NULL user_id with the identity in `details`, so break-glass actions
are actually recorded instead of failing the FK; and a dropped audit row now logs a loud
[AUDIT-DROP] line naming the action and increments a counter, rather than vanishing into
console.error.
The token is written to a 0600 file instead of stdout — under systemd or Docker, printing
it meant journald captured a live admin credential well past its lifetime. Added --list
and --revoke-all.
In-flight recovery tokens minted before this change stop working; they live one hour and
were unrevocable, which is the problem being fixed. Minting already required a working DB,
so redeeming against one is not a new dependency.
test/session-token-resolution.test.js now mints a real grant for its recovery token, so
its assertions keep testing that break-glass is refused on those surfaces for lack of a
users row — not for the unrelated new reason that the token is invalid.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The on-device settings PIN (devices.settings_pin, minted at pairing) and the pairing code
assigned to imported devices both came from
`Math.floor(100000 + Math.random() * 900000)`.
Math.random is not a CSPRNG. V8 implements it as xorshift128+, whose internal state is
recoverable from a handful of consecutive outputs, and every call in a process draws from
that one shared stream. Both values are also observable by ordinary users — settings_pin
is returned in device API responses today — so a user who collects a few outputs could
predict the values minted around them, including for other tenants.
lib/numeric-code.sixDigitCode() uses crypto.randomInt, which is CSPRNG-backed and
rejection-samples so the distribution stays uniform. Range is 100000..999999 inclusive,
identical to the old expression, so codes are still exactly six digits with no leading
zero — the on-device keypad and pairing UI are unchanged.
Deliberately NOT converted, because neither gates access: the image-generation seed in
lib/image-gen.js, and the anti-burn-in pixel jitter inside generated widget HTML.
Also unchanged: the settings_pin backfill in db/database.js, which uses SQLite's random()
— that is ChaCha20 seeded from OS entropy, not a weak PRNG.
This is the generator half of the finding only. The separate half — that settings_pin is
returned to every workspace member, including read-only roles — is a response-shape change
and waits on the consumer enumeration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /api/devices/:id/screenshot returns a live picture of what a screen is showing, but
it was still authorized pre-tenancy: `device.user_id !== user.id`, with a role bypass
listing 'admin'/'superadmin'. Three consequences, all now covered by tests:
- `device.user_id &&` SHORT-CIRCUITED. A device with no user_id — never paired, or its
owner deleted — skipped the ownership test entirely, so any authenticated account on the
instance could read it. An unpaired panel displays its pairing code on screen, so that
image is also a route to claiming the device (AUTH-10, out of scope here but connected).
- 'platform_admin' was absent from the bypass list. #14 renamed 'superadmin' to
'platform_admin', so an actual platform admin fell through to the ownership test and was
denied unless they happened to own the row.
- Workspace members other than the owner were denied a device they administer through
every other endpoint.
Now uses accessContext() against the device's workspace — the same helper routes/devices.js
uses — which covers direct membership, org-level access and platform staff in one call. A
device with no workspace is denied outright rather than defaulting open.
Deliberately unchanged: the ?token= query-parameter mechanism on this route, which is a
separate finding with its own blast radius.
No response shape change: still 200 / 401 / 403 / 404 with the same bodies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The only throttle on POST /api/auth/login was the per-IP limiter in server.js. That
bounds one noisy source and nothing else: it does not bound a distributed attempt, and
it is only as accurate as a deployment's proxy configuration. Nothing counted failures
against the account actually being attacked, and nothing cleared such a count on success
because no such count existed.
lib/login-lockout.js mirrors lib/totp-lockout.js and lib/pair-lockout.js so there is one
lockout idiom here rather than three. 10 failed passwords lock an account for 15 minutes.
Keyed on user.id, never on the submitted email: the email is attacker-supplied and
unbounded, so keying on it would let anyone grow the Map without limit — the same class
of bug fixed elsewhere in this campaign. A user id only exists for a real account, so the
key space is bounded by the user table and needs no eviction sweep, exactly like
totp-lockout.
A locked account returns the SAME 401 and body as a wrong password. A distinct 429 would
tell an attacker "this account exists and is under attack", turning login into an
account-existence oracle; the test asserts the locked response is byte-identical to both
the wrong-password and unknown-account responses. The trade is that a locked-out
legitimate user sees the generic message, so the trip is recorded in activity_log
(auth:login_locked) for the operator instead.
The counter is cleared as soon as the password verifies — before the TOTP and
email-verification branches, which return early and never reach issueSession, so a reset
placed there would never fire for those accounts. SSO paths do not share this code and
are unaffected.
Frontend needs no change: login.js renders any non-ok body's `error` string verbatim, and
the body is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The diag widget runs in a null-origin sandboxed iframe, so it cannot carry a session and
its telemetry POST must stay unauthenticated. But the handler stored into a plain Map
keyed on a value taken from the request body, with no cap, no TTL and no eviction — an
unauthenticated caller could add entries until the process died. On this product a dead
server is a fleet-wide reconnect, so a bound here is a fleet-safety control.
Two changes:
- lib/bounded-snapshot-store.js: a "latest snapshot per key" store with a global entry cap
and a TTL, evicting least-recently-WRITTEN. The cap is GLOBAL rather than per-IP on
purpose — signage sites egress through one NAT address, so a per-IP limit punishes a
whole venue for one noisy panel and does nothing about a distributed writer. Same
reasoning the OTA download guard already documents ("NEVER per-IP (SNAT)"). A live panel
rewrites its key every 2.5s, so only entries the dashboard already treats as stale
(>15s) are ever eligible for eviction.
- The POST now answers 204 instead of res.json({ok:true}). The reporting widget ignores
the response (fetch(...).catch()), and services/activity.js activityLogger wraps
res.json — so this also stops an anonymous caller from writing one activity_log row, and
running two synchronous statements, per report.
Read contract unchanged: a live key returns its object, an unknown OR expired key returns
null — the shape frontend/js/views/device-detail.js already handles ("no report yet"), and
it treats anything older than 15s as stale regardless, so the 60s TTL is 4x looser than
what the UI honours. No client change; no rate limiter added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
getClientIp() decides the value every per-IP control keys on — the auth/pairing rate
limiters, lib/pair-lockout, and activity_log.ip_address — so a caller must never be able
to choose it. It believed CF-Connecting-IP whenever the immediate peer was in the
`trust proxy` list, which includes loopback/linklocal/uniquelocal.
Those entries are correct for X-Forwarded-For: a proxy APPENDS to that header and Express
walks the chain right-to-left, so a client-supplied value cannot become the resolved
address. CF-Connecting-IP has no chain — a local reverse proxy passes through whatever
single value the client sent — so treating a loopback peer as evidence the request came
through Cloudflare means trusting the client.
Gate it on the published Cloudflare ranges alone. This is also the portable behaviour:
most self-hosted installs are not behind Cloudflare, and for them the header is now
simply ignored, with attribution falling back to req.ip under whatever `trust proxy` the
operator configured. Installs that do front with Cloudflare are unaffected — their peer
really is a CF edge.
Documented the distinction at config/cloudflareIps.js so the two lists are not conflated
again. No response shape or DB change; no client impact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Uploaded files are served from the SAME ORIGIN as the dashboard, so how a browser
interprets them is a security boundary. Two things decided that interpretation, and
both were caller-controlled: the stored extension came from
`path.extname(originalname)`, and the only type check read `file.mimetype` — a request
header. A caller could therefore choose to have their bytes served as an active
document from the app origin.
Two independent invariants now hold the boundary:
1. INGEST — lib/upload-sniff.js sniffs magic bytes after multer writes a neutral
`.part` file (diskStorage names the file before any bytes exist, so the sniff cannot
happen there), maps the result through a hardcoded mime->extension allowlist, renames
accordingly, and stores the sniffed mime. Unsupported bytes are refused with a 400.
2. SERVING — upload responses carry `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox`, so if a response
is ever treated as a document it lands in an opaque origin with scripts disabled.
Anything outside the inline-safe extension set is additionally forced to download.
This holds regardless of how a file reached disk, so a future gap in (1) is contained
rather than exploitable.
Applied at every instance of the pattern, not just the first: lib/content-ingest.js,
the /replace route, the four content-serving paths across server.js and routes/content.js
(the latter pair currently shadowed by mount order, which is not a guarantee), and the
ZIP-import path in routes/status.js, which took its extension from the archive entry.
SVG stays accepted and stays inline: white-label logos are SVG, and octet-stream +
nosniff makes <img> fail. Scripts in an SVG never run in an image context, and the
sandbox CSP covers the one case where they would — a direct navigation. SVG is also no
longer handed to sharp, which removes the librsvg path where the open libvips CVEs live.
Existing rows are untouched — no migration. The four upload fixtures in agency.test.js
uploaded `Buffer.from('x')` declared as image/png; that is the exact "declared type is a
lie" case this closes, so the fixtures now use real PNG bytes. No assertion changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Six places verified a session JWT inline instead of going through requireAuth,
each repeating a slightly different subset of its checks. Introduce
resolveSessionUser() in middleware/auth.js as the single definition of "this
token is a usable session, and here is whose it is", and route all of them
through it: the three /api/status token routes, the screenshot route, the
content-reference gate, and the /dashboard socket handshake. requireAuth is now
a thin wrapper over the same helper, so the two cannot drift.
Also:
- Give the pre-TOTP token a distinct audience so it is redeemable only through
verifyMfaPendingToken (POST /api/auth/totp/verify). verifyToken refuses any
token carrying an audience, so a token minted for one purpose cannot be
redeemed on another path.
- The dashboard socket handshake now takes userId/userRole from the live users
row rather than from the token claim, so role changes take effect on the next
connection instead of riding the token's remaining lifetime.
- Add test/session-token-resolution.test.js covering all six surfaces,
including the socket handshake.
Every call site keeps the status code and error body it returned before.
Net query cost: the content-reference gate and the socket handshake each gain
one users-by-id lookup (the same one requireAuth already does per request); the
other four are unchanged or replace an equivalent lookup.
In-flight pre-TOTP tokens are invalidated by the audience change; they live 5
minutes, so the window is a re-login at worst.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
getUserPlan()'s auto-downgrade was guarded on `subscription_status !== 'active'`,
but that column DEFAULTs to 'active' and is only ever changed by Stripe webhook
events. For trial users who never touch Stripe — the entire population it's meant
to catch — the condition was always false, so the downgrade never ran and every
signup kept Pro free forever.
Re-key the guard on the real signals:
- trial expired (!trial_active), AND
- stripe_subscription_id IS NULL (never paid), AND
- plan_id === trial_plan (still on the plan the trial granted), AND
- plan_name !== 'free'
The plan_id === trial_plan clause is load-bearing: it protects comped / hand-
granted plans (e.g. a manually-set enterprise plan, where plan_id !== trial_plan)
from being silently downgraded. Grandfathered accounts (trial_started IS NULL)
never enter the block at all, so the ~home cohort is untouched. Added a comment
documenting the subscription_status-default trap so it isn't reintroduced.
Enforcement stays forward-only/lazy — the downgrade happens in the resolver on a
user's next request; no mass update here.
Downstream (deviceSocket.checkDeviceAccess, traced, unchanged): a genuinely-
expired free-tier trial now resolves to free and its device-limit block correctly
caps it to 1 device; grandfathered home (2 devices) and paid users are not
blocked. NOTE: the separate "Trial Expired" screen branch there is a pre-existing
dead condition (it needs trial_started set AND plan_name='free' at once, but the
downgrade clears trial_started) — left as-is per scope; flagged for follow-up.
Tests (new trial-expiry.test.js — there was none, which is how this shipped):
lapsed trial downgrades; comped enterprise (plan_id!=trial_plan) not downgraded;
grandfathered home (trial_started NULL) not downgraded; paid user not downgraded;
in-window trial not downgraded; plus a regression pinning that subscription_status
='active' no longer shields a lapsed trial. Suite 563/563.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add allow_promotion_codes: true to the checkout.sessions.create call in
POST /checkout. This is what renders the "Add promotion code" field on Stripe's
hosted checkout page; for API-created sessions there is no Dashboard equivalent
(that toggle only exists for Payment Links, which we don't use), so a comment
warns against removing it as "redundant". The billingPortal branch is untouched
— portal sessions handle discounts separately.
Testing: no Stripe-SDK test/mock existed (the billing-*.test.js files cover the
#146 usage-metering path, not Stripe). Added stripe-checkout.test.js using the
repo's in-process router-mount convention with a minimal `stripe` stub injected
via require.cache, asserting the checkout payload carries
allow_promotion_codes:true (and still builds a subscription session for the
requested price). Full suite 557/557.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Subtitles/captions are set once in the content library and applied
automatically by the player — no in-player controls (the player stays bare).
- DB: 4 new content columns (captions_enabled, captions_lang for YouTube;
subtitle_url, subtitle_lang for uploaded videos), all default off/NULL.
- buildSnapshotItems: denormalize the 4 fields into published_snapshot so the
player receives them (enumerated query).
- content.js PUT: accept the 4 fields (subtitle_url only clearable here).
- POST /:id/subtitle: dedicated .vtt uploader (separate multer, since the main
filter is video/image-only); stores the file in the content dir, records
subtitle_url + subtitle_lang. Old subtitle file replaced; DELETE cleans up
the sidecar.
- Player: YouTube -> loadModule('captions') + setOption(...languageCode) in
onReady (best-effort, wrapped). Uploaded video -> a <track kind="subtitles">
appended to the <video>, forced mode='showing' on load (same-origin, so
CORS-clean like the video).
- Edit modal: YouTube gets an enable-captions checkbox + language; uploaded
video gets a .vtt file picker + language + a remove-subtitle option. en/es.
Honest limitation (in the PR): YouTube caption control via the IFrame API is
undocumented/version-dependent and only works if the video actually has
captions — hence best-effort and wrapped so it can never break playback.
Test: content-subtitles.test.js — the 4 fields survive publish -> snapshot,
the .vtt upload endpoint stores + records the file, and a non-.vtt is rejected.
Suite 550/550.
Closes#216
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The content library had no batch operations — every item was managed one at a
time. Add multi-select with batch delete and batch move.
Backend (content.js):
- POST /content/batch/delete — array of ids, atomic: validates + authorizes
EVERY id first (malformed/missing/forbidden rejects the whole batch), then
deletes in one transaction. Reuses the single-delete teardown.
- POST /content/batch/move — array of ids + target folder_id, same atomic
validate-all-first; target folder must share each item's workspace. Folder is
organizational (not in the snapshot), so no device push.
- Refactor: extract purgeContentRow() (file removal + snapshot scrub + row
delete + affected-device collection) and pushContentUpdates(); DELETE /:id now
uses them, so single + batch share one scrub path (no duplication). Add a
boolean contentWritable() mirroring checkContentWrite's authorization.
- 500-item cap per batch; UUID validation guards the snapshot-scrub LIKE.
Frontend (content-library):
- Per-card selection checkbox, select-all/none (visible), shift-click range.
- Selection persists across folders/pages (issue-aligned cross-page selection);
cleared after a successful batch op.
- Batch toolbar (shown when >0 selected): count, move-to-folder picker, delete
with click-again confirm. Selected cards get an outline.
- api.batchDeleteContent / batchMoveContent; en/es i18n.
Not included: batch "set expiry" (listed in the issue's toolbar sketch but only
delete/move had endpoint specs) — deferred; PUT already does per-item expiry.
Test: content-batch-ops.test.js — batch delete removes rows+files+scrubs
snapshots; atomic rejection leaves valid rows intact; malformed id -> 400;
batch move reassigns folder; cross-workspace folder refused; empty batch -> 400.
Suite 553/553.
Closes#213
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Uploading N files fired N sequential XHRs (one POST per file). Select-many now
goes up in a single request.
- Server POST /api/content: upload.array-style `files` field (up to 20) via
upload.fields, looping ingestUploadedFile per file. Keeps the legacy single
`file` field so older clients / API callers are unaffected. Response shape is
backward-compatible: a single file returns the content object (what every
existing caller reads), a batch returns the array.
- api.uploadContent: accepts a File, FileList, or array; appends all under
`files`; aggregate upload progress; resolves to object (single) or array
(batch).
- content-library handleFiles: one batched request with aggregate progress and
a "N files uploaded" toast instead of a per-file loop.
- en/es i18n for the count-based progress/toast strings.
checkStorageLimit is left as-is — it's a coarse pre-gate (blocks only when
already at/over the limit), same as before; per-file aggregate sizing was a
listed "consideration", not required, and is out of scope here.
Test: content-multi-upload.test.js drives the real router+multer over HTTP —
3-file batch creates 3 rows and returns an array, legacy single `file` returns
an object, single `files` returns an object, empty -> 400. Suite 545/545.
Closes#212
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Content discovery was client-side only, scoped to the items already rendered
on the current page — searching "logo" on page 1 couldn't find logos on page
2 or in another folder.
Server (GET /api/content):
- ?q= text search on filename (LIKE, workspace-wide — a search ignores the
open folder so nothing is missed). LIKE metacharacters are escaped so a
filename with % or _ matches literally.
- ?type=video|image|youtube|web — youtube (video/youtube) and web (other
remote_url) are split from plain uploaded video/image so the four UI buckets
map cleanly.
- ?sort=date_desc|date_asc|name|size — whitelisted (never interpolates user
input into ORDER BY); default keeps the legacy newest-first ordering.
Frontend (content-library):
- Type filter + sort dropdowns; search debounced (300ms) and now hits the
server instead of filtering the DOM.
- Result count shown while a search/type filter is active.
- en/es i18n.
api.getContent gains an opts arg ({q,type,sort}); folder_id is omitted while
searching to match the server's workspace-wide behaviour.
Test: content-search-filter-sort.test.js mounts the real router and covers
substring match, LIKE-escape (literal %), the type buckets, name/size sort,
the ORDER BY injection guard, and combined filters. Suite 541/541.
Closes#214
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On Android TV with weak/unstable WiFi, YouTube embeds auto-select 1080p+
and buffer/stall. Add a per-item "Unstable connection" flag that biases the
YouTube embed toward a 720p ceiling.
- DB: content.unstable_connection INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 (non-destructive,
existing rows unchanged).
- buildSnapshotItems: denormalize the flag into published_snapshot so it
reaches the player (that query enumerates columns, so it had to be added
explicitly — covered by a new test). preview-payload reuses the same query.
- content.js PUT: accept + coerce unstable_connection to 0/1.
- Player: playerVars.vq='hd720' + best-effort setPlaybackQuality('hd720') in
onReady when the flag is set. Both are hints YouTube may still override, but
together they bias the initial selection down to 720p.
- Edit modal: YouTube-only checkbox + hint; en/es i18n.
Scoped to the core ask; the issue's optional "Shorts get inverse hd1080"
refinement is intentionally left out (dubious for signage, and forcing higher
quality on a weak link is the opposite of the goal).
Closes#217
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three features from this session, full server suite green (535/535).
