HIGH 1 (teams IDOR): POST/DELETE /api/teams/:id/devices now require the
caller to own the device before assigning or detaching it. Without this
check, any team member could pull any device into their team via UUID
guess and gain remote-control access.
HIGH 2 (schedules IDOR): PUT /api/schedules/:id now re-verifies
ownership of every changed target field — device_id, group_id,
content_id, widget_id, layout_id, playlist_id. Previously only the
schedule owner was checked, letting users fire arbitrary content on
victim devices via update.
HIGH 3 (filename XSS): file.originalname captured by multer bypassed
sanitizeBody. New safeFilename() wraps every INSERT path (multipart
upload, remote URL, YouTube). Frontend sinks now go through esc() in
content-library.js, device-detail.js, video-wall.js. Web player gets
an inline escHtml helper for its info overlay where filenames, device
name, and serverUrl land in innerHTML.
HIGH 4 (kiosk public XSS): config.idleTimeout is now coerced via the
existing safeNumber() helper at both interpolation sites. A crafted
value with a newline can no longer escape the JS line comment to
inject arbitrary code into the public render endpoint.
HIGH 5 (folder DoS): POST /api/folders enforces a per-user cap of 100
folders (429 on overflow). Superadmin exempt.
MED 1 (SSRF): ImageLoader.decodeUrl rejects any URL scheme other than
http(s) so a malicious remote_url can't read local files via file://.
On the server, validateRemoteUrl() is extracted and now also runs on
PUT /api/content/:id remote_url updates — previously the SSRF check
only fired on POST.
MED 2 (fingerprint takeover): the WS device:register fingerprint
reclaim path now rejects takeover while the target device is online or
within 24h of its last heartbeat. A leaked fingerprint can no longer
hijack an active display.
MED 3 (npm audit): bumped uuid 9.x -> 14.0.0 (v3/v5/v6 buffer bounds
CVE; we only use v4 so not exploitable, but clears the audit). path-
to-regexp resolved to 0.1.13 via npm audit fix. 0 vulns remaining.
MED 4 (folder admin consistency): ownedFolder() and the content.js
folder_id move check now both treat only superadmin as privileged,
matching GET /api/folders. Previously a plain "admin" could rename
or delete folders they couldn't see, and could move content into
folders they couldn't list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New content_folders table with hierarchical parent_id and per-user
scoping. content.folder_id added (ON DELETE SET NULL so deleting a
folder drops items back to root). New /api/folders route exposes
list/create/rename/move/delete with cycle detection on move.
Content library UI: breadcrumb navigation, subfolder grid, "+ New
Folder" creates inside the current folder, drag-and-drop content
items onto folder cards to move them, and the edit modal has a
folder dropdown showing each folder's full path.
Per-user scoping is enforced server-side: every folder query
filters by user_id, and folder ownership is checked on both folder
mutations and content.folder_id updates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
