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Author SHA1 Message Date
ScreenTinker 30a71c1319 autorun.zip must be STORED and opened with roBrightPackage
A BrightSign consultant ran our v1.9.29-rc2 autorun.zip through BSN.cloud's
automated deployment. The archive reached the player and then could not be
opened — reported as invalid. Two causes, both ours.

1. COMPRESSION. We built with default deflate. The player bootstrap extracts
   autozip.brs by itself before any script runs, and roBrightPackage supports a
   specific set of methods, of which "no compression" is the universally safe
   one. Both builders now store: scripts/build-autorun-zip.sh passes -0, and the
   server-side package builder used archiver level 9 — maximum deflate — so
   EVERY self-update package it produced would have failed the same way, silently
   and in the field.

2. THE UNPACK API. We used roUnzip; BrightSign's own tooling uses
   roBrightPackage. Converted in autozip.brs and in the self-update path.

This is the failure mode worth naming: a compressed package uploads, downloads
and deploys perfectly, then fails to open on the player. It reads as a broken
deployment rather than a broken zip, so it gets debugged everywhere except where
the bug is. Both builders now ASSERT the property rather than trusting the flag —
the build script walks `unzip -v` and refuses a compressed member, and a test
walks the local file headers of the server-built package checking method 0.
Verified by negative control: re-enabling compression fails the test.

Also adopted the shipped volume-discovery pattern in autozip.brs — probe
USB1:/SD:/SSD:/FLASH: for the archive instead of guessing two volumes. The unit
that drove this port boots from FLASH because its card interface is dead, and
extracting to a volume that does not exist fails silently.

1056 pass.

Reported by giyokun, who was right about both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
2026-08-05 11:36:18 -05:00
ScreenTinker 8fd6eb75d5 BrightSign: cache content for offline, and let the package update itself
Two gaps that both end the same way — a panel nobody can fix without a van.

OFFLINE. Content bytes were never persistently cached. The service worker
skipped /uploads/content/ and leaned on the browser's HTTP cache, which is
reasonable on a desktop and is not a documented-persistent store here:
BrightSign guarantees survival across reboots for IndexedDB, localStorage and
SQLite, and their own answer for offline video is to cache the bytes explicitly.
A panel could come back from a power cut with its playlist intact — that lives in
localStorage — and no media to play it with.

The reason content was skipped is real, and player-cache-policy.js is what makes
intercepting it safe. Seeking video issues range requests, and naive caching is
worse than none: storing a 206 as the whole file means every later full request
gets a fragment, and answering a range request with a 200 makes some media stacks
fail outright. So only complete 200s are stored, and ranges are served by slicing
the stored body into a correct 206. The content cache survives shell
re-versioning, or every deploy would re-download the playlist over a link that may
be exactly what is broken.

SELF-UPDATE. The package can replace autorun.brs, so a truncated file is a dark
panel with no app underneath. The safety is the ordering: download to .part,
verify sha256 AND size, then delete the .done marker, rename, reboot. Marker
first is not stylistic — leaving it makes the next boot skip the archive and the
update silently never happens. A failed extract parks the zip as .bad instead of
retrying every boot, which would be a loop indistinguishable from a hardware
fault. sha256 because that is what roMessageDigest can compute; a checksum the
player cannot verify is an unverifiable package.

The decision lives on the server and is unit-tested, and the host only executes
it — re-implementing the version comparison in BrightScript would put the
prerelease trap somewhere untestable. That trap is honoured directly: a player on
1.9.29-rc1 is running something semver-OLDER than 1.9.29, so an opted-in player
HOLDS a prerelease of its own core rather than being pulled off the build it was
given to test. Narrowly — a newer core still lands, so opting in never means
never updating again.

Both loop conditions are closed by construction. The manifest and the download
come from one buffer hashed once, so a checksum cannot describe bytes we are not
serving. And the version is stamped into autorun.brs at build time by both
builders, so the script reports the version it actually is — otherwise the player
applies the update, still reports the old version, and is offered the same
package forever.

Failure always degrades to "keep running the old version": an unreachable
manifest, a missing checksum, a failed verification, a full attempt counter and
an unbuildable package all resolve to skip.

998 tests pass (was 954).
2026-08-05 10:09:00 -05:00