TOTP 2FA (#100) — backend shipped without a UI; add it:
- Login: mfa_required -> 6-digit challenge (recovery codes accepted) -> /totp/verify.
- Settings > Account: enable (QR + confirm -> recovery codes once), regenerate,
disable; SSO accounts see "managed by your identity provider".
- /totp/setup returns a server-rendered qr_data_url (bundled qrcode dep). keyuri
folds the request Host into the issuer so multi-instance accounts are
distinguishable in the authenticator app.
Email verification on signup — hosted HARD-block / self-host SOFT-nudge:
- email_verified column; existing users asked on first login (SSO + platform
admins grandfathered); single-use 24h tokens (SHA-256 hashed).
- Gate engages only when email is configured (never locks out a no-mail instance).
GET /verify-email + POST /resend-verification (generic, no account enumeration).
- Client: "confirm your email" flow + resend, verified/error toasts, self-host
banner; onAuthSuccess refuses a tokenless response (defensive).
Tizen SSSP URL-Launcher install — Fusion-style one-URL native install:
- Server hosts /tizen/sssp_config.xml (dynamic <size>, always matches the served
.wgt) + /tizen/ScreenTinker.wgt + a human landing. lib/wgt-cache.js resolves the
signed .wgt (/data mount wins, mirroring the APK).
- build-wgt.sh also emits a static sssp_config.xml for CDN hosting.
- Retail panels require a Samsung Partner cert; dev-mode is SDB self-signed only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(widgets): bulk import for the directory board (JSON / CSV / TSV / text)
Adds an "Import from JSON / CSV" button to the directory-board editor. Paste JSON
(the { company, tenantsByFloor, advertisements, backgroundImages } shape plus
categories[]/floors[]/flat-array/bare-floor-map variants), a CSV/TSV/pipe/semicolon
table (with or without a header — vacant/yes/1 => available, quoted fields), or a
sectioned "room name" text list, and it auto-fills title, footer, floors->categories,
rooms/names/details/availability, and background-image URLs. "Replace / append" toggle.
Tolerant key matching (room/suite/unit/id, name/tenant/company, details/subtitle, …);
warns on things it can't use (bare-filename background images, headerless columns).
parseDirectoryImport is pure and was unit-tested in node across every format.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(widgets): directory board — logo replaces title, and images load on the player
Two on-screen bugs on the directory board:
1. A logo did not remove the title text — both rendered, stacking the wordmark over
the name. renderDirectoryBoard (and the directory-search header) now gate the title
h1 behind !logoSrc, so a logo replaces the title. New render test guards it.
2. Logo + background images did not show on the player (NS_ERROR_DOM_CORP_FAILED,
0 bytes). The player embeds widgets in a sandbox="allow-scripts" (opaque-origin)
iframe, so /api/content image requests are cross-origin, and the helmet default
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin blocks them. Set CORP: cross-origin (+
ACAO:*) on the content file + thumbnail routes, matching the existing /uploads/content
static route. Content already serves publicly, so no new exposure. Verified in a real
sandboxed iframe: same-origin blocks, cross-origin loads.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Tizen .wgt player black-flashed between IMAGE items on slow decode HW
(Samsung OM55B / SSSP). Root cause: playCurrent() called clearStage() before
renderImage() set img.src, so the stage was empty (black) until the new image
decoded. Images had no decode-gated double-buffer — video gained one in #167
(938a43a), which made the always-present image flash conspicuous by contrast.
renderImage has been byte-identical since the first Tizen commit, so there was
nothing to revert; the buffer had to be ADDED, mirroring the video path.
- preloadImage()/_takePreloadImage()/_releasePreloadImage(): one-ahead,
image-only decode-gated buffer modeled on preloadVideo()/_takePreload().
Detached <img>, src set, warmed via HTMLImageElement.decode() (feature-
detected — onload/complete fallback for Tizen 5.0 / SSSP6). Warmed when the
current image begins its dwell and from the group-sync boundary tick.
- renderImage now SWAPS: take the pre-decoded <img> (or decode a fresh one) and
only THEN clearStage()+append, in one synchronous block — the compositor
never sees an empty stage. Never clear-then-load on the image path.
- Scoped to images only: playCurrent() skips the up-front clearStage() solely
for image targets (same branch order as the dispatch); video/youtube/widget
keep their pre-dispatch clear untouched. onerror and decode() rejection route
to skipSoon(); stale-index guard blocks mounting a stale decode over the
current item after next()/gotoIndex/load(); one-ahead with stale release on
index move, load(), stop(), and group-sync exit. #A1 single-item heal intact.
Tests:
- server/test/tizen-image-blackflash.test.js (new, 4/4): loads the real
player.js in a vm context with a test-controllable decode() Promise and proves
the invariant — across image->image the #stage is NEVER without a mounted
<img> (old element held until the new image's decode()/onload resolves, then
swap). Covers decode() supported, decode() absent (onload fallback), and
broken-image (decode-reject / onerror) -> skipSoon. Proven to VIOLATE on the
old clear-then-load ordering and HOLD on the fix.
- server/test/pip-overlay.test.js: the decode-gate makes image mount async,
which broke its older shim (no decode()/onload/complete). Teach the shim
element complete/naturalWidth so renderImage takes its synchronous
complete-fallback branch and mounts. Test-only.
Full server suite 486/486. node -c clean. Headless proves the DOM ordering
invariant (the flash's precondition); final black-frame sign-off needs a real
OM55B panel (manual steps in the test-file header).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A fresh unclaimed player that reconnects (same fingerprint) INSIDE the server's
~5s deferred-offline grace hit a false 'active on another connection' reclaim
reject, then collided on UNIQUE(devices.pairing_code) on the fall-through INSERT
and wedged unclaimed with no content. Real trial customer (web player) hit it.
server/ws/deviceSocket.js:
- Fix A (guard): gate the liveConn reclaim reject on !inDeferredOffline
(pendingOfflines.has(id)). A device mid-deferred-offline is a zombie, not live,
so a same-fingerprint reconnect is a legit reconnect, not a hijack. A genuinely
live socket (never disconnected -> no pending-offline) still rejects a cloned
fingerprint -> anti-hijack boundary preserved (documented).
- Fix B (idempotency): when the unclaimed old row holds the SAME pairing_code the
reconnecting player presents, ADOPT/refresh it (mirror the claimed-reclaim path,
but no device:paired) instead of INSERT-colliding. Differing-code case unchanged.
- deferOffline is NOT shrunk (it exists to prevent transient-blip flapping).
server/player/index.html:
- The cold-boot flap source: an unfiltered pageshow handler ran verifyLivenessSoon()
on every load, opening+registering a socket early, which the boot connect() then
tore down and rebuilt (connect->register->disconnect->reconnect). Guard it with
ev.persisted (mirror the pagehide guard) so only real bfcache restores trigger it.
server/test/pairing-race.test.js:
- Forces the race against the real socket server (log-gated reconnect inside the
deferred-offline window), asserts no false reject / no UNIQUE collision / single
claimable row; + a hijack case asserting a cloned fingerprint on a genuinely-live
display is still rejected. Web- and android-shaped fingerprints. Fails 2/4 on
pre-fix code, 4/4 with the fix.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Vertical Shorts were played in a player forced to 100%x100% on a landscape
frame, so they looked wrong (pillarboxed/small). Option A: detect vertical at
ingest, persist it, and have every player honor it.
- Ingest (routes/content.js): detect a Short from the /shorts/ URL form OR
portrait oEmbed dims (oEmbed now queried with the ORIGINAL url so /shorts/
reports its true dimensions), and persist it as st_aspect=vertical on the
stored embed URL. That's the only signal players get (remote_url), so it must
be captured at ingest, not re-derived per loop. YouTube ignores the unknown
param; players read the video id, not the full URL, to build the embed.
- Players read st_aspect=vertical and center a 9:16 box (fills a portrait screen,
pillarboxes cleanly on landscape) instead of 100%x100%:
web (player/index.html), Android (WebViewSupport.youtubeEmbedHtml), Tizen
(player.js single-zone + zone paths). Dashboard library uses a static thumbnail,
so it's unaffected.
Not doing Option B (yt-dlp): runtime dep + storage/bandwidth + maintenance +
YouTube ToS; embed-disabled Shorts already skip gracefully.
Tests: youtube-shorts.test.js (4) — /shorts/ and portrait-dims tag vertical,
landscape stays untagged, /shorts/ tags even if oEmbed fails. Android compiles;
web player inline JS + Tizen player.js parse.
Note: pre-existing Shorts added before this aren't retagged (would need an oEmbed
backfill) — re-add to fix, or a follow-up migration.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(widgets): add directory-search widget
An interactive, walk-up search view of an existing directory-board. It
references a source board by id (no data copy), so a venue can run the
scrolling board on a main screen and a search view on a tablet, letting
people find an entry instantly.
Server (routes/widgets.js):
- register 'directory-search' + renderDirectorySearch(): resolves the source
board, inlines its categories as one \u003c-guarded JSON blob, renders all
text via textContent (XSS-safe), live case-insensitive filter over
identifier/name/subtitle (debounced), grouped results, available styling,
optional touch on-screen QWERTY keyboard that drives the same filter path.
- missing / non-directory-board source -> friendly full-page fallback, not a 500.
- live-sync while open is out of scope; left a // TODO for a poll hook.
Frontend editor (views/widgets.js): type + magnifier icon, source-board
dropdown (from loaded widgets, filtered to directory-board), title, logo
(reuses the board's picker), placeholder text, theme, on-screen-keyboard toggle;
getConfigFromForm case. i18n: widget.dirsearch.* + type keys in en/es/it/de/pt/fr.
docs: openapi widget_type enum. Tests: server/test/directory-search.test.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(widgets): live-sync for directory-search (poll source board, no reload)
Reflect directory-board edits on an open directory-search page without a reload.
- New public GET /api/widgets/:id/data.json returns { categories } for a
directory-board (404 for missing/wrong-type so the page keeps last-good data
on a transient miss). CORS-open (ACAO:*) + no-store so a null-origin sandboxed
widget iframe can read it; exposes only data already public via /render.
Exempted from CSP + auth in server.js alongside /render.
- directory-search page inlines its source_widget_id and polls the board's
data.json every 30s via a relative URL (works behind a proxy/base path and
from a null-origin iframe). Only rebuilds + rerenders when the data actually
changed, so a mid-search view isn't disturbed; skips while document.hidden;
keeps last-good data on any fetch error. Flatten logic factored into
buildFlat() and reused by the poll.
Tests: data.json feed (categories, CORS header, 404s) + poll wiring in
directory-search.test.js (13/13). Verified live in a browser (page.clock
fast-forward): editing the board updates the search page with no reload.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(android): let player WebViews take touch focus for interactive widgets
directory-search is served through the existing generic widget path
(loadUrl <server>/api/widgets/:id/render), so it already renders on Android
with JS + DOM storage + mixed-content enabled, same-origin (so its live-sync
fetch of the source board's data.json works), and no touch blocking.
Add isFocusable/isFocusableInTouchMode to the shared WebView config so the
search field reliably takes a tap/cursor inside the kiosk lock-task WebView.
Harmless for passive widgets (board/YouTube have no focusable inputs); the
widget's own on-screen keyboard still drives the filter when the system IME
is suppressed. Verified with :app:compileDebugKotlin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bold Media Group's fleet broke on the 1.9.3->1.9.6 upgrade. Their MDM does an
uninstall/reinstall (app data wiped), so the player registers with
{ pairing_code, fingerprint } and NO device_id and shows a pairing code — but the
dashboard reported "code does not exist". Deleting the device_fingerprints row fixed
it, which pinpointed the fingerprint-reclaim guard in server/ws/deviceSocket.js.
Root cause: the reclaim guard was
`stillAlive = !!liveConn || secondsSince < reclaimSettleSeconds; if (stillAlive) reject`.
On an in-place reinstall the old row heartbeat seconds ago, so `secondsSince < 300` is
ALWAYS true -> it emitted device:auth-error and returned BEFORE the pairing_code INSERT,
so the code the player displayed never existed server-side.
The settle window's real purpose was to REMATCH an existing fingerprint back to its
device row on reinstall — not to force a fresh re-pair. So the fix keys off claim status,
not the timer (server-only; no APK change — reviewed and confirmed unnecessary):
- Reject ONLY when the old row has a genuinely LIVE socket (liveConn) — the real anti-
hijack boundary. Unchanged.
- CLAIMED old row (user_id set) -> RECLAIM it regardless of the settle window: reuse the
row, rotate the token, emit device:registered{online} + device:paired. The panel returns
straight to paired (no operator re-pair, no orphaned duplicate row), preserving name /
claim / playlist / content. device:paired drives the app off the pairing screen, so the
fresh code it showed is irrelevant.
- UNCLAIMED old row -> fall through to the pairing_code path and PROVISION FRESH with the
shown code (reclaiming would leave a stale/null code -> "code does not exist"). #150
relinks the fingerprint to the new row.
`reclaimSettleSeconds` is now vestigial for this path. Trade-off: a fingerprint-only reclaim
of a CLAIMED-but-offline device is no longer delayed ~300s — not a new attack class (the old
code already granted it once the window elapsed); liveConn remains the hard boundary. Truly
closing that window without a re-pair needs client keystore attestation (a future APK).
Also fixes a latent crash this newly exercises: middleware/subscription.js getUserPlan()
dereferenced an undefined user in its else branch ("Cannot set properties of undefined
(setting 'trial_active')") when the user/plan JOIN missed. Under the claimed-reclaim path
that ran checkDeviceAccess->getUserPlan, the throw was swallowed by the reclaim try/catch and
silently dropped the device to provision-fresh. Guard: `if (!user) return null`.
Tests (server/test/fingerprint-reclaim.test.js):
- NEW: a CLAIMED reinstall reclaims the SAME row, emits device:paired, creates no duplicate,
keeps the fingerprint linked — regardless of the settle window (the Bold repro, fixed right).
- NEW: recent heartbeat + no live socket, UNCLAIMED -> provisions fresh with the shown code.
- NEW: a LIVE old socket still rejects and creates no new row (security preserved).
- Updated the #143 gone-device test to expect provision-fresh for an unclaimed row, and the
log-noise assertion to the "reclaim rejected" message.
465/465 server tests pass. Server-only: NOT deployed, no version bump, Android untouched.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a pluggable email transport so self-hosters without Azure/M365 can send
mail through any standard SMTP server (Postfix, Gmail, Mailgun, SendGrid, corp
relay). Graph stays the default; behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged when
EMAIL_TRANSPORT is unset or "graph".
- config: EMAIL_TRANSPORT ("graph"|"smtp", default graph) + SMTP_HOST/PORT/
SECURE/USER/PASSWORD/FROM.
- services/email.js: branch by transport behind the SAME public sendEmail()/
isConfigured() surface. SMTP via nodemailer (lazy-required, like MSAL).
Shared across both transports: the "[ScreenTinker] " subject prefix (unless
rawSubject), the GRAPH_DEV_RESTRICT_TO allow-list, html-from-text derivation,
and the never-throws contract (failures log + return sent:false). SMTP_SECURE
true=implicit TLS(465)/false=STARTTLS(587). Auth optional (unauthenticated
relay ok); SMTP_USER without SMTP_PASSWORD is flagged. SMTP_FROM parses
"Name <addr>". New emailConfigStatus() for startup diagnostics.
- server.js: startup logs the transport and a LOUD error when the selected
transport is partially configured (some fields set, others missing) or when
EMAIL_TRANSPORT is invalid (falls back to graph). A fully-unset transport
stays a silent stdout fallback (unchanged dev behavior).
- nodemailer ^6.9.16 added as a production dep (bundled in the Docker image).
- .env.example + README: SMTP config section, Gmail example, transport table.
- test/email-transport.test.js: 15 tests — transport selection, config
validation (missing/partial/invalid), SMTP message building (from/prefix/
fromName override/text alt), sendEmail routing (mocked nodemailer), rawSubject,
dev-restrict on smtp, and the smtp_error never-throws path.
462/462 server tests pass. Boot verified for all four states (configured,
misconfigured, invalid, default).
Closes#173
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(diagnostics): device incident log — why a screen went offline/black, with device-attested cause
Field request (Bold/s_t_r_o_b_e): "screens go offline randomly — let us see the cause." Answers it
across the fleet with a unified incident log, and — the key insight — lets the DEVICE disambiguate
the cause the server can't: if the app process survived the gap it was a NETWORK problem (not a
reboot), and it can even tell a dropped Wi-Fi/Ethernet link from a link-up-but-server-unreachable
(router/upstream) failure.
Schema:
- device_status_log gains reason + detail (WHY each offline transition happened).
- NEW device_events table (unified incident feed): type (offline/online/display_off/display_on/
crash/reboot/network/app_error) + reason + detail, indexed, age-pruned + per-device capped.
Server:
- Capture the socket.io disconnect REASON (transport_close/ping_timeout/transport_error) instead of
discarding it — recorded in the offline-cause log. devices.offline_reason stays on the EXIT-SIGNAL
contract (crashed/clean_exit/silent) — a separate axis, preserved (violent death = 'silent').
- device:event handler (typed incidents) + device:connectivity-report handler (device-attested).
lib/incident-classify.js (pure, unit-tested) composes reason+detail: cold_start->reboot;
link_lost->network "Wi-Fi/Ethernet link lost"; else network "LAN up, server unreachable
(router/upstream)"; appends SSID / weak-signal (rssi<-75) / IP-changed. On a report it upgrades the
most-recent offline row from the server's guess to the device's ground truth.
- heartbeat timeout -> 'heartbeat_timeout'; retention/cap for device_events.
- Device-detail API returns statusLog.reason/detail + the last 50 device_events.
Device (Android WebSocketService): ConnectivityManager default-network callback (link-lost during a
gap) + Wi-Fi SSID/RSSI + IP snapshot -> device:connectivity-report on reconnect (app survived =>
network); ACTION_SCREEN_ON/OFF receiver -> device:event display_on/off ("screen went black"). All
guarded/feature-detected; no manifest change; compiles clean.
Web + Tizen players: reconnect connectivity-report (link_lost from navigator.onLine during the gap)
+ visibilitychange -> display_off/on. Best-effort (no wifi detail in a browser). Tizen exit-signal
marker slice untouched.
CMS (device-detail): the offline cause on the uptime-timeline hover + a new "Recent incidents" panel
(merged offline periods + typed events, friendly labels, detail, relative time + down-duration).
Built as a 4-way parallel agent fan-out over disjoint domains against a locked contract, then
integrated. Verified: full server suite 443/443 (incl. the seam fix keeping the exit-signal contract
intact), Android compileDebugKotlin clean, all players + CMS node -c clean.
Refs #170.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(diagnostics): internet-reachability probe — split "our server down" from "no internet" (#170)
Follow-up to the incident log: when a device's link is UP but it's offline, "router/upstream" was a
catch-all. The device now probes a public host (1.1.1.1 / 8.8.8.8 :443) DURING the gap, so the cause
pinpoints blame:
- link_lost=true -> Wi‑Fi/Ethernet link lost (device's own link)
- link up, internet_ok=true -> server_down: internet reachable, OUR server was unreachable
- link up, internet_ok=false -> no_internet: router/ISP down
- link up, no probe result -> generic router/upstream (unchanged fallback)
- Android WebSocketService: fire a short daemon-thread TCP probe (443, either host) at disconnect;
the result rides the connectivity-report as internet_ok (omitted if the gap ends before it finishes).
- lib/incident-classify.js: 3-way split on internet_ok; new reasons server_down / no_internet.
- Frontend i18n: device.event.server_down / .no_internet labels.
- Tests: +3 classify cases (server_down, no_internet, link_lost wins over internet_ok). 12/12.
Verified: classify 12/12, Android compileDebugKotlin clean, node -c clean. Refs #170.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(diagnostics): log an 'upgrade' incident (old → new app_version) — server-side (#170)
When a device reports an app_version different from the stored one, applyDeviceInfo logs an
'upgrade' device_events row (detail 'old → new'). Server-side, so it covers Android/Tizen/web with
no client change; a fresh pair (no prior version) isn't counted. Adds device.event.upgrade label.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The subprocess-booting test suites hand-picked fixed ports in a cramped ~3955-4021 range, and
156-schedule-read-path deviated to a RANDOM port (3900 + rand%90) that overlapped those fixed
ports. Under CI load two servers could race on the same port, surfacing as flaky "no such table:
devices" / "FOREIGN KEY constraint failed" (a server answering a request against a half-migrated
or wrong DB). It's environmental — the suites pass locally and in isolation.
Fix: a shared test/helpers/free-port.js (bind :0 on loopback, read the OS-assigned port, release)
called in before() so every suite gets a guaranteed-unique ephemeral port — concurrent suites can
no longer collide, and no one has to hand-assign ports.
- Codemod converted 30 suites: const PORT = <fixed|random> -> let PORT (+ BASE) assigned via
`PORT = await freePort()` at the top of before().
- 3 hand-fixed (different structure): 148-eviction-storm (lowercase `base`), boot-health (no
before() — allocates PORT + a throwaway SEED_PORT inside the test, replacing the hardcoded
3894), totp-keyrotation (no before() — allocates at the test start before bootServer()).
No fixed 39xx/40xx ports remain. Full server suite 435/435; the 4 hand-touched suites pass in
isolation. Pure test-infra change — no app code touched.
* fix(content): rotation-aware media dimensions — portrait no longer stored landscape (#170)
Ingest recorded CODED width/height and ignored rotation, so a portrait phone video
(coded 1920x1080 + 90° Display-Matrix) or a portrait photo (EXIF orientation 6) was
stored LANDSCAPE. The player then rendered it wrong-aspect and letterboxed — the
"portrait content degraded + blue bar at the bottom" symptom in #170. The reporter's
workaround (pre-rotate + mark Landscape) is exactly what this bug forces.
- lib/media-orientation.js (new): pure, unit-tested display-dimension helpers = single
source of truth for ingest AND the backfill. videoDisplayDims() reads the modern
Display-Matrix side_data rotation (falls back to the legacy tags.rotate, sign-normalized);
imageDisplayDims() honors EXIF orientation 5..8. Odd quarter-turns swap W/H.
- lib/content-ingest.js: use the helpers for stored dims; add sharp .rotate() so image
THUMBNAILS are auto-oriented too (video thumbs were already auto-rotated by ffmpeg).
- scripts/backfill-rotation-dims.js (new): idempotent, dry-run-by-default maintenance to
correct already-uploaded portrait media (re-probe -> fix dims -> regenerate image thumbs).
- test/media-orientation.test.js: 5 bites (tag + Display-Matrix, sign/normalize, EXIF 5..8,
the blue-bar landscape->portrait case, null-safety).
Scopes #170 to its residual-on-1.9.4 issues; the 1.9.3 "never displays" slice was #162 +
the remote_url-null download fix, already shipped in 1.9.4. The slow low-res/orientation-
cycling first load is tracked separately in #170 pending repro data.
Refs #170.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(android): honor EXIF orientation in ImageLoader so portrait photos render upright (#170)
Completes the rotation-aware media fix on the PLAYER side. The server ingest fix (this
branch) corrects stored dimensions + auto-orients the thumbnail, but the panel draws the
full-res original via BitmapFactory, which ignores EXIF — so a portrait photo (landscape
pixels tagged "rotate 90") still rendered sideways on the screen. QA root-cause pass on
#170 caught this gap: the Android player reads no stored dims and applied no EXIF.
ImageLoader now reads the EXIF orientation (from the file for cached content, from the byte
stream for remote_url images — ExifInterface(stream) is API 24+, minSdk is 24) and rotates/
flips the decoded bitmap via a Matrix (all 8 orientations). NORMAL/UNDEFINED is a no-op (no
extra allocation); a transformed copy recycles the source; OOM falls back to the source
rather than crashing. Videos were already correct (ExoPlayer honors the rotation matrix).
Verified: :app:compileDebugKotlin clean.
Refs #170. Rides with the server rotation-dims fix on this branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agency-portal uploads previously all landed at the workspace library root, unsorted.
Instead of the issue's whole-workspace folder dropdown (which would leak every folder
name to an external party), bind ONE folder per agency token — admin-controlled and
agency-invisible — and scope the portal picker strictly to that folder's own subtree
(Hybrid-C). Fully backwards-compatible: no bound folder -> root, exactly as before.
Model / multi-workspace: an agency token is bound to ONE workspace at issuance, so the
token key IS that workspace's private link and the bound folder lives in that workspace.
An admin with N workspaces mints one token per workspace (each with its own auto-folder).
No workspace-switcher in the portal — the token is the tenant boundary.
Backend:
- api_tokens.upload_folder_id (additive; ON DELETE SET NULL -> deleting the folder falls
back to root).
- lib/agency-targets.folderSubtree(): recursive-CTE helper = the SINGLE confinement source
shared by GET /api/agency/folders AND the POST /api/agency/content target check, so the
set the agency can SEE and the set it may WRITE to can never drift. Workspace-guarded at
the anchor row; descendants inherit the workspace (folders.js forbids cross-ws parents).
- routes/agency.js: GET /folders (bound subtree only); POST /content defaults to the bound
folder and 403s any folder_id outside the subtree.
- routes/tokens.js: create auto-creates "Agency — <name>" (or binds a picked folder,
validated same-workspace, respecting the 100-folder cap) inside the token tx; new
PUT /:id/upload-folder to rebind; listing surfaces the bound folder name.
- middleware/apiToken.js + lib/content-ingest.js: upload_folder_id onto req.apiToken; ingest
writes folder_id.
Frontend:
- Agency portal: folder <select> shown only when a real subfolder choice exists (identifies
the "Main folder" root client-side without learning the token's folder id).
- Settings: folder pick at token creation, bound-folder display, rebind modal.
- i18n: 7 new apitoken.* keys across all 5 locales.
Tests (429/429):
- test/agency-folder.test.js: 5 folderSubtree confinement bites (subtree in, siblings out,
workspace guard, null -> root).
- test/agency.test.js (+1 e2e): auto-create, default-to-bound, in-subtree pick lands there,
sibling -> 403, admin-pick, unknown-pick -> 400, rebind-to-root.
Closes#158.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(group-sync): synchronized playback per group (server + Android) [stage 1]
Play a group's shared playlist in lockstep across its displays — start/end items
together — by reusing the video-wall sync primitive with the spatial transform
removed and keyed on group_id instead of wall_id.
Server:
- device_groups += sync_enabled + leader_device_id (optional pin).
- buildPlaylistPayload emits a group_sync:{group_id, is_leader} block ONLY for a
member whose playlist matches the group's shared playlist (playlist-match guard —
a mismatched member is ignored, never synced). Membership via device_group_members.
- Leader auto-election: pinned-if-online -> first online matching member -> stable
fallback; computed (never persisted, so the operator's pin is preserved).
- group:sync / group:sync-request relay among eligible members (mirrors wall:sync,
guarded on membership + playlist match).
- Self-heal: re-push payloads to group members on (re)connect so is_leader refreshes.
- PUT /api/device-groups/:id accepts sync_enabled + leader_device_id and re-pushes.
Android:
- WallController is now mode-aware. WALL = transform + object-fit:fill + forced
follower-mute (UNCHANGED — every wall branch is byte-equivalent when isGroup=false).
GROUP = same leader/follower timing incl. the full video drift controller, but
full-screen (no transform), normal fit, and per-item mute honored (no forced mute).
- WebSocketService: emitGroupSync/emitGroupSyncRequest + onGroupSync/onGroupSyncRequest.
- MainActivity: dispatch emit by mode, parseGroupConfig, onPlaylistUpdate group hook.
Wall path is provably unchanged (additive mode, defaults to WALL). Kotlin compiles;
server suite 407/407.
Stage 2 (follow-up): web + Tizen parity, dashboard sync toggle + leader picker,
offline-sweep leader promotion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(group-sync): web + Tizen player parity [stage 2]
Mirror the Android group-sync generalization in the two web-based players so a group
with a shared playlist syncs across mixed player types, not just Android.
Web player (server/player/index.html):
- group:sync / group:sync-request handlers (index jump + latency-compensated video
drift, same maths as wall:sync) — no audio policy here, per-item mute honored.
- emitGroupSync() + applyGroupSync() (4Hz leader broadcast; follower sync-request).
NO CSS transform, NO forced mute (unlike applyWallMode).
- isFollower now also true for a group follower (suppresses self-advance).
- handlePlaylistUpdate handles data.group_sync (mutually exclusive with wall).
Tizen (tizen/js/player.js WallController + app.js):
- WallController is mode-aware: WALL styles the slice + forced follower semantics
(UNCHANGED when mode !== 'group'); GROUP clears any wall styling (full-screen) and
drives leader/follower timing only. syncId()/clearStageStyle() helpers; emitSync/
onSync/onSyncRequest key the event + id off the mode.
- app.js: group:sync/request socket handlers; onPlaylist enters group sync on a
group_sync block, else exits — content renders through the normal single-zone path.
Realigned the v4-exit-signal-phase3 TIZEN slice (682->696) shifted by the app.js edits.
Wall path is provably unchanged in both (additive group mode). Server suite 407/407;
both players' JS parse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(group-sync): dashboard UI — sync toggle + leader picker [stage 3]
On each group's header row:
- "Sync" checkbox -> PUT /api/groups/:id { sync_enabled } enables synchronized
playback; server re-pushes to members so they enter/exit sync mode. A hint notes
it needs a group playlist and that a display on a different playlist is ignored.
- When on, a "Leader: Auto / <display>" picker -> { leader_device_id } (null = auto-
elect, which self-heals; or pin a specific member to always lead when online).
Adds api.updateGroup(id, data) and the en i18n strings (en-only, mirroring the
existing per-group UI keys; the i18n parity test is apitoken-scoped).
Frontend parses (ESM); server suite 407/407.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(group-sync): rework to clock/schedule sync + double-buffer + polish
Replace the leader/follower relay model with clock/schedule sync. Every
same-playlist member derives the identical (index, position) locally from a
server-disciplined clock + the deterministic playlist schedule, so sync:
- needs no server at play-time (offline-native), and
- has no leader role to double-elect (kills the split-brain class the leaked
WallController tick produced).
Server
- heartbeat-ack now carries server_ms + echoes client_ms for NTP-style clock
discipline; the client caches the offset (survives an outage).
- POST /groups/:id/resync -> group:resync (manual "Resync now").
- (kept: group_sync payload; leader machinery is now vestigial/ignored.)
Clients (web / Tizen / Android)
- Clock offset disciplined over the heartbeat, cached (localStorage / prefs).
- Schedule engine: pos = (syncedNow mod Sum(duration_sec)) with a CANONICAL
slot formula identical across platforms so mixed-platform groups can't drift.
- Snap-on-load: a fresh clip hard-seeks ONCE to the exact position (was ~5s of
gentle nudge to eat a ~0.3s load offset); steady-state keeps the gentle nudge.
- Double buffer: warm the next clip a few s before the boundary -> instant
switch, no black hold. Android pre-decodes on a throwaway surface so the swap
doesn't flash one wrong-aspect (landscape-stretched) frame.
- In-place duration edits: duration_sec dropped from the change signature and
applied in place, so a duration edit re-anchors the schedule WITHOUT a restart.
- Live-log shows discrete corrections (jump/align/seek) immediately; only the
steady-state line is throttled.
Android
- Fix leaked WallController leader tick: onDestroy() now stops it (Handler on the
main looper outlived the Activity -> zombie broadcaster / split-brain).
Dashboard
- Group leader picker -> "Resync now" button.
Tests: heartbeat-ack clock fields + resync route; exit-signal .wgt slice realigned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(dashboard): version indicator + GHCR update check with admin panel
- Add server/lib/ghcr-check.js: GHCR tag poller (36h cache, semver filter)
- Extend /api/version with latest_version and update_available
- Add POST /api/admin/check-update (force GHCR poll)
- Add POST /api/admin/trigger-update (Docker compose or manual instructions)
- Sidebar footer: version label + amber badge when update available
- Admin > System: version comparison card with Check/Update buttons
- 14 new tests (10 unit + 4 integration), 68/68 passing
Closes#163
* fix(dashboard): gate trigger-update to platform-admin + add GHCR fetch timeout
Review follow-up on #165 (the two blockers):
- trigger-update runs `docker compose up -d` on the HOST via docker.sock
(root-equivalent) but was behind requireAdmin, i.e. reachable by any
workspace-level admin. On a multi-tenant host that's a customer, not the infra
operator. Gate it with requirePlatformAdmin (DOCKER_UPDATE_ENABLED still gates
it further). check-update stays requireAdmin — it's a read-only GHCR poll.
- ghcr-check.checkNow had no fetch timeout. Node's global fetch has no default
timeout, so a hung GHCR connection never settled — leaving `inFlight` set
forever (the finally never ran), which wedged the background poller AND hung
any awaited checkNow (/api/admin/check-update). Add a 10s AbortController
timeout on both requests so the try/catch/finally always fire.
All 405 server tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: ScreenTinker <hello@screentinker.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lets an operator (or an MDM) own updates instead of the app self-installing, which
on managed panels shows a self-install confirm dialog over customer content
(#155). Three layered controls:
- GLOBAL (server): config.otaEnabled from OTA_ENABLED (default on). When off,
/api/update/check returns update_available:false, reason:ota_disabled_global —
the whole instance stops offering updates.
- PER-DEVICE (server + dashboard): new devices.ota_enabled column (default 1). When
0, that device is never offered an update (reason:ota_disabled_device). A
"Self-update (OTA)" toggle in the device settings flips it via PUT /api/devices/:id.
- AUTO-DETECT (Android): UpdateChecker stands down entirely when a foreign device
owner (an MDM/DPC) manages the panel — detected via getActiveAdmins() + not being
device owner ourselves. Pure client-side, errs safe, needs no server change.
The two server gates are enforced server-side so they cover EVERY client version,
not just ones with the client-side stand-down. When OTA is off the device still
reports its version (dashboard sees state); the MDM/operator owns the actual update.
For an MDM-managed fleet (e.g. Pivot/MAXHUB), turn OTA off and let the MDM push the
APK — the install-dialog race disappears from every angle.
Tests: +2 (per-device gate + a real OTA_ENABLED=false server for the global gate);
full server suite 393 pass; Android compiles.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The v4-exit-signal-phase3 tests eval a hardcoded LINE RANGE out of tizen/js/app.js
(harness(TIZEN, 663, 697)). The #162 stage-owner fix inserted ~19 lines above that
block, so the slice no longer captured the crash/pagehide handlers and the three B/wgt
tests failed. Re-point the range to 682-716 (block content unchanged, verified identical).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /:id built the items array but never called schedulesForItem, so the playlist
editor rendered "always plays" for items that have a live schedule. Because the
editor re-PUTs whatever it loaded and PUT .../schedules is a wholesale
DELETE+INSERT, an unchanged save on a mis-loaded item silently wiped the real
schedule. Mirror GET /:id/items:351 so the read path returns the blocks the
editor and player already agree on.
Adds render / round-trip / wipe-trap regression tests (subprocess HTTP harness).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The -patchN scheme (e.g. 1.9.2-patch3) parses as a semver prerelease, so decide()'s
superseded-prerelease guard refused to offer a newer stable core (1.9.3) to the existing fleet —
stranding every 1.9.2-patchN device on OTA (Force Update didn't help; the re-check re-returned
superseded-prerelease). isReleased() now counts -patchN as a shipped release, so those devices get
offered 1.9.3 via normal OTA, while GENUINE prereleases (-beta/-rc/-alpha) keep prerelease semantics
and newer cores are never downgraded. 6 new tests + 14 existing OTA tests green (388/388 suite).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI flaked on the 300k-row prune non-blocking assert: a healthy chunked prune hit a 417ms max
event-loop gap on a shared runner, over the strict 250ms bar (the same test passed on the prior
commit; the release bump changed no logic). These probes exist to catch a MULTI-SECOND freeze (the
pre-fix whole-table sort froze 40-48s) — not to enforce a sub-300ms latency SLA — so a strict bar is
fragile under runner contention/GC. Widen both to <1500ms: still << "seconds" (catches any real
regression) but robust on CI. No production code changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Server-side keystone: the server now honors the v4 liveness contract uniformly across the MIXED
fleet (v4 + old pre-v4 + disconnected), all three clients depending on it.
- UNIFORM heartbeat-ack: emitted from the single shared device:heartbeat handler (uniform by
construction; no per-client/per-path branch), BEFORE the auth guard so a known device's watchdog
stays armed. Harmless to old clients (they ignore it).
- RECONNECT-WINDOW ack-gap fix (ackableHeartbeat): ack a KNOWN device (authed socket OR a device_id
that resolves) even mid-reconnect; NOT anonymous/never-authenticated sockets (degrade-safe);
identity-agnostic. No state mutation before requireDeviceAuth (auth surface unchanged; device_ids
are uuidv4).
- DASHBOARD LIVENESS (deriveLiveness): server-derived, VERSION-AGNOSTIC Healthy/Degraded/Offline
from signals every client sends (socket presence, heartbeat age, reconnect frequency); no client
status-push.
- IDENTITY CAPTURE (capture-don't-act): client_type/client_version/platform/contract_version columns;
degrades to legacy/unknown for old clients; NEVER breaks register.
- A-BUCKET FIX (QA): recordReconnect + persistIdentity gated on !isPlaylistRefresh (a ~45-60s refresh
is not a reconnect/new identity — matches #134), and the identity write is change-detected — closing
the WAL write-amplification (A1) and the benign-refresh -> false-"Degraded" (A2) regressions.
New lib/liveness.js (pure helpers, unit-tested). 30 new tests (uniform ack, ack-gap, mixed fleet,
identity capture, cross-client conformance, refresh-gate reproduce-then-prove); 366/366 total.
OTA artifact-availability is a separate concern (out of scope).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Field-safe SERVER net. A device opening duplicate/rapid sockets (the APK duplicate-socket bug,
separate track) currently churns through evictions during the reconnect-throttle's 30s
post-restart WARM-UP (only the hard ceiling 20 applies then, so an 8-in-9s burst passes
undamped and each new socket evicts the prior). This makes the server absorb it: a thrashing
PAIRED device converges to ONE stable connection and stays online.
- lib/session-settle.js (decision only; bounded, swept): shouldHold(deviceId, incumbentAlive)
— true only when a socket was accepted for this device within SESSION_SETTLE_WINDOW_MS
(config, default 2500ms) AND the incumbent is alive. Warm-up-independent.
- deviceSocket register gate (just before evictPriorSocket): if a LIVE incumbent exists and
we're inside the window, SOFT-REFUSE the new socket (device:throttled reason=session_settle
+ disconnect) and keep the incumbent; else accept + evict + (re)arm the window.
- LIVENESS SAFEGUARD (load-bearing): only hold when the incumbent socket is actually in the
/device namespace — a dead/half-open incumbent is replaced, NEVER stranding the device (max
hold is the 2.5s window from the incumbent's accept, then any new socket is accepted).
- Soft refusal, NEVER a quarantine (reuses patch1's paired-safe philosophy); single-session
enforcement intact for a legitimate move; unpaired/abusive flapping still caught by the
existing limiters. O(1), no loop impact.
Tests (liveness first-class): live incumbent holds + DEAD incumbent replaced (not stranded);
storm of 6 sockets converges to ONE, stays online, not quarantined (during warm-up); single-
session move past the window replaces cleanly; unit decision + bounded sweep. The
evicted-socket-rearm test shrinks its settle window so it still exercises the eviction path.
Suite 336/336.
Item 2: when the heartbeat checker marks a device offline it now also disconnects any socket
it still holds for it, so DB-offline can't diverge from socket-state into a silent half-open
(defensive — the live-socket guard already defers genuinely-live sockets).
Item 3: tighten half-open detection WITHOUT reintroducing the TV-WebKit decode-load risk the
30s pong-timeout was chosen for — lower only pingInterval 30s->15s (probe more often), KEEP
pingTimeout at 30s. Detection = interval+timeout = 45s (was 60s), and the client inherits
these via the handshake so BOTH ends detect a dead peer ~25% sooner. (Deliberately did NOT
drop pingTimeout to ~20s: MAXHUB is a video-playing TV-class device and the code comment
warns tighter timeouts cause spurious drops under decode load.)
Item 4: SO_KEEPALIVE on every accepted connection (lib/tcp-keepalive.js) so a half-open TCP
can't persist indefinitely at the OS layer, independent of the app ping.
Tests: server closes a non-ponging peer within ~pingInterval+pingTimeout while a ponging peer
survives; a device whose transport dies ends offline with its connection torn down; keepalive
applied to each accepted connection (and never breaks setup on error). Suite 328/328.
The flap-limiter could 30-min quarantine a PAIRED, legitimate device on reconnect churn.
Behind Bold's single SNAT IP a repeated edge flush -> every device reconnects -> trips flap
-> quarantined -> a recoverable blip becomes a SUSTAINED FLEET-WIDE LOCKOUT we caused.
check(key, now, {paired}) now skips (and clears) the quarantine escalation for a paired
device — it still gets the brief soft cooldown if it truly hammers, but never the long
lockout. The register gate computes paired = device_id && validateDeviceToken(...) (a
matching STORED token, false for missing/mismatch) so a spoofed device_id can't claim the
exemption; unpaired/anon flapping (attacker / unprovisioned hammering) still quarantines.
Tests: unpaired flapper still quarantined; paired never quarantined (soft cooldown only);
paired creds RELEASE an in-flight quarantine; N paired devices from one SNAT IP all admitted
on reconnect and never quarantined across repeated flush cycles.
Live error: "Uncaught (in promise) TypeError: PlayerMediaHealth.shouldShowIdle is not a
function" inside the device:paired socket handler.
WHAT WAS ACTUALLY WRONG: not a missing/misnamed definition — the module DOES export
shouldShowIdle (served + unit-tested). It's a VERSION SKEW: /player/* is served network-first
by the service worker, so a transient module-fetch failure falls back to the STALE cache (an
older player-media-health.js that predates shouldShowIdle) while index.html loads fresh with
the call. window.PlayerMediaHealth then exists but lacks the method, and the call site
guarded the OBJECT (`window.PlayerMediaHealth ? ...`) not the METHOD — so it threw, aborting
the rest of the device:paired handler (the showStatus after it was skipped).
FIX: guard the METHOD at both call sites (typeof X.method === 'function') so a stale/partial
module can never throw — it falls back to the safe inline default (!isPlaying for the idle
decision) and the handler runs to completion.
SIBLING (errors travel in pairs): the needsReattach call in the "Playlist unchanged" branch
had the SAME object-not-method guard. It was inside a try/catch so it couldn't throw uncaught,
but a stale module would silently skip the re-attach/hideStatus. Guarded it the same way.
No service-worker change needed: network-first already self-heals on the next good load; the
method-guard covers the transient/offline-fallback skew permanently.
Tests: player-media-health.test.js +1 module-surface test (both needsReattach and
shouldShowIdle are exported functions — catches the define-vs-call class). Inline player JS
syntax-checked; both guards verified present. Suite 319/319.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CONFIRMED from a live console capture (restore cache -> video plays -> reconnect ->
"Playlist unchanged" -> screen falls to "Waiting for content..."). Audio survived because
only the "showing content" VIEW was covered, not the audio path.
ROOT CAUSE: the server re-emits device:paired on EVERY re-register of an already-paired
device (ws/deviceSocket.js:510) — i.e. on every reconnect, while content is already playing.
The player's device:paired handler called showStatus('Waiting for content...') UNCONDITIONALLY
(the "falls through to idle" sibling), putting the idle overlay OVER the live video. The
following device:playlist-update -> "Playlist unchanged" branch returned early and never
cleared it, so the idle screen stuck on top of playing content.
FIX (idle screen only when genuinely idle; unchanged is a strict no-op that keeps playback):
- lib/player-media-health.js: new shouldShowIdle(state) — idle ONLY when nothing is playing
AND there's genuinely no content. Already-playing (or content-present-about-to-render) is
never idle.
- device:paired handler: gate showStatus on shouldShowIdle({isPlaying, hasContent}) instead
of showing it unconditionally. On a reconnect while playing -> no-op.
- "Playlist unchanged" branch: when healthy playback is confirmed, hideStatus() to clear any
stale idle overlay a reconnect's device:paired may have put up — so the confirmation can
never leave "Waiting for content..." over live content. Still leaves the actual media
element exactly as-is (no teardown, no flicker).
- sw.js cache v10 -> v11.
SIBLING SCAN: device:paired was the only unconditional idle reset. The connect() idle
prompts (connecting / connecting_muted) were already guarded by !isPlaying; empty-playlist
and no-renderable idles are genuine.
Tests: player-media-health.test.js +2 (shouldShowIdle: playing never idle; idle only when
empty+not-playing). Inline player JS syntax-checked; module served + guard referenced on a
booted server. Suite 318/318.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ROOT CAUSE (hypothesis A, pre-existing — NOT a beta7 regression; server/player/index.html
is untouched since v1.9.2-beta6): handlePlaylistUpdate's "Playlist unchanged" branch blindly
returned. The media re-attach (renderContent) lives ONLY in the content-changed branch, so
if the <video> surface was lost (element detached from the DOM while still decoding — video
gone, audio still playing) a no-new-content refresh never re-attached it. New-content
refreshes were fine because they re-render.
FIX (make the refresh idempotent for the media surface, no flicker on the healthy path):
- server/lib/player-media-health.js (new, UMD + unit-testable, mirrors schedule-eval.js):
needsReattach(state) — re-attach ONLY when playback should be happening but the current
item's surface is actually lost (video null / detached / ended / errored; non-video: no
mounted surface). A healthy attached+live video returns false, so a routine poll stays a
no-op (no re-render, no flicker). Served at /player/player-media-health.js from the single
source; loaded by the player.
- index.html no-change branch: extract the current item's DOM facts and, iff
PlayerMediaHealth.needsReattach, call playCurrentItem() to re-render the current item.
Wrapped so the health check can never break a refresh.
- teardownCurrentMedia: also release currentVideoEl even when it was DETACHED from the
container — a detached-but-playing <video> keeps emitting audio and the container-scoped
querySelectorAll can't find it. This kills the "ghost audio" on re-attach.
- sw.js cache bumped v9 -> v10 so players pick up the new index.html + module.
Tests: test/player-media-health.test.js (6) exercises the branch selection — healthy video
-> no re-attach; detached/null/ended/errored -> re-attach; idle -> never; non-video by
surface presence. Inline player JS syntax-checked; module served + referenced verified on a
booted server. Suite 316/316.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The billing:read scope + dual-path gate were built but there was no way to MINT a token
(and it must NOT go in the workspace-scoped, self-service API-Tokens UI). Adds a server-side,
owner-only CLI — no new UI, no network endpoint. Owner-only BY CONSTRUCTION: it's a
host-side script, so filesystem/shell access = the platform owner.
- server/lib/billing-token.js (testable): mintBillingToken/revokeBillingToken/
listBillingTokens. Reuses the EXACT existing token path — same secret (st_ + 32 bytes
base64url), same SHA-256 hashing (hashToken), same api_tokens columns — no second format.
Resolves the platform OWNER (oldest platform_admin/superadmin; #14 collapsed superadmin ->
platform_admin so that's the top tier) and binds to their workspace. api_tokens.user_id +
workspace_id are BOTH NOT NULL (no platform-level token exists); the workspace binding is
VESTIGIAL for billing (billing:read is off-ladder -> can't reach any workspace router;
billing is platform-global), documented in-file rather than loosening NOT NULL pre-release.
- scripts/mint-billing-token.js: thin CLI wrapper. --name mints and prints the secret ONCE
(+ id, + "run as owner on host" warning), --list, --revoke <id> (soft revoke, mirrors the
dashboard DELETE).
Tests (4, test/billing-token-mint.test.js): minted row is scope EXACTLY billing:read with a
matching SHA-256 hash and no read/write/full/agency scope; the token reads GET
/api/billing/usage (200) but is refused on /api/devices (403) and /api/admin (401) — scope
isolation; revocation -> 401; mint requires a name; revoke refuses a non-billing id. CLI
smoked live (mint/list/revoke). Suite 310/310.
SPEC-vs-REALITY (again): spec said bcrypt + JSON `scopes`; this codebase uses SHA-256 + a
single `scope` TEXT column. Built to the real system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Least-privilege way to read GET /api/billing/usage without requiring platform admin.
Additive + isolated: reuses the existing api_tokens scope system (the off-ladder 'agency'
scope is the precedent) and does NOT touch the shared role/permission checks other
endpoints rely on.
- New off-ladder scope 'billing:read' (routes/tokens.js SCOPES). Like 'agency' it is NOT
on the read<write<full ladder, so tokenScopeGate rejects a billing token on every
PUBLIC_ROUTER and JWT-only routers reject any st_ token -> the scope grants billing-read
and NOTHING else.
- DUAL-PATH gate requireBillingRead (middleware/apiToken.js), written as an EXPLICIT OR:
authorize if (billing:read token) OR (platform-admin session). Admins keep read access
but are NOT required to; the token path doesn't lock out admins or vice versa. Billing
route now mounted with bearerAuth (token OR JWT front door) + requireBillingRead (was
requireAuth + requirePlatformAdmin).
- MINTING is platform-admin only (stricter than read/write/full/agency, which any
workspace member may mint) since a billing:read token grants GLOBAL billing-read. Note:
no finer "owner" tier exists here (#14 collapsed superadmin->platform_admin), so
PLATFORM_ROLES is the top level required.
Tests (5, test/billing-authz.test.js): dual-path positive (token AND admin session both
200) + negative (user 403 / anon 401); scope isolation (billing token 403 on /api/devices,
401 on /api/admin; read token 200 on devices but 403 on billing); minting owner-only
(user + ordinary-admin 403, platform-admin 201); revocation -> 401. Existing token
firewall/partition suite (api.test.js) + billing-endpoint tests unchanged & green. Reused
the exact SHA-256 token-verification path (no bcrypt/new mechanism). Suite 306/306.
NOTE: spec described bcrypt + JSON `scopes` + an analytics:read precedent; this codebase
actually uses SHA-256 + a single `scope` TEXT column + 'agency' as the off-ladder
precedent. Implemented faithfully to the real system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements the ByteTinker-Bold distribution-agreement billing math and surfaces it on a
standalone admin-only route. No UI (the API figure is the deliverable). Server-side only.
Contract math (lib/billing.js, config-driven; defaults ARE the agreement):
- ASD (per device/day) = min(1.0, online_seconds / (hours*3600)) # 28800 default
- BillableScreens (per month) = round-half-up( Sum ASD / days_in_month )
- Flat tier (not marginal): 1-499 $1.50 / 500-999 $1.25 / 1000+ $1.00; cost = screens*rate.
Single global rate card for now (per-tenant is a future concern; noted in code).
Data foundation:
- New durable rollup device_usage_daily(device_id, day 'YYYY-MM-DD', online_seconds),
index on day. status_log (3d) / telemetry (24h) can't back a billing month.
- Accumulated INCREMENTALLY off the heartbeat tick from the live connection map (same
source as devices_connected) - never reconstructed from logs. Each tick credits every
connected device's today-row (min(86400, +elapsed)), chunked + transactional (non-blocking);
per-tick credit capped (accrualCapSeconds) as a stall/restart guard.
- Retention ~400d, pruned via chunked-prune (pruneUsageDaily in runMaintenance).
API: GET /api/billing/usage?month=YYYY-MM (default current), requirePlatformAdmin, mounted
SEPARATELY from /api/status (billing is revenue data + a heavier aggregate; must not touch
the hot status path). Reads the rollup only. MTD figure averages over COMPLETED days only
(today shown in `daily` but excluded until it completes); is_final + billable_screens_final
appear once the month completes.
Tests (12): ASD math; billable round-half-up; flat tier/cost boundaries; accumulator
(accrues by interval, caps at 86400/day, disconnected doesn't accrue); report MTD-excludes-
today + final-month is_final; retention prune; endpoint authz (admin 200 / non-admin 403 /
anon 401) + billing absent from /api/status. Suite 301/301. First-full-month caveat +
formula in docs/billing.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1. devices_connected (always on, never gated): a top-level /api/status field next to
loop_lag = LIVE WS socket count from the heartbeat connection map (getConnectedCount),
NOT devices.status='online' (which lags by the offline-timeout). The single
most-glanced operational number, so it can't disappear when debug is off. Also dropped
4 dead per-poll COUNT(*) queries the route computed but never returned.
2. debug block behind an admin flag: new minimal app_settings KV table (none existed;
ai_settings is per-workspace, white_labels is branding) + lib/app-settings.js (cached,
refresh-on-write so status polls read a cached boolean, not a DB row).
routes/status.js includes `debug` ONLY when status_debug_enabled is on (persisted value
overrides the STATUS_DEBUG_ENABLED env default); when off the key is omitted entirely.
3. Admin toggle: GET/PUT /api/admin/status-debug (requirePlatformAdmin, mirrors the
branding endpoints) + a checkbox in the Admin tab "Status endpoint" section
(mirrors the branding checkbox). Takes effect on the next poll, no restart.
Tests: devices_connected always present+numeric and rises with a live socket (booted +
socket.io-client); debug present by default, admin flips OFF -> key omitted (loop_lag +
devices_connected remain) -> ON again, no restart; non-admin 403, anon 401; unit coverage
for getConnectedCount + app-settings default/override. Suite 289/289.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The debug block exposed only gauges (buckets, quarantined, inFlight) — state, not work.
A real flapping Firestick reads as flap.buckets:36, quarantined:0, indistinguishable
from healthy. Add lightweight in-memory throughput counters (total + last-completed
rolling window) so the server tells the flapper/flood story itself.
- lib/rolling-counter.js: shared bounded scalar counter (total, curWindow, lastWindow,
windowStart); rolls lazily on bump AND read (no timer), idle decays to 0.
DEBUG_STATS_WINDOW_MS default 60000.
- flap-limiter: refused{Total,LastWindow} (every allow:false), quarantineStarts{Total,
LastWindow} (a quarantine event stays visible after the gauge decays).
- ota-breaker: stats() rateBackoff{Total,LastWindow}.
- ota-download-guard: servedTotal/shedTotal alongside the per-window values.
- database: maintenance sweepsTotal (confirm the prune is firing, not stalled).
- routes/status: debug block gains ota_breaker + the new fields (aggregate-only, cheap).
Tests: rolling-counter window-roll + idle decay; each counter increments on the right
event; booted /api/status asserts the new fields present + numeric. Suite 285/285.
Fallout doc: observability section lists the fields + what each tells a soak-watcher.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The storm harness asserted a tick COUNT (environment-timing-sensitive) that could flake
in CI. Kept the real invariant (max event-loop gap < 300ms) and loosened the tick
assertion to >=2 (enough to have measured a real gap), which cannot flake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Expose the new internal states so we can SEE the limiters biting during the alpha soak
instead of grepping logs. /api/status now carries debug: {
flap: {buckets, quarantined},
ota_download: {inFlight, servedThisWindow, shedThisWindow, windowCount},
maintenance: {deleted, ms, at, running}, // last status-log prune
log_coalescer_buffer,
}. Aggregate counts only (no device ids/secrets), cheap in-memory reads. stats()
added to flap-limiter + ota-download-guard (singleton prod state), getMaintenanceStats
from database. Asserted in the booted /api/status test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The coalesced loop-lag summary carried an arbitrary sample's p99. Now record() tracks
the MAX (peak) over the window and the summary emits it — the peak is the number that
matters during an incident: '[loop-lag] band=critical (x47 in 30s, peak 1502ms)'. Band
CHANGES still log immediately, unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Booting against a pre-bloated 300k-row device_status_log, /api/status answers in <3s
while the table is still large (chunked startup prune trickling in the background), and
the backlog drains to the cap with the server responsive throughout. The old whole-table
sort froze boot ~40s. Fallout doc gets the P2 findings section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Investigated the fleet-wide simultaneous reconnect concern. buildPlaylistPayload is
synchronous but cheap: measured avg 0.078ms / max 0.70ms per call with a 200-item
snapshot; 230 devices = ~18ms CPU spread across 230 separate handler invocations (the
loop yields between them), never one block. Per-call << 50ms invariant. No change
needed; documented with the measured number.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Block is a real lever now, so cover the authz path. Booted server + JWT; device and a
viewer membership seeded via the DB file. Proves POST /api/devices/:id/{block,unblock}:
owner (workspace_admin) -> 200; unauthenticated -> 401; cross-workspace user -> 403;
workspace_viewer -> 403 (read-only), with the DB blocked column asserted at each step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every new subsystem is disable-able via env (flip + restart, no redeploy/bisect):
- FLAP_LIMITER_ENABLED=false -> flap limiter always allows.
- OTA_DOWNLOAD_GUARD_ENABLED=false -> download guard always admits.
- MAINTENANCE_BAND_GATE_ENABLED=false -> interval maintenance ignores band.
- CONNECT_RATE_QUARANTINE_TRIPS=0 -> quarantine off (already; confirmed).
Startup prune is never band-gated regardless. Kill switches table added to the fallout
doc. Tests assert each OFF behaviour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A fixed OTA_DOWNLOAD_MAX_CONCURRENT=10 throttled a legitimate coordinated rollout even
on a perfectly healthy server, and a shed 503 costs a client a full ~30-min re-check
cycle. Made the download guard's concurrency + rate caps band-aware:
- normal -> serve FREELY (no cap): a whole-fleet rollout isn't staggered when healthy
- elevated -> the configured caps engage (early backpressure)
- critical -> shed 503 (the real protection, unchanged)
Kill switch OTA_DOWNLOAD_GUARD_ENABLED=false disables it entirely.
Tests updated: normal serves 50/50 with 0 shed; caps + shed now asserted under elevated;
storm harness OTA flood runs under elevated (the loaded state). Suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
resolveIdentity runs on every register (block + flap gates). It already returned on
device_id before any DB access; memoized the device_fingerprints statement (prepared
once, lazily) and documented the invariant. Test asserts a device_id-present resolve
prepares/runs ZERO device_fingerprints queries; a device_id-absent resolve does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The flap limiter's auto-quarantine used to run `UPDATE devices SET blocked = 1` — a
PERMANENT, human-cleared block on an automatic trigger. A stuck-then-recovered device
stayed dark until someone noticed.
- Removed the auto-write from ws/deviceSocket.js. devices.blocked is now written ONLY by
an operator (dashboard endpoint / direct SQLite).
- Quarantine moved into lib/flap-limiter.js as IN-MEMORY, TIME-LIMITED state: after
connectRateQuarantineTrips trips in a window the identity is quarantinedUntil = now +
connectRateQuarantineMs (new, default 30m); check() then refuses cheaply with
reason:'quarantined' and AUTO-CLEARS when the window passes. Safe in-memory now that
Item A ended the restart loop, and a self-healing auto-action must not survive as a DB row.
- Log quarantine START once; repeat refusals go through the coalescer. Stale
"-> blocked=1" comments updated.
- connectRateQuarantineTrips=0 still disables it.
Tests: quarantine engages after N trips, refuses cheaply during the window, auto-clears
after connectRateQuarantineMs; and an integration flapper is quarantined while
devices.blocked stays 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Combines all four spiral inputs at once: a pre-bloated device_status_log (300k rows), a
maintenance sweep running over it (the old whole-table sort froze 40-48s), a hard
flapper, and an OTA download flood from a single SNAT IP. Asserts:
- the event loop never enters a multi-second freeze (max 10ms-ticker gap < 300ms,
vs 40-48s pre-fix) and the ticker keeps firing throughout,
- the chunked sweep drains the 300k backlog to the per-device cap,
- every limiter still bites under load: the flapper is refused, the OTA flood is shed
past the global window cap (served capped, never per-IP).
Suite 267/267.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Don't let telemetry/logging cook the loop under a storm.
- lib/log-coalescer.js: dedup+count high-frequency lines, flush ONE summarized line per
key per window ("[loop-lag] band=critical (x47 in 30s)"). Bounded buffer (auto-flush
at MAX_KEYS). Applied to the loop-lag "still loaded" line (band CHANGES stay immediate),
the per-request OTA check line, and "Device reconnected".
- loop-lag: event_loop_lag rows are BUFFERED and batch-inserted on a flush interval
(was a synchronous INSERT per sample); the buffer is bounded (drop-oldest). Its
retention prune now rides the Item-A chunkedDelete so this table can never repeat the
status_log bloat-then-freeze. /api/status still reads in-memory current (real-time
band unaffected).
- Bounded the previously un-evicted per-device Maps: content-ack limiter gets an idle
sweep (started in server.js); status-log-writer.lastWritten is capped (drop-oldest;
it only suppresses a redundant consecutive row, so eviction is safe).
Tests: N identical lines -> one counted line; single line verbatim; coalescer buffer
bounded under a distinct-key flood; content-ack Map swept of idle buckets.
loop-lag-integration updated for the batched-insert cadence. Suite 266/266.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Enforcement (deviceSocket): resolve identity ONCE via the SNAT-safe chain and check
blocked against the RESOLVED device_id (device_id directly OR fingerprint->device_id),
so a blocked device that reconnects WITHOUT a device_id is still caught — the old
"if (device_id)" gate let a device_id-less reconnect slip past. Still the first gate,
before flap/throttle/DB/playlist. Nulling the token still does NOT block (it
re-provisions) — the blocked column is the lever.
- Dashboard toggle: POST /api/devices/:id/{block,unblock} (write-gated + workspace-scoped
via checkDeviceOwnership) writes devices.blocked; takes effect on the device's NEXT
register with no restart. api.js + a Block/Unblock button in device-detail.js.
- Outage procedure documented in-code: direct SQLite
"UPDATE devices SET blocked = 1 WHERE id = <id>" works with the dashboard down.
Tests: blocked refused at handshake with no playlist build; device_id-less reconnect
with a mapped fingerprint still refused; unblock effective on next register, no restart.
Suite 262/262.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fleet SNATs to one IP, so nothing on the OTA path may key on IP.
- /api/update/check: EARLY-RETURN before any filesystem call when the breaker won't
offer (rate-backoff / up-to-date / phantom / client-newer). A looping client that
gets rate-backoff now does ZERO fs — the flood can't become a statSync flood.
- lib/apk-cache.js: resolve APK path/size/mtime once at boot + refresh on an interval;
the check/download endpoints read cached metadata (get() does no fs, proven by test).
- lib/ota-download-guard.js + /download/apk: GLOBAL concurrency + rate caps + critical-
band shed (503 Retry-After), NEVER per-IP. Replaces the per-IP-per-10min log throttle
(which hid the flood under SNAT) with a per-window served/shed aggregate so a download
flood is VISIBLE. Bounded single rolling-state object; in-flight released on finish/close.
- Breaker unchanged; no IP limiting or device_id requirement added (legacy field clients
send no device_id on OTA checks — must keep working).
Tests: apk-cache get() = 0 statSync over 1000 reads; download guard sheds past global
concurrency + per-window rate + critical band; admit() has no IP parameter. Suite 259/259.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The #142 burst throttle (5/10s) misses a device flapping every 3-5s (~2-3/10s) — yet
each cycle is an expensive register+build+acks and one status_log row (the spiral
trigger). Now that Item A ends the restart loop that used to wipe in-memory throttle
state every ~40s, an in-memory sustained limiter can finally bite.
- lib/device-identity.js: SNAT-safe identity resolution — device_id -> fingerprint
(map via device_fingerprints -> device_id, else raw fp) -> device_token -> ONE bounded
global anon bucket. NEVER IP (the fleet SNATs to 10.10.10.1). An unidentifiable client
is still bucketed (collectively) so an anon flood is capped, never unthrottled.
- lib/flap-limiter.js: per-identity connect-frequency over a long window
(CONNECT_RATE_WINDOW_MS=5min, CONNECT_RATE_MAX=20; anon bucket cap 60). Over the rate
-> refuse + disconnect (cheap). Bounded by an idle sweep (anon bucket never swept).
Optional auto-quarantine: a device_id-resolved hard flapper -> blocked=1.
- Wired at the device:register gate BEFORE fingerprint tracking/throttle/DB/build,
skipping same-socket playlist refreshes. Sweep started in server.js.
Tests: 4s-flapper refused after the window max; 60s-normal never; two device_ids
independent (never IP); device_id-less bucketed by fingerprint; neither id nor
fingerprint capped via global anon; idle sweep preserves the anon bucket. Suite 254/254.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The death-spiral amplifier: pruneStatusLog ran a whole-table ROW_NUMBER() sort,
40-48s synchronous on the 1.1M-row incident table, freezing boot -> healthcheck
fail -> restart loop.
- lib/chunked-prune.js: shared chunkedDelete (rowid IN (SELECT ... LIMIT ?) since
better-sqlite3 has no DELETE...LIMIT) — bounded batch + setImmediate yield between
batches, optional band-gate. Core invariant: no sync op blocks >~50ms ever.
- pruneStatusLog: rewritten per-device via a loose index-scan seek
(WHERE device_id > ? ORDER BY device_id LIMIT 1 — O(log n) each), retention +
newest-cap trimmed in bounded batches, async, re-entrancy-guarded, band-gated on
the interval / un-gated + fire-and-forget at startup so a bloated table self-heals
on deploy WITHOUT freezing boot.
- heartbeat.js: maintenance moved off the interval body into async band-gated
re-entrant runMaintenance(); play_logs + provisioning prunes chunked; offline-marking
stays synchronous.
- pruneTelemetry: bounded single statement (OFFSET 6000 LIMIT batch), stays sync.
- idx_devices_provisioning so the provisioning prune batch subquery is an index range.
Tests: correctness (per-device cap + retention, independent devices), 300k-row backlog
trims in many batches with max event-loop gap <250ms, band-gate no-op while critical +
startup runs regardless, re-entrancy (concurrent -> once). Existing prune tests updated
to await. Suite 247/247.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found in the alpha load test: client-chosen pairing codes collide by birthday
paradox, the provisioning INSERT hit UNIQUE(devices.pairing_code), the SqliteError
threw out of the (synchronous) socket handler -> uncaughtException -> logFatalAndExit
-> the WHOLE server exited and every device dropped. The colliding flood crash-LOOPED
the container (2 restarts).
Two layers, same "one device can't take down the fleet" theme as #142/#143/#144:
1. Narrow (deviceSocket.js): wrap the device:register provisioning INSERT in
try/catch — a UNIQUE pairing_code collision (or ANY db error) rejects THAT
registration (device:auth-error -> client retries) instead of throwing.
currentDeviceId/authenticated now set only AFTER the row exists (no half-auth
socket on failure).
2. Broader (lib/safe-socket.js): protectSocket() overrides socket.on per connection
so any handler throw is caught, logged (event + id + stack), the socket told, and
DISCONNECTED — per-CONNECTION fail-fast, not whole-PROCESS. We don't keep serving a
connection from possibly-half-mutated state (honors the existing fail-fast intent),
we just contain it to "one device reconnects" (a non-event after beta5). Wired into
both the /device and /dashboard connection handlers; auto-covers future handlers.
Audited first: no handler throws as control flow, so blanket-wrapping is safe.
Tests (mutation-verified, fail without their fix):
- register-insert-crash.test.js: a pairing_code collision AND a general bind error
each reject-one-device with no uncaughtException; server keeps serving.
- socket-handler-isolation.test.js: a throwing handler disconnects only that socket;
the server + other sockets stay alive.
Full suite 243/243.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Second head of the OTA-loop root cause (#144), on the connection/heartbeat
layer: unbounded device-driven work with no circuit-breaker. Symptoms in Bold
prod — devices shown OFFLINE in CMS while online+playing, loop-lag simmer
(p99 300-1145ms), device_status_log grown to 1.1M rows.
False-offline (two causes, both fixed):
- evicted-socket re-arm race: evictPriorSocket runs before registerConnection,
so the evicted old socket's disconnect armed a fresh offline timer for a
just-reconnected device. Tag evicted socket ids and bail in the disconnect
handler (ws/deviceSocket.js).
- heartbeat checker false-positive: a device with a live socket in /device is
UP even if its in-memory lastHeartbeat is stale under lag; skip it instead of
marking offline (services/heartbeat.js).
Storm containment:
- batched/coalescing device_status_log writer (lib/status-log-writer.js): net
state per device per flush, breaking the storm->bloat->slow-write->lag loop.
- newest-N-per-device row-count cap in the global sweep (db/database.js): hard
bound regardless of churn; trims the existing 1.1M backlog on the first sweep.
Per-device prune unified to statusLogRetentionDays (was hardcoded 7d).
- reconnect-throttle idle-bucket sweep (lib/reconnect-throttle.js): the #142
throttle already existed; added the memory-bound sweep it lacked (wired in
server.js). No second breaker.
- cosmetic: cap the OTA breaker level counter (lib/ota-breaker.js).
- best-effort status-log flush on the crash path (server.js).
Tests: load harness (test/reconnect-storm-load.test.js) proves breaker engage,
clean offline-clear, no-throttle-on-normal-reconnect, batched writes, bounded
loop-lag; cause-1 re-arm race proven with teeth (test/evicted-socket-rearm.test.js).
Both mutation-checked (fail without their fix). Full suite 240/240.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
/api/update/check offered the update whenever client !== latest (raw string
inequality, not semver) with no backoff. A device that can't APPLY the update
(broken OTA client 1.7.12, signing/Fire OS) keeps reporting the same version and is
told update_available=true on every poll; a fast poll loop saturates the event loop
(prod loop-lag 49s). All requests share one NAT IP, so IP-keying is useless.
server-only breaker (lib/ota-breaker.js), two independent axes:
- RATE breaker (primary, immediate): a key checking >THRESHOLD (3) times within
WINDOW (60s) is looping -> throttle update_available with exponential backoff
(30s->2m->8m->cap 30m). Healthy devices poll ~12 min and never approach this, so
rollout/stragglers are inherently safe -- NO grace-for-flood timer; slow == safe.
- PHANTOM guard (immediate): unrecognized version, or a prerelease of an OLDER core
(superseded old-minor beta e.g. 1.9.1-beta4), gets no-offer on the first check. A
RECENT real older version (beta3 vs latest beta4; stable 1.7.12) stays offerable.
- Never offers a downgrade (client >= latest -> no offer).
KEYING (#144 option 3): keyed on device_id when present, else reported version.
- server.js:581 accepts + logs ?device_id=, passes it to the breaker.
- UpdateChecker.kt:122 appends &device_id=<config.deviceId> (existing registered id;
omitted until provisioned). One-line client change.
beta4+ clients get precise per-device throttling; stuck legacy clients sending only
?version= are caught by the version-keyed + rate + phantom logic. Response gains
additive `reason` + `retry_after_seconds` (old clients ignore).
BOUNDED STATE: a periodic sweep (startSweep, wired in server.js) evicts buckets idle
> IDLE_RESET_MS so the keyed Map can't grow unbounded (churned device_ids); not
reset-on-access only.
SCOPE (deliberate): this targets the FAST flood + phantoms. The slow #144 drip
(stable 1.7.12 polling ~every 12 min, ~20/hr) stays below >3/60s and is NOT
throttled -- catching it needs #144 option-3 "skip-this-version after N cycles",
which is intentionally NOT in this build.
NOTE: carries a CLIENT/APK change -> versionCode must increment at the beta4 bump and
the release keystore is required for the APK. The device_id path only helps devices
that can install beta4+; the stuck legacy fleet is covered by the version-keyed path.
Tests: unit (lib/ota-breaker, injected time) a-f + comparator + escalation + sweep +
slow-drip-scope; HTTP integration (real endpoint, device_id passthrough). Full suite
green serial AND parallel (234). OTA-only delta -- reconnect/reclaim/shed/content-ack/
block untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bold: screens sit on the Connect page showing the server URL = paired server-side
but never told, so the app never starts playing.
Flow / gap (Step A):
- CLIENT leaves the Connect page ONLY on the 'device:paired' event — web player
(player/index.html) hides the setup screen; Android ProvisioningActivity.onPaired
launches MainActivity + finish(). That event is the sole signal.
- SERVER pushes 'device:paired' to the device's room from POST /api/provision/pair
(server.js) at pair time — but ONLY reaches a LIVE socket then. The normal
device_id reconnect path emitted device:registered + device:playlist-update but
NOT device:paired. So a screen paired while disconnected, or that reconnects after
pairing (exactly the screens cycling on the Connect page), is paired server-side
(user_id set, receiving playlists) yet never gets device:paired -> stuck on Connect.
Fix (server-only, uses the EXISTING client listener — no client update needed, which
matters because we can't push a client update to stuck screens): on the device_id
reconnect, if the device is paired (user_id set), re-emit 'device:paired'
{device_id, name}. Push-on-pair (server.js) already covers the live-at-pair-time
case; this covers paired-then-reconnect. A paired screen now leaves Connect and
plays on its next reconnect with no client change and no manual re-pair.
Tests (port 3989, real flow): provision -> pair via /api/provision/pair (socket
closed) -> reconnect RECEIVES device:paired (+name +playlist) — the stuck-screen
repro; an unpaired device gets NO device:paired (stays on the pairing flow); the fix
reuses the existing device:paired event (no new protocol). Full suite green serial
AND parallel (220); dbac699 / 404c330 / e734281 intact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bold beta1: three devices spam "Fingerprint reclaim rejected ... device active
(status=offline, ~2500s since heartbeat, liveConn=false)" twice/~2s indefinitely —
contradictory: gone by every signal yet treated as active.
Root cause (NOT a missing clear — corrected the hypothesis). The reject condition
was `liveConn || status==='online' || secondsSince < RECLAIM_GRACE_SECONDS(24h)`.
For the observed devices liveConn=false and status=offline, so the ONLY true term
is `secondsSince < 24h` — an effective 24h CALENDAR grace, not a stale flag. Audited
the clears: liveConn (deviceConnections) is removed on the debounced disconnect
(heartbeat.removeConnection) AND the offline_timeout sweep (deviceConnections.delete);
status is set 'offline' on both. liveConn=false + status=offline PROVE the clears
ran — there is nothing stale to clear. The 24h time gate (mislabeled "device active")
blocked a legitimately-gone device from reclaiming for up to 24h, so it retried
every ~2s forever-in-practice. The "twice per ~2s" is two reclaim ATTEMPTS per cycle
(client reconnect + re-pair-on-auth-error), each hitting the single console.warn —
not double-logging in one attempt.
Fix:
- Decide "still alive" from RUNTIME signals: `!!liveConn || secondsSince <
reclaimSettleSeconds`. A device with no live socket and a heartbeat older than the
settle window is gone -> reclaimable. A live (or just-seen) device is still
rejected, so reclaim-abuse protection holds. NOT just ignoring "active" — it fixes
WHY it was stuck (the 24h gate). RECLAIM_SETTLE_SECONDS default 300 (was 24h).
SECURITY TRADEOFF flagged in config: shortens the anti-fingerprint-theft window;
raise to re-tighten. Tuning guess to validate vs Bold.
- Log throttle: the deferral logs at most once per device per RECLAIM_REJECT_LOG_
WINDOW_MS (default 60s) — collapses the double-log + the per-2s flood (same
discipline as the content-ack shed log). Cleared when a reclaim proceeds.
Recovery of the 3 wedged devices (2febcaa9, 1984694c, 139159eb): they SELF-HEAL on
their next reclaim attempt (~2s) once this ships — their heartbeats are ~2500s stale
(>300s settle) and liveConn=false, so the reclaim now succeeds. No operator SQL needed.
Tests (port 3988): gone device reclaims; live device still rejected; clear-on-leave
(disconnect clears liveConn -> stale device reclaims); deferral log <=1 per window.
Full suite green serial+parallel (217). reconnect-throttle.js, the dbac699 content-ack
limiter, and the 404c330 block/auth code untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Highest-priority #143 item (operator finding from Bold): nulling a device's token
did NOT lock it out — device 75c2a08a immediately reconnected and saturated the
loop. Two distinct defects:
1. Auth short-circuit (the cause). device:register used
if (device.device_token && !validateDeviceToken(...)) { reject }
so a NULL/empty STORED token made the guard falsy -> validation SKIPPED, and the
next block even MINTED a fresh token and persisted it. Nulling a token thus
RE-PROVISIONED the device instead of locking it out. Fix: drop the
`device.device_token &&` guard -> `if (!validateDeviceToken(device_id, device_token))`
(validateDeviceToken already returns false for null-stored/missing/mismatch), and
remove the legacy "mint a token for a null-token device" path (the re-provision
vector). An already-provisioned device (every row, incl. 'provisioning', is created
WITH a token) presenting null/empty/invalid is now REJECTED + disconnected.
The first-pairing seam is unaffected: a brand-new device has NO device_id and goes
through the pairing_code branch (which mints id+token) — a different code path.
2. No server-side kill switch. Added a `blocked` column (devices.blocked INTEGER
NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; schema.sql + a database.js migration). The block is the FIRST
gate at the top of device:register — before the fingerprint block, the reconnect
throttle, any DB writes, or playlist build — so a blocked device's socket is
refused immediately (auth-error 'Device blocked' + disconnect, zero further work).
It does NOT rely on null-token (the thing that failed). The row is re-read every
register, so a DIRECT SQLite edit takes effect on the device's NEXT reconnect with
NO server restart. Operator statements (dashboard-down, hand-edit):
block: UPDATE devices SET blocked = 1 WHERE id = '<device_id>';
unblock: UPDATE devices SET blocked = 0 WHERE id = '<device_id>';
Tests (port 3987): nulled-token provisioned device is REJECTED (75c2a08a repro);
blocked=1 refused at the first gate (no register/playlist); unblock reconnects;
first-pairing still works; normal valid-token device unaffected. Full suite green
serial AND parallel (213); reconnect-throttle.js + the dbac699 content-ack limiter
untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#142's content-ack dedup is insufficient: a device cycling 2-4 content IDs makes
every ack look unique so dedup never fires, while aggregate volume from ~30 devices
saturates the event loop (the #142 reconnect throttle kept the server responsive,
which is how this was even observable).
Folded ONE control on the content-ack path (no competing limiters; reconnect-
throttle.js untouched) in lib/content-ack-limiter.js:
- Step 1 — per-device RATE budget: caps TOTAL non-duplicate acks per device per
window regardless of differing content_id (the case dedup misses). Over budget =
DROP silently (the per-ack log+emit is the cost); log ONCE per device per window
when shedding starts. Keeps the #142 dedup (dedup'd repeats don't consume budget).
Per-device, in-memory, resets on restart (modeled on lastPlayLogAt; does NOT reuse
reconnect-throttle's ban-semantics bucket).
Env (TUNING GUESSES, validate vs Bold's fleet): CONTENT_ACK_MAX_PER_WINDOW=20,
CONTENT_ACK_RATE_WINDOW_MS=10000 (=2/s, above legit ~<=1/s, below the flood).
- Step 2 — global pressure valve: reuses the #142 loop-lag band (+ its hysteresis,
no second control loop). Under CRITICAL band, shed content-acks even for an
in-budget device; reconnects + dashboard/HTTP are ALWAYS processed; a healthy
device in a non-critical band is never touched by the valve. Valve open/close
logged once at the band edge in services/loop-lag.js (not per shed message).
Tests (unique ports 3985/3986, not the 3982/3983/3984 set):
- unit: the #143 regression (cycling ids evading dedup IS rate-limited), under/over
budget, dedup still works + doesn't consume budget, valve sheds in-budget under
critical while normal is untouched, rate precedence, window reset, per-device
isolation.
- integration: socket flood is capped to budget with a single shed-start log;
under-budget passes every ack; valve OPEN sheds content-acks while a reconnect +
/api/status still succeed.
Full suite green serial AND parallel (208 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
services/heartbeat.js deleted unclaimed provisioning devices with
created_at < now - (365 * 86400) — a YEAR — while its own comment said "older
than 24 hours". So socket-register pairing junk lingered ~365x longer than
intended. Change the window to 24 * 3600 to match the comment.
Correctness fix only — does NOT touch the pre-auth register path or add a rate
limiter (that pre-auth hardening is a separate security issue, out of this cut).
Extracted the sweep into pruneProvisioningDevices() (still in heartbeat.js, called
from the same interval) so it is unit-testable. Test asserts a >24h unclaimed
provisioning row is swept while a <24h row, an imported row (user_id set), and a
non-provisioning row are kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
device:content-ack logged + emitted every message, so a device repeatedly
reporting the same "content <id>: ready" (observed from an older app version)
added avoidable load per message.
- Suppress identical (device_id, content_id, status) reports within
config.contentAckDedupMs (default 10s), modeled on the lastPlayLogAt throttle.
A status change has a different key and passes immediately; a fresh report after
the window passes too. In-memory, resets on restart. The handler does no DB
writes, so this is purely shedding redundant log+emit work.
test: integration over a real authenticated device socket — a burst of identical
"ready" collapses to one log/emit, a "ready" after the window passes, and a status
change is never deduped. Unique PORT (3984).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The per-device insert-time prune (deviceSocket.js) only ever touches a device
that is actively inserting, so it misses two paths: removed/idle devices whose
rows linger forever, and heartbeat.js's offline_timeout insert that bypasses
logDeviceStatus entirely. The reporter's 1.2M-row bloat accumulated UNDER a 7-day
per-device prune for exactly this reason.
- pruneStatusLog() (db/database.js): a GLOBAL time-range sweep across ALL devices,
modeled on the play_logs prune. Run once on startup (recovers a bloated table
right after deploy) and on the heartbeat interval (services/heartbeat.js).
- STATUS_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS env, default 3 (lower than the old hardcoded 7d; the
dashboard only shows a 24h uptime window, so 2-3d is ample for diagnostics).
- Deliberately NO per-device row cap: Step 3's throttle already bounds how fast a
storming device can generate status rows, so a cap would add sweep complexity
for little gain (noted for later if needed).
- NO VACUUM / auto_vacuum here (kept off the hot path); space reclaim is left as a
separate decision (see report).
test: deterministic in-process unit test proves the sweep deletes over-retention
rows across all devices — including a device absent from the devices table and an
offline_timeout row — while keeping recent rows; idempotent on an empty table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gates genuine reconnects PER DEVICE before the heavy register work (DB writes +
playlist build) runs, so a single flapping device can no longer saturate the
event loop and take down the server.
- Actuator is per-device, keyed on device_id (modeled on lastPlayLogAt). A device
is flagged only when it exceeds reconnectBaseMax genuine reconnects per window.
Same-socket playlist refreshes (isPlaylistRefresh) are exempt.
- Load-awareness is BANDED (normal/elevated/critical from the step-2 lag signal),
not a continuous controller. The band only MULTIPLIES an already-flagged
device's backoff; global lag never gates a healthy device.
- Hysteresis: escalate immediately while storming (tighten fast); decay one level
per reconnectReleaseMs of calm (release slow).
- HARD CEILING per device, independent of band and warm-up — a slow-ramp attacker
can't train through it.
- COLD START: for reconnectWarmupMs after boot, force the normal band and apply
only the hard ceiling, so a full-fleet reconnect after a deploy doesn't throttle
healthy screens. State is in-memory, resets on restart.
- Observability: every throttle engagement logs device, band, observed vs allowed
rate, and backoff. Throttled device gets device:throttled + a deferred disconnect.
Tests (api.test.js style):
- unit: healthy-never-throttled, storm-throttled-with-growing-backoff, band
multiplies backoff, hard-ceiling-even-in-warmup, warm-up leniency, neighbor
isolation, slow release.
- integration GATE (the required one): full-fleet reconnect right after restart
throttles NO healthy device; a single device storming IS throttled; a neighbor
stays unaffected while another storms.
- also fixes pre-existing test PORT collisions (my new integration files clashed
with totp.test.js:3979 and totp-keyrotation.test.js:3980 -> moved to 3982/3983);
full suite now green serially AND in parallel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Continuously samples event-loop delay via perf_hooks.monitorEventLoopDelay()
(C++-backed histogram; cheap). Each window persists mean/p50/p99/max to a new
event_loop_lag table and recomputes a coarse load band (normal/elevated/critical)
from the window p99. Standalone value: current lag is exposed on /api/status and
band changes are logged, so site lag is diagnosable independent of throttling.
The band feeds the #142 reconnect throttle (next commit) but ships first as its
own subsystem.
- event_loop_lag is bounded from day one: indexed on sampled_at + scheduled prune
(LAG_TELEMETRY_RETENTION_DAYS, small default) modeled on the play_logs prune.
Deliberately NOT another unbounded-growth table.
- Band transitions are asymmetric: jump up immediately (tighten fast), release one
level at a time after N calm samples below a deadband (release slow, no flap).
Pure nextBand() function, unit-tested deterministically.
- config: LAG_SAMPLE_INTERVAL_MS, LAG_RESOLUTION_MS, LAG_TELEMETRY_RETENTION_DAYS,
LAG_PRUNE_INTERVAL_MS, LAG_ELEVATED_MS, LAG_CRITICAL_MS, LAG_RELEASE_SAMPLES.
- tests: band-transition unit tests; integration proves sampling persists, stays
bounded under the prune, and surfaces on /api/status.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A mute toggle wrote the draft playlist_items + emitted a live device:mute-changed but only markDraft()'d — it never updated playlists.published_snapshot, the copy the device actually plays. So the device's item.muted stayed 0 and every loop/reload re-applied full volume: dashboard icon red but audio kept playing (Android; web's native <video> loop masked it). emitMuteChanged now surgically patches the matching item's muted (0/1) inside the published_snapshot and re-pushes the playlist, so loops re-apply the correct flag. Surgical patch (not publishPlaylist) so a mute toggle can't prematurely publish other draft edits or flip publish state. Adds a regression test that fails without the patch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the cache/backoff loop fix (aa23cf0): make a device that can't
self-install visible to operators, and fix the signature-verify bug that kept the
whole #139 fix from engaging on the actual Fire OS target.
Dashboard surface (Phase 2):
- devices gains ota_status / ota_target_version / ota_attempts / ota_updated_at
via the idempotent ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN migration (non-destructive,
default-backfilled, idempotent on re-run).
- The device reports ota_status (OtaThrottle.statusFor -> none | pending |
manual_update_required) in device_info; the server persists it on register
(the reconnect backstop). devices d.* already surfaces it to the dashboard.
- Dashboard shows a non-blocking amber badge when manual_update_required
("Update available (vX) - install failed N times, manual update required");
i18n key in en.js (non-en inherits via the en fallback). Server suite +1 test.
Event-driven status (Option B):
- New device:ota-status WS message, emitted on STATE TRANSITIONS only
(enter-backoff -> manual_update_required, clear -> none), so the badge updates
promptly without waiting for a reconnect and without per-poll/heartbeat chatter.
Server handler persists the same fields; an unknown/forged device_id is a safe
no-op. The register-path persist stays as the reconnect backstop.
Signature-verify fix (the critical piece):
verifyApkSignature read the downloaded APK's signer via
getPackageArchiveInfo(GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES).signingInfo, but that field is
null for ARCHIVE files on API 28/29 (populated only from API 30). On Fire OS 8
(Android 9 / API 28) - the actual deployment target - this returned 0 certs from
a correctly-signed APK, so every OTA was refused as "tampered," the cache was
deleted, and the full APK re-downloaded every check cycle. This was the real
cause of the #139 re-download loop, NOT a silent-install failure: the cache and
backoff added in this branch sit behind this verify gate and never engaged on
the target.
Fix: below API 30, read the archive's signer via the legacy GET_SIGNATURES +
.signatures (its v1/JAR cert, which IS populated on 28/29). Keep
GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES + signingInfo for API >= 30 and for the installed-app
read (which works on 28+). The archive's signer is still extracted and compared
to the installed app's signer; a mismatch or zero-cert APK is still rejected.
This reads the cert correctly on old APIs - it does not weaken verification.
Verified on emulators:
- API 28: verify now passes for a legit APK (was: 0 certs, refused). Full backoff
then engages - 8.5MB pulled once, cache-hit on retries, backoff after 3,
manual_update_required emitted once; clears on successful update.
- API 28 negative: a re-signed (different-key) APK is still refused on cert
MISMATCH - no hole opened.
- API 30: unchanged path still passes (no regression).
- server suite 173/173, OtaThrottleTest 7/7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two independent multi-zone bugs, plus operator-facing warnings, i18n, and
regression tests guarding the data contracts.
Bug 1 — per-item mute was a no-op end to end:
- GET /api/devices/:id dropped the `muted` column from its assignments SELECT,
so the dashboard toggle never reflected state (the muted=false case in
particular). Column restored to the device payload.
- Android player now honours the per-item mute flag for YouTube (initial state
+ live via the IFrame JS API).
Bug 2 — items whose zone_id belongs to a different layout were silently dropped:
- Player fallback (web + Android): an orphaned zone_id is recovered into the
largest zone instead of vanishing, with telemetry.
- server/lib/zone-validate.js is the single source of truth for the orphan rule
(zone not in the device's active layout); used by the device payload
(per-item `orphan` flag + `active_layout_zones`) and the device list
(`orphan_count`).
- Assign-time hardening: a stale zone_id (not in the device's active layout) is
cleared to null on POST/PUT rather than persisted as a new orphan.
- scripts/find-orphan-zone-items.js: read-only sweep for existing orphans.
Dashboard warnings (operator-facing, never on the live player):
- Per-item badge + reassign affordance, device-list glance, preview banner.
- Graceful degradation: the zone selector falls back to /api/layouts/:id so it
can't vanish on a stale payload.
i18n: orphan-zone strings added to en/es/fr/de/pt/it (hi falls back by design;
count strings interpolate through tn()).
Tests: server/test/device-zone-contract.test.js adds 5 regression tests for the
data contracts above (muted true/false round-trip, active_layout_zones, orphan
flag + count, orphan-clears-on-reassign, assign-time clearing). 172/172 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The PiP endpoints and the per-item mute field shipped without OpenAPI coverage.
- openapi.yaml: add POST /pip (show), DELETE /pip + POST /pip/clear (clear), all
x-required-scope: full; add the `muted` boolean to PUT /assignments/{id}; add a `pip` tag.
- openapi-contract.test.js: the scope heuristic only treated `command` paths as full-scope,
so a full-scope non-command route (/pip) would fail it — extend it to recognize /pip.
Docs-only as far as the running build goes (no route/behavior change). Lands on main; not
in the frozen v1.9.1-beta4 tag — ships in the next tag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(server): proxy remote YouTube thumbnails instead of ENOENT on a local path
YouTube content stores thumbnail_path as a REMOTE URL
(https://img.youtube.com/vi/<id>/hqdefault.jpg), but the thumbnail-serving route
path.resolve'd it into contentDir -> a local file that never existed -> ENOENT logged
a few times a minute (the tester-log spam). Recreating content didn't help (new rows
store the same remote URL).
- GET /api/content/:id/thumbnail now proxies a remote http(s) thumbnail_path
server-side (same-origin, so dashboard CSP img-src is unaffected) via a non-throwing
helper: upstream 404 -> 404, other failure/timeout -> 502, image/* only (modest SSRF
hardening; the URL is server-set at ingest). Local thumbnails keep the sendFile path;
the playlist/widget/workspace access gating is unchanged for both branches.
- routes/widgets.js inlineUserContent skips the disk read for a remote thumbnail and
leaves the /api/content/:id/thumbnail reference in place (the proxy serves it).
- routes/content.js ingest unchanged; a comment notes the future download-at-ingest +
backfill option for CDN independence.
- New test/thumbnail-proxy.test.js: local sendFile still works; a remote thumbnail is
proxied (mock upstream, no local read, no ENOENT); upstream 404 -> clean 404. Full
server suite 164/164.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(server): boot banner shows the real version, not a hardcoded v1.2.0
The startup ASCII banner printed "ScreenTinker Server v1.2.0". Use the already-imported
VERSION (require('./version'), the single source of truth that reads the root VERSION
file) in a fixed-width field (VERSION.padEnd(22).slice(0, 22) — the same padEnd
discipline the port line uses) so the fixed-width box border stays aligned for any
version length. No other behavior changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(server): persist + ship + real-time per-item mute (#129)
The dashboard mute toggle was a no-op end to end. The active model is playlist_items
(the device payload is its published_snapshot); the legacy `assignments` table the bug
report cited is unused for devices. Three breaks:
- PUT /api/assignments/:id silently dropped `muted` (only read sort_order/duration_sec/
zone_id). It now accepts muted (coerced 0/1) and ITEM_SELECT returns it, so the toggle
persists and its on/off state sticks.
- playlist_items had no `muted` column — added (schema + idempotent migration).
- buildSnapshotItems didn't select muted, so it never reached the published_snapshot /
device payload — now included.
Real-time: on a mute change, emit device:mute-changed { content_id, widget_id, muted } to
every device on that playlist so the player toggles the matching item's volume live,
decoupled from publish (the value is also in the next snapshot, so it persists). Adds a
[mute] log line (the report noted zero mute log entries).
Test: test/mute.test.js — PUT persists + returns muted, it reaches the published
snapshot, and a non-mute update doesn't reset it. Server suite 164/164.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(player): apply per-item mute live on Android + web (#129)
Honor the new per-item mute from the server, both in real time and on reload.
Android:
- WebSocketService: onMuteChanged callback + main-thread device:mute-changed handler.
- MediaPlayerManager.setVideoMuted(): flips the live ExoPlayer volume on the current
video (YouTube autoplays muted; images/widgets are silent).
- MainActivity: on device:mute-changed, apply immediately if the toggled item is the
one playing now.
- PlaylistController.sig(): include muted so a published mute change re-renders/persists
instead of being de-duped.
Web player (server/player/index.html):
- device:mute-changed handler toggles the current <video>; the video mount now also
honors item.muted so a published mute sticks across reloads.
Tizen intentionally not included: its player mutes ALL video for autoplay, so per-item
unmute isn't achievable there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* PiP overlay MVP: push image/web overlays to a device or group (#109)
Implements the #109 MVP from docs proposal: a floating overlay PUSHED to a device or
group in real time, rendered above the playlist without disturbing it. Scope is the
MVP only — video/RTSP, MQTT, offline-queue, and the priority/stacking system are
deferred to follow-up PRs as the proposal specifies.
Protocol (/device socket, player-agnostic):
- device:pip-show { pip_id, type:image|web, uri, position, width, height, duration,
title?, title_color?, background_color?, opacity?, border_radius?, close_button? }
- device:pip-clear { pip_id? }
The player fetches uri itself (same trust model as remote_url content; server never
proxies). type:web is full-trust by design, hence the 'full' token scope.
Server (server/routes/pip.js, new; mounted in config/api-surface.js PUBLIC_ROUTERS):
- POST /api/pip and POST /api/pip/clear + DELETE /api/pip, all requireScope('full').
- Resolves device_id to a device OR a group, expands a group to members, and emits
per-device — reusing the group command route's room-size online check and
{device_id, name, status: sent|offline} result shape. Generates pip_id.
- Validates type/position allowlists, uri http(s), numeric bounds on
width/height/duration/opacity/border_radius, colors via the existing VALID_COLOR
(#RRGGBB; transparency is the separate opacity field).
- Workspace-isolated: every target query is scoped to req.workspaceId, so a token
bound to workspace A can't address workspace B (404). Offline devices are reported,
never queued (PiP is ephemeral).
Player overlay layer (Tizen; tizen/js/pip-overlay.js, new):
- A #pip sibling ABOVE #stage that PlaylistPlayer/ZoneRenderer never touch.
- applyOrientation now applies the SAME transform to #pip as #stage, so corner
positions track the visible CONTENT in all four orientations.
- image -> <img>, web -> <iframe> (muted by default: empty allow= denies autoplay),
sized/positioned/styled per payload, optional title bar.
- Single overlay slot, last-show-wins; duration timer (0 = until cleared); pip-clear
(id-aware) or timer tears down; teardown wrapped so a malformed payload can't wedge
the layer. Reports show/clear over device:log (tag 'pip').
Dashboard: a minimal "Send overlay" / "Clear overlay" tester on the device-detail
controls (device/group via the open device, type, uri, position, duration), calling
POST /api/pip through the api helper.
Tests (server suite green, 161/161):
- api.test.js: PiP tier — authz (read/write 403, full passes), workspace isolation
(wsA token -> wsB device 404), payload validation, device + group targeting, clear;
plus the PUBLIC_ROUTERS snapshot-firewall updated for /api/pip.
- pip-overlay.test.js: loads the real player.js + pip-overlay.js in a vm with a DOM
shim; proves the overlay shows, auto-dismisses on the duration timer, and never
changes the playlist signature / touches #stage; web->iframe, last-show-wins,
id-aware clear, malformed-payload safety.
Not in this PR (intentional):
- Android player overlay — fast-follow. Protocol + server are player-agnostic; the
Android layer (an overlay View above the player, orientation-matched to MainActivity's
rootView rotation) is the same shape and lands next.
- OpenAPI docs for POST /api/pip — the contract test's scope heuristic only treats
'command' paths as full-scope, so documenting a full-scope non-command route there
needs that heuristic extended first; deferred with the docs item (proposal §8.6).
- video/rtsp types, MQTT, offline queue-on-reconnect, priority/stacking, arbitrary
(x,y)/selector positioning (proposal §6).
Refs #109
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* PiP overlay: add Android + web players (#109)
Extends the #109 PiP MVP to the other two players so the protocol (device:pip-show /
device:pip-clear) is honored fleet-wide, not just on Tizen. No server/protocol changes —
the route and socket messages are player-agnostic; these are the two missing surfaces.
Web player (server/player/index.html):
- New #pipContainer layer above #playerContainer, pointer-transparent, that the playlist
render never touches. The same orientation transform is applied to it as to
#playerContainer (extended to also reset width/height on landscape so a
portrait->landscape switch realigns), so corner positions track the visible content.
- Inline PiP logic mirroring tizen/js/pip-overlay.js: image -> <img>, web -> <iframe>
(muted by default via empty allow=), position/size/bg/opacity/radius/title, single slot
last-show-wins, duration timer (0 = until cleared), id-aware clear, wrapped teardown.
- device:pip-show/clear handlers; reports show/clear over device:log (tag "pip").
Android player:
- activity_main.xml: a pipLayout FrameLayout as the LAST child of rootLayout — it draws
above the content AND inherits rootView's orientation rotation/translation, so corner
positioning is orientation-matched for free.
- PipOverlay.kt (new): builds the overlay box into pipLayout. image -> ImageView (decoded
off-thread via ImageLoader, dropped if torn down mid-decode); web -> WebView with
mediaPlaybackRequiresUserGesture=true (mute-by-default). Gravity-based corner/center
placement with a 4% inset, GradientDrawable bg + corner radius, alpha=opacity, optional
title bar. Single slot last-show-wins; duration timer; id-aware clear; teardown wrapped
and also run on activity destroy (WebView cleanup).
- WebSocketService: onPipShow/onPipClear callbacks + safeOn handlers posted to the main
thread (they build Views) + a sendLog(tag, level, message) emitter for device:log.
- MainActivity: instantiate PipOverlay (log -> wsService.sendLog("pip", ...)), wire the
callbacks, tear down on destroy.
Verified: Android assembleDebug builds clean; web player inline JS parses; server suite
still 161/161 (no server changes this commit). Not yet validated on real hardware —
four-orientation corner positioning mirrors the player container/rootView transform but
should be eyeballed on a panel.
Refs #109
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agencies can only be designated FULL-SCREEN playlists (no item with zone_id) - a full-screen
agency upload can't safely target a zone, so the ambiguous case is excluded rather than
solved. Checked at THREE points:
- Designation (tokens.js create + PUT /:id/targets) -> 400: reject a zoned target.
- Upload (agency.js item-add) -> 409: block if the playlist BECAME zoned after designation.
MANDATORY because auto-publish has no draft net - a full-screen playlist designated to an
auto-publish token, then zone-assigned, would otherwise auto-publish a full-screen upload
into a zoned playlist. The upload check is the only thing that catches it.
- Picker (settings.js): zoned playlists greyed/disabled with the reason (GET /playlists now
returns a zoned flag); backend reject is the guard if the UI is bypassed. i18n x5.
isZonedPlaylist = EXISTS(playlist_items WHERE zone_id IS NOT NULL). Pure restriction - no
zone structure, no api_token_target_zones.
Bite-test (the exact sequence) GREEN and re-proven to bite: full-screen -> designate to an
auto-publish token -> zone-assign the playlist -> agency upload is BLOCKED (409), not
auto-published; neutralizing the upload check makes it go red. 149 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Settings → API Tokens: each agency token gets an "Edit playlists" control that opens the
playlist picker pre-checked with the token's CURRENT designations (from the list GET's
tok.targets), lets the admin add/remove, and calls the existing PUT /:id/targets to
atomically re-designate. Reuses the creation picker pattern; common.save/cancel reused;
edit_targets + targets_updated i18n across all 5 locales. No security-model change - the
endpoint was already proven.
Test (integration): PUT /:id/targets re-designates (add + remove) and the confinement
follows the NEW set - a re-designated token reaches only its new playlists (router.param
403s the removed one). 148 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Investigation found zone placement is a DEVICE property (device.layout_id), not a playlist
property: a normal playlist has no derivable layout (zone_id is NULL unless set in the
device-assignment flow), so a playlist-scoped zone grant can't reach the normal flow. The
right model: placement belongs to the device (same playlist can be full-screen on one screen,
a zone on another); the agency just gets whole-playlist grants + size-guidance.
Removed the zone-grant machinery (security-adjacent dead surface is a liability, not dormant
convenience): api_token_target_zones (schema + a DROP migration for the dev DB where the
short-lived CREATE ran), resolveGrantedZone, grantableZoneIds, buildZoneGrantRows, the
create/PUT zone validation, GET /api/playlists/:id/zones, getPlaylistZones, the settings
zone-picker + its i18n, and the zone-grant bite-test.
KEPT (model-agnostic, good): the reactive per-playlist size-guidance card - GET
/api/agency/playlists/:playlistId/layout (router.param-confined) now reports the zones the
playlist actually feeds (where/what-size content lands), or full-screen when it has no layout.
Whole-playlist grants = today's working model. 147 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Issuance (on the proven seam):
- tokens.js create + PUT /:id/targets accept per-playlist zone grants (target_zones), inserted
into api_token_target_zones inside the same transaction as the playlist grants (FK requires
the parent, so order matters and is correct).
- Issuance validation (the mirror of runtime confinement): grantableZoneIds() - can grant ONLY
a zone the playlist's layout actually feeds; can't grant one it doesn't have or one from
another playlist's layout. Bite-tested. PUT re-designate stays atomic: delete parent rows ->
zone grants cascade out (no manual child delete).
- settings.js: checking a designated playlist reveals its grantable zones (GET
/api/playlists/:id/zones, JWT); leave unchecked = whole-playlist. i18n across all 5 locales.
Card:
- GET /api/agency/playlists/:playlistId/layout (rides router.param - confined; a non-
designated playlist -> 403, asserted). "Your zone" = the GRANTED zones. Retired the
token-wide /layouts (the per-playlist card replaces the disconnected lump).
- Portal card reacts to the playlist selector: pick a playlist -> its layout renders, the
granted zone highlighted with px size, siblings as context.
Full suite + agency bite-suite green (154).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Placement-as-grant, replacing the inferred auto-place idea. api_token_target_zones is an
ADDITIVE second table (does NOT touch the proven api_token_targets), structurally anchored:
a composite FK to api_token_targets(token_id, playlist_id) makes a zone grant orphan-
impossible and cascade away when the playlist grant is revoked - "narrow" is structural, not
conventional. zone_id FK -> layout_zones cascades on zone/layout delete.
Confinement (lib/agency-targets.resolveGrantedZone, called in the item-add): grants exist ->
the item MUST land in a granted zone (a body zone_id picks among grants, never escapes them);
none -> whole-playlist/full-screen as before. The item-add stamps the granted zone_id.
Bite-tested (6, all proven incl. neutralize->red on the confinement): granted YES; non-
granted/cross-playlist/ambiguous blocked; orphan-grant rejected by the FK; cascade on
playlist-grant revoke, on playlist delete, on zone/layout delete; and foreign_keys=ON
asserted (a cascade that no-ops because FKs are off is the trap). 153 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reuses the existing scheduler + sendEmail infra (no new scheduler). The agency endpoint
enqueues one agency_notifications row per item added; a 15-min flush groups unsent rows per
token+playlist+action and sends ONE digest per group to the workspace owner/admins + the
playlist owner (deduped via UNION). Draft -> "added N items, awaiting approval"; published ->
"updated <playlist>".
Two robustness rules, both tested:
- Queue never balloons when SMTP is off: the endpoint skips enqueue when !isConfigured(),
and the flush drains-and-discards unsent rows as a backstop.
- sent_at is stamped ONLY after a successful send, so a failed send retries next cycle
instead of silently dropping.
Wired into boot via startAgencyDigest(). 147 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
So the agency can size/place content: returns the canvas size + zone positions/sizes for the
layouts its designated playlists feed, marking which zones are theirs. DEVICE-FREE BY
CONSTRUCTION - the query path is playlist_items.zone_id -> layout_zones -> layouts and never
touches devices/groups/schedules, so device names/locations/IPs/topology are structurally
absent, not filtered. Geometry only - no sibling-zone content. layout.name included (admin's
canvas name); thumbnail_data omitted (could render other zones' content).
Confinement query in lib/agency-layouts.js, bite-tested: own layout YES, a non-designated
playlist's layout NO, response has NO device fields (asserted on a db where a location-named
device exists), and neutralizing the t.token_id filter goes red. 142 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
api_tokens.auto_publish (DEFAULT 0 = draft, the fail-safe). Admin sets it at token creation
in the designate UI (checkbox, agency scope only). The agency endpoint reads it from the
TOKEN ROW via req.apiToken (apiTokenAuth attaches it) - NEVER from req.body, so an agency
can't opt itself out of approval. 0 -> markDraft; 1 -> the shared publishPlaylist path.
Tests (integration): draft is the default; a draft token with auto_publish:true IN THE BODY
still lands draft (body ignored); an auto-publish token goes live; manual publish still works
(extraction regression). i18n across all 5 locales. 141 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The portal needs to show an agency which playlists it may post to. New read surface on the
security primitive, built with write-path rigor: the confinement query lives in
lib/agency-targets.js (own token + bound workspace only) and is bite-tested four ways -
own targets yes; another token's, outside the allowlist, and cross-workspace all NO;
neutralizing the t.token_id filter makes it go red. Real-path wiring + the portal's
graceful 401 trigger asserted in the integration suite. No :playlistId, so router.param
doesn't apply - the query is the seam.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agency capability behind the proven off-ladder/agencyGate primitive:
- agencyGate is now SCOPE-only at the mount; the per-target check is router.param
('playlistId') in routes/agency.js - it fires WITH the param before the handler, so no
:playlistId route can skip it (drift-proof). A mount-level target check was silently
bypassed (Express populates req.params only at route match); the integration bite-suite
caught it - this is the fix.
- routes/agency.js: POST /content (shared ingest) + POST /playlists/:id/items (date-bounded
#74/#75 item; lands as draft so the admin's re-publish is the approval gate).
- tokens.js: issue scope='agency' tokens bound to a non-empty in-workspace playlist
allowlist (atomic); PUT /:id/targets re-designates (JWT-only -> can't self-widen).
- server.js: AGENCY_ROUTERS mounted bearerAuth + resolveTenancy + agencyGate.
Full bite-suite (test/agency.test.js) GREEN and re-proven to bite on the SHIPPING path:
neutralizing the router.param check makes non-designated->403 go red. Four assertions at
three seams: target (router.param), off-ladder (tokenScopeGate), can't-widen (tokens
JWT-only), issuance cross-workspace (create validation). 139 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The capability/target-restricted token model for the agency portal (#73 option B),
proven before any endpoint sits on it:
- 'agency' scope value is OFF the read/write/full ladder, so the existing tokenScopeGate
rejects it on every public router by construction (auto-confinement, no new code).
- api_token_targets join table: which playlists an agency token may act on.
- agencyGate: THE single seam - agency-scope-only + (playlist in this token's allowlist
AND in the bound workspace), one query enforcing target + cross-workspace isolation.
- AGENCY_ROUTERS category in config/api-surface.js (mounted with agencyGate, not
tokenScopeGate) - declared; router/mount land with the endpoints.
Both bite-tested: spine (agency 403s on tokenScopeGate; read/write still pass) and the
gate (non-designated/cross-workspace/non-agency/JWT -> 403; neutralizing the target check
goes red). NARROW - not the general capability-scope system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review caught the encrypted TOTP secret riding in the login/verify response body:
issueSession receives a SELECT * user row and only destructured out password_hash, so
totp_secret_enc (and the internal replay counter totp_last_step) leaked. Encrypted, so
not catastrophic, but it regresses the API work's "secrets never in responses" rule.
Strip both in issueSession (covers /login and /totp/verify); add an assertion that a
verify response carries no totp_secret_enc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unit: the mfa_pending BITE (db-injected so removing the rejection goes red), lockout, replay,
recovery-hash, decrypt-null graceful. Integration: enrollment, login->mfa_required, route-level
bite, recovery single-use, API-token bypass, verify lockout. Key-rotation: enroll under key A,
reboot under key B -> recovery still works, TOTP fails cleanly (no 500).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 6-digit pairing code is generated client-side, so the server can't raise its entropy
without a player change. Instead, harden server-side (no client change):
- lib/pair-lockout.js: lock an IP out of POST /api/provision/pair after 5 failed claims
(15-min lockout), and expire stale provisioning codes after 15 min so a code is not
claimable indefinitely. A successful claim resets the IP.
- /pair enforces both. Only an UNKNOWN code (404) counts toward the lockout (a real guess);
an EXPIRED code (410) is a legitimate-but-stale code and does NOT count, so a slow bulk
rollout from one shared-NAT IP can't lock itself out. getClientIp is Cloudflare-aware
(CF-Connecting-IP validated against a trusted edge peer), so the lockout keys on the real
per-client IP, never a shared edge.
Unit-tested deterministically with injected time, incl. the bulk-rollout-never-locks case.
Closes#87
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/provision was a second pairing endpoint that paired a device by code but,
unlike POST /api/provision/pair, did NOT assign a workspace, enforce checkDeviceLimit, or
emit device:paired / dashboard:device-added - a silently-diverging duplicate that no
client ever called. It now returns 410 Gone and points callers at /pair, so
/api/provision/pair is the single, fully-protected pairing endpoint. The mount stays in
the JWT-only partition, so a Bearer st_ token still gets 401 (requireAuth) before the 410.
Closes#90
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The non-security gaps named in the public-API self-review:
- gap-fix: zone_id (playlist items) + layout_id (device PUT) accepted and returned on read,
INCLUDING the cross-tenant rejection (the is_template OR workspace_id guard - the
security-relevant one).
- docs serving: /openapi.yaml serves the spec, /docs returns the Redoc page.
- i18n drift-guard: apitoken.* keys have full parity across en/es/fr/de/pt (a key missing
in one locale fails CI).
- token lifecycle branches: token-create workspace-membership validation and last_used_at
stamping (integration), plus the must_change_password gate (unit test via the in-memory
DB injection - cross-process WAL visibility is unreliable for that branch in-process).
119 tests total (was 108), all in the existing node --test job.
Closes#92
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-review follow-ups, kept as a separate commit so the review trail is honest.
- Spec drift: POST /widgets/preview was documented scope 'read' but the method-based
tokenScopeGate enforces 'write' for any POST, so a read-token integrator following the
published docs would hit a surprise 403. The code is right; fix the SPEC to match it.
- Guard it forever: test/openapi-contract.test.js cross-checks every spec operation's
x-required-scope against the enforcement rule, and that every documented path is a
public (token-reachable) router - both derived from the same config/api-surface.js.
Adds js-yaml (devDep) to parse the spec. Spec/enforcement drift now fails CI.
- Vendored Redoc: add frontend/vendor/README.md (library, version 2.3.9, source, update
steps) and drop the dangling //# sourceMappingURL line so /docs doesn't 404 in devtools.
Remaining (non-security) test-coverage gaps tracked in #92.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated public-API suite (boots the real server as a subprocess) so CI green proves
the token layer, not just the pre-existing tests:
- Partition firewall, derived from the SAME config/api-surface.js server.js mounts from:
every JWT-only router 401s a token; a public-surface snapshot fails if any router is
added to the token door; known-privileged routers asserted JWT-only.
- Threat model: role-strip gates, workspace-binding both directions (token ignores
X-Workspace-Id, JWT honors it), the scope ladder, the render bypass, token lifecycle,
and JWT no-regression.
- Device WS round-trip via socket.io-client (added as a devDep): valid device_token
registers + receives its playlist; wrong token rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each playlist item can carry schedule blocks (active days, start/end
time-of-day, optional start/end dates). An item plays when the screen's
local "now" matches at least one block; an item with no blocks always
plays. #74 covers time-of-day/day-of-week windows including overnight
wrap; #75 covers inclusive date ranges (auto-expiry). Evaluation is
on-device, so dayparting and expiry work offline.
- Shared evaluator contract: shared/schedule-vectors.json (39 vectors —
DST US+AU, overnight-wrap anchoring, timezone correctness, date
boundaries). Canonical JS evaluator in server/lib/schedule-eval.js;
Kotlin and Tizen ports kept in lockstep by drift guards (Tizen byte-diff
test, Kotlin JUnit reads the shared JSON, new android-test CI job).
- All three players (web, Android, Tizen) filter by schedule against their
own clock, idle with a "Nothing scheduled" message + 30s re-check when
everything is filtered, and fail open on any evaluator error.
- Editor: per-item schedule modal + row badge in the playlist editor;
client validation mirrors the server; editing marks the playlist draft.
- Part B (behaviour change): device/group schedule overrides now evaluate
in each device's effective timezone instead of server-local time.
- Device detail shows the reported timezone + a clock-skew warning.
- i18n for en/es/fr/de/pt across all new strings (namespaced itemsched.*
to avoid colliding with the device-schedule calendar's schedule.*).
- CHANGELOG documents the feature, the Part B change, the fail-open
guarantee, and the scheduled-single-video re-render tradeoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- server/version.js: shared version helper that reads the root VERSION file once
(fallback 0.0.0). Replaces the stale hardcoded 1.2.0 / 1.5.1 / 1.0.0 fallbacks
in /api/version, /api/update/check, and /api/status.
- config.js: DATA_DIR / DB_PATH / UPLOADS_DIR / CERTS_DIR env overrides for the
db, uploads, and certs/jwt-secret locations. Unset resolves to exactly the
legacy in-repo paths, so existing installs (including production) are
byte-for-byte unchanged. Guarded by test/config-paths.test.js.
- package.json: rename remote-display-server -> screentinker (+ lockfile name).
- scripts/bump-version.sh: one-shot bump across VERSION, package.json (+lock),
android (versionName and versionCode + 1), and the tizen widget version; makes
one commit plus an annotated tag; prints the push command, never pushes.
- .gitignore: global *.db / *.db-wal / *.db-shm / *.db.* so no database file
(including .db.devbak backups, at any path) can be committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Models sometimes stacked text lines at the same y (unreadable) and emitted accent
shapes after text, so a band could hide the words.
- deoverlapTexts: push a line down only when it also overlaps horizontally
(leaves side-by-side text alone), with conservative line-height clearance so
real rendering doesn't re-overlap; shift the stack up if it ran past the bottom.
- Order shapes before text in the output so accent bands always render behind the
words.
Verified: 0 text-on-text overlaps across multiple prompts (Playwright DOM check);
unit test asserts overlapping lines get separated + shapes precede text. 63/63.
Text could run off the edge (long/large headlines, nowrap) and shapes placed at
the far edge (e.g. a bottom band at y=100) spilled over.
- Server-side fit pass on every generated element: shrink text fontSize so it
fits the canvas width (chars*fontSize*0.075, tuned for bold/uppercase
headlines) and height (incl. line-height), then nudge x/y within 4% margins;
clamp shapes so x+width<=100 and y+height<=100. Deterministic - doesn't rely on
the model getting layout right.
- Designer preview: vw -> cqw (+ container-type on the canvas) so text scales to
the canvas, not the browser window. The preview was overstating size vs what
actually publishes; now it matches. Published widget keeps vw (scales on the
player).
Verified: Playwright DOM check shows zero elements overflowing the canvas after
generation; unit test asserts long text is shrunk + repositioned in-bounds. 62/62.
Competitor pressure (Mandoe 'AI Magic Create'): prompt -> signage. We answer it
in a way that's actually BETTER for signage and costs the operator nothing.
Key idea: don't generate raw images (AI garbles text - fatal for menus/promos).
The LLM returns a STRUCTURED design spec (headline, supporting text, accent
shapes, palette) that the existing Designer renders with real fonts - crisp and
fully editable. Reuses the whole Designer.
BYOK, fully under the customer's control: each workspace configures its own
OpenAI-COMPATIBLE endpoint + key - OpenAI cloud OR self-hosted (Ollama / LM Studio
/ llama.cpp). Operator bears zero AI cost/liability.
- server/lib/secretbox.js: AES-256-GCM for the key at rest (never returned).
- routes/ai.js: GET/PUT /api/ai/settings (admin; key write-only) + POST
/generate-design (editor+). Output is strictly validated/normalized (cap count,
clamp ranges, px->%, strip HTML, validate colors) - never trust the model.
SSRF guard: hosted instances block private/internal targets; self-hosted (the
whole point of local AI) may point at localhost/LAN.
- Designer: an 'AI generate' panel (prompt + Generate) + a settings modal.
Verified end-to-end against local Ollama (llama3.1:8b): prompt -> editable design
on the canvas. Unit tests cover normalization + the SSRF guard. Suite 61/61.
Phase 2 (next): AI background images (OpenAI images / AUTOMATIC1111).
Self-hosters rebuilding could end up schema-behind-code, failing only at runtime
(a missing users.must_change_password locked out all logins). Two root causes:
1. The migration loop swallowed EVERY error (catch {}), so a real ALTER failure
was indistinguishable from the benign 'duplicate column' on an already-migrated
DB. Now only 'duplicate column'/'already exists' is treated as a no-op; any
other error is logged loudly, and a one-line summary reports how many new
column migrations actually applied this boot.
2. Nothing verified the schema after migrations. Added lib/schema-check.js:
verifyAndRepairSchema() checks the tables + columns the request path REQUIRES,
idempotently repairs missing repairable columns (logging each), and if anything
required is STILL missing, prints a loud FATAL block and exits - failing fast at
boot instead of at the first authed request.
Note: the reported 'audit_log missing' was a misdiagnosis - the code uses
activity_log (0 refs to audit_log), created by schema.sql on every boot.
Tests: healthy (no-op), auto-repair of must_change_password, missing-table report.
Platform admins can now cleanly remove a customer org (account ends) or a stray
workspace from the UI, instead of raw SQL that risks orphaning resources.
The tenant cascade isn't pure DB CASCADE - workspace-scoped tables (devices,
content, playlists, ...) are NO ACTION and must be purged before the workspace.
Extracted that logic out of deleteUserCascade into shared deleteWorkspaceCascade /
deleteOrgCascade helpers (one tested implementation; deleteUserCascade now reuses
the purgeWorkspaces extraction).
Backend (platform-admin only): GET /api/admin/orgs (list + owner + counts +
workspaces), DELETE /api/admin/orgs/:id, DELETE /api/admin/workspaces/:id.
UI: an Organizations section in Admin listing every org/workspace with a
type-the-name confirmation before the irreversible delete.
Tests: org/workspace cascade (real FKs) + endpoint gating/404. Suite 53/53.
MSPs onboarding customers as separate orgs had no way to create one with
AUTO_CREATE_ORG_ON_SIGNUP=false (the only path was signup auto-org). Add a
platform-admin 'Create organization' action.
POST /api/admin/orgs (requirePlatformAdmin) creates the org + its first 'Default'
workspace. organizations.owner_user_id is NOT NULL, so an org can't be ownerless;
the creating admin becomes org_owner + workspace_admin (mirrors the signup
bootstrap in routes/auth.js) - which also surfaces the org in their switcher.
Customer users are then added via the existing Add User / manage-memberships flow.
UI: 'Create organization' button + single-field modal in the Admin area (gated).
Tests: create (201 + memberships + audit), empty-name 400, non-admin/operator 403.
The public, CSP-exempt widget render (GET /api/widgets/:id/render) inlined
config values straight into <style>/CSS and (for the text widget) raw into the
same-origin document. A workspace editor could store `}</style><script>...` in a
color/background/size field (bypassing the UI pickers via the API) → stored XSS
executing in the app origin for anyone who opens the render URL (JWT theft).
- safeCss(): allow colors/gradients but reject CSS breakout / url() / @import /
expression / javascript:. Applied to background/color across clock, weather,
rss, social renders.
- safeNumber(): coerce font_size / scroll_speed / max_items to a finite number
so they can't smuggle markup.
- Text widget keeps its intentional raw HTML/CSS feature, but it now renders
inside an <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts"> (NO allow-same-origin) - scripts run
in a null origin that can't reach the dashboard's localStorage/JWT.
Tests: test/widget-render-xss.test.js (breakout rejected, numbers coerced, text
isolated, legit colors/gradients preserved). Full suite green.
Five low-risk, high-value fixes surfaced by the security review:
#3 Branding lockdown — `custom_domain`/`custom_css` (which feed the PUBLIC,
pre-auth branding resolver and the login-page <style>) are now settable only
by platform admins; a workspace_admin can no longer hijack the platform login
page by claiming its domain. The public /api/branding (+ /domain) now return
only presentational fields via publicBranding() (no id/user_id/workspace_id/
custom_domain/timestamps leak).
#6 Strip device_token — the device WS auth secret (validated with
timingSafeEqual) was returned in device list/get/update + pairing responses
(SELECT d.* / *). New lib/device-sanitize.js strips it everywhere; prevents
device impersonation by any workspace user.
#7 must_change_password enforced server-side — was a frontend-only redirect, so
a provisioned temp password worked indefinitely via the API. requireAuth now
403s every route except GET/PUT /api/auth/me (the password change, which
clears the flag) and logout while the flag is set.
#8 XSS — escape user data interpolated into innerHTML in teams.js, kiosk.js,
layout-editor.js (team/page/layout/zone names, member name/email, kiosk
config fields). scriptSrcAttr 'unsafe-inline' made these exploitable via
injected event handlers, not just markup.
#9 Thumbnail IDOR — /api/content/:id/thumbnail had no auth/scope gate (any UUID
served any tenant's thumbnail). Now mirrors the /file route's playlist/widget
workspace-scoped reference check.
Tests: new test/security-fixes.test.js (device strip, publicBranding field
allowlist, must_change_password gate). Full suite 41/41. Verified live against a
prod-data copy: device_token absent from /api/devices, /api/branding trimmed.
Not addressed here (tracked for follow-up): Android OTA signature verification
(Critical), public widget-render XSS, token revocation/logout, pairing-code
strength, validateRemoteUrl hardening, import quota.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
White-label is stored per-workspace (white_labels.workspace_id); unbranded and
new workspaces - and the login page - fell back to hardcoded ScreenTinker. Add a
single platform default that everything inherits beneath the per-workspace layer.
Resolution (lib/branding.js): workspace row -> custom-domain match -> platform
default -> hardcoded ScreenTinker. Row-level override: a workspace with its own
row keeps it (current behavior); only row-less workspaces inherit the default,
so editing the default propagates instantly (no row-copying at creation).
The platform default is a white_labels row with a FIXED id ('platform-default'),
not a "workspace_id IS NULL" sentinel - legacy pre-multitenancy rows can also
have a null workspace_id, which would be ambiguous.
- routes/admin.js: GET/PUT /api/admin/branding (requirePlatformAdmin) to read/
upsert the single platform-default row; audit-logged.
- server.js: public GET /api/branding (domain match -> platform default ->
hardcoded) for pre-login/pre-workspace contexts.
- routes/white-label.js: authed GET now falls back to the platform default
(was hardcoded) for row-less workspaces.
- Frontend: login page resolves + applies branding (logo, name, colors, favicon,
custom CSS) pre-auth; Admin page gets a "Default branding" form.
Tests: resolver order incl. legacy null-ws safety; admin GET/PUT (single row,
upsert, platform-admin-only 403). Full suite 37/37. Verified end-to-end:
public + authed + login-page all inherit the platform default; per-workspace
override preserved.
Closes#15.
The Workspace column on the platform Users page could only move a 0/1-workspace
user and showed a dead "N workspaces" label for multi-membership users. Replace
it with a "Manage workspaces" modal that handles the full picture.
Backend (routes/admin.js, requirePlatformAdmin):
- GET /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces list memberships (+org/ws names, role)
- POST /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces add to a workspace (upsert role)
- PUT /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces/:wsId change role in a workspace
- DELETE /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces/:wsId remove (last one allowed -> unassigned)
Roles validated against WORKSPACE_ROLES; each mutation writes an audit row.
Frontend:
- Workspace cell is now a summary (Unassigned / <name> / N workspaces /
"Platform (all)" for staff) + a Manage button.
- New admin-user-workspaces-modal: lists every membership with an inline role
dropdown + Remove, plus a type-to-filter "Add to workspace" picker (org-grouped,
excludes current memberships) with a role select. Staff get a note that they
already have platform-wide access. Refreshes the table on close if changed.
- Removed the old single-select inline move control (superseded by the modal).
Tests: 6 added (add to multiple workspaces, per-workspace role change, upsert,
remove incl. last->unassigned, validation 400/404, non-platform-admin 403).
Full suite 33/33. Verified headless: Manage opens, lists memberships, filtered
picker, add/role-change/remove round-trips persist (throwaway user, cleaned up).
The #18 user-delete bug was the first symptom of a broader gap: 13 tables
reference workspaces(id) (and activity_log also organizations(id)) with NO
ACTION, so deleting a workspace or organization fails the same FK wall once it
holds any content. SQLite can't ALTER an FK action, so this migration rebuilds
each table (the create-copy-rename pattern the assignments/schedules migrations
already use), changing only the tenant FK clause:
workspace_id -> ON DELETE CASCADE (resources belong to the workspace)
activity_log.workspace_id / organization_id -> ON DELETE SET NULL (keep audit)
user_id FKs are intentionally left as-is - user deletion stays handled app-side
by lib/user-deletion.js (the #18 fix).
- lib/tenant-cascade-migration.js: pure, idempotent core (table-existence
guarded; transforms the stored CREATE text, copies rows verbatim, recreates
indexes; fixes activity_log's AUTOINCREMENT sequence; baseline-vs-after
foreign_key_check so pre-existing orphan rows don't abort it but a botched
rebuild does).
- db/database.js: boot wrapper owns the pre-migration snapshot + process.exit
on failure, matching the other heavy migrations.
Tests (node:test): reproduces the workspace-delete FK failure, applies the
migration, verifies FK actions (CASCADE / SET NULL), index recreation, data
preserved, and that workspace/org delete now cascades (activity_log preserved).
Full suite 27/27. Verified on a copy of a real DB: 13 tables rebuilt,
integrity_check ok, workspace delete cascades, no new FK violations.
DELETE /api/auth/users/:id ran a bare `DELETE FROM users`, but 23 columns
reference users(id) and only 4 cascade, so with foreign_keys=ON the delete
fails the moment the user is referenced anywhere - and a real user always is
(owns an org, created a workspace, has login activity). Reproduces on a fresh
DB, exactly as reported.
The schema also lacks cascades from workspaces -> tenant resources, so the DB
can't clean up on its own. New lib/user-deletion.js resolves every reference in
one transaction (defer_foreign_keys=ON for forgiving order; table-existence
guard for resilience):
- Refuse (409) if the user OWNS an organization that has other members -
don't nuke a shared tenant; transfer ownership first.
- Hard-delete the organizations they SOLELY own (workspaces + all contents).
- In orgs they don't own, PRESERVE resources: SET NULL the nullable
creator/inviter columns, and reassign the NOT NULL legacy creator user_id to
the resource's org owner (fallback: the acting admin).
- Memberships (organization_members/workspace_members/team_members/
content_folders) cascade on the user delete; pending invites they sent and
legacy teams they own are removed.
The handler now 404s an unknown id and 409s the shared-org case.
Tests (node:test): reproduces the FK failure, then verifies provisioned-member
delete (resources preserved + unlinked/reassigned), solo-org-owner cascade,
shared-org refusal (409), self-delete 400, non-superadmin 403, unknown 404.
Full suite 22/22. Verified end-to-end on a copy of a real DB: deleted a user
owning 2 solo orgs, foreign_key_check clean.
Closes#18.
Adds a "Workspace" column (after Plan) to the platform Users admin table so a
platform_admin can see and reassign a user's workspace inline, alongside the
Role/Plan dropdowns. Single-workspace move/assign model.
Backend:
- GET /api/auth/users (platform branch): one aggregate query adds
workspace_count and, for exactly-one membership, the workspace id/name + org
name (no N+1).
- PUT /api/admin/users/:id/workspace (requirePlatformAdmin - operator excluded):
move (1 membership) or assign (0) into the chosen workspace, default role
workspace_viewer, in a transaction; no-op if already there; REFUSES (400) a
user with >1 membership (manage in the members view). logActivity
admin_set_user_workspace.
Frontend (admin.js):
- Editable <select> only for a 'user' with 0/1 membership; multi-membership ->
read-only "N workspaces", platform staff -> read-only "Platform (all)".
- Options grouped by org via <optgroup>, built ONCE from /me's
accessible_workspaces (same source as the Add User picker) and reused per row.
- Picking "Unassigned" or the same workspace is a no-op so a stray pick can't
strip a membership. Success -> toast + refresh. EN i18n only.
Tests: 4 added (single-membership move 200 + changed, zero-membership assign
200, multi-membership 400 refused, non-platform-admin/operator 403). npm test
16/16. Verified headless: column renders, selected value correct, "Platform
(all)" for staff, and a dropdown move persisted (throwaway user, cleaned up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bug: #13 added 'platform_operator' to the frontend role dropdown
(PLATFORM_ROLE_OPTIONS) but #14's PUT /api/auth/users/:id/role whitelist
(ASSIGNABLE_PLATFORM_ROLES) only listed ['user','platform_admin'], so
selecting "Platform operator" returned 400 "Invalid role" - the role was
unassignable via the UI.
Fix: add 'platform_operator' to ASSIGNABLE_PLATFORM_ROLES. One line; the
self-demote guard is intentionally left untouched (a platform_admin still
cannot self-assign the non-owner operator role and lock themselves out).
Tests (node:test, isolated in-memory DB injection - no DB_PATH change):
- admin-users.test.js: platform_admin can PUT role=platform_operator on a
target user -> 200 and the row persists as platform_operator (regression
guard for the whitelist gap).
- operator-permissions.test.js (new): verify-then-test of the highest-blast
-radius deny. Operator CAN update/delete a workspace-scoped content row
(cross-org write works) but is denied (403) updating or deleting a shared
(workspace_id IS NULL) row - proving the separate PLATFORM_ROLES gate in
content.js's checkContentWrite still holds after canWrite was broadened to
isPlatformStaff.
Verified read-only (no leak): the other shared-asset write sites keep their
PLATFORM_ROLES gate that excludes operator - kiosk.js:57, widgets.js:110,
folders.js:31, layouts.js:59/117/133.
cd server && npm test -> 12 pass / 0 fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds server/test/admin-users.test.js and a `npm test` (node --test) script.
No DB_PATH override: the suite mounts the real routers against an isolated
in-memory better-sqlite3 instance injected into the require cache, seeded by
the test itself. Node v20 built-ins only (node:test, node:assert, fetch).
Covers: Add User success (response omits password/hash, hash stored not
plaintext, membership written, hosted lifecycle sentinels stamped, audit row
without the password), duplicate-email 409 (no overwrite), non-admin 403,
platform_operator denied (403), org_admin scoped to their own org only,
input validation, and the must_change_password lifecycle (set on create,
surfaced on login, cleared on PUT /api/auth/me).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
