The subprocess-booting test suites hand-picked fixed ports in a cramped ~3955-4021 range, and
156-schedule-read-path deviated to a RANDOM port (3900 + rand%90) that overlapped those fixed
ports. Under CI load two servers could race on the same port, surfacing as flaky "no such table:
devices" / "FOREIGN KEY constraint failed" (a server answering a request against a half-migrated
or wrong DB). It's environmental — the suites pass locally and in isolation.
Fix: a shared test/helpers/free-port.js (bind :0 on loopback, read the OS-assigned port, release)
called in before() so every suite gets a guaranteed-unique ephemeral port — concurrent suites can
no longer collide, and no one has to hand-assign ports.
- Codemod converted 30 suites: const PORT = <fixed|random> -> let PORT (+ BASE) assigned via
`PORT = await freePort()` at the top of before().
- 3 hand-fixed (different structure): 148-eviction-storm (lowercase `base`), boot-health (no
before() — allocates PORT + a throwaway SEED_PORT inside the test, replacing the hardcoded
3894), totp-keyrotation (no before() — allocates at the test start before bootServer()).
No fixed 39xx/40xx ports remain. Full server suite 435/435; the 4 hand-touched suites pass in
isolation. Pure test-infra change — no app code touched.
Least-privilege way to read GET /api/billing/usage without requiring platform admin.
Additive + isolated: reuses the existing api_tokens scope system (the off-ladder 'agency'
scope is the precedent) and does NOT touch the shared role/permission checks other
endpoints rely on.
- New off-ladder scope 'billing:read' (routes/tokens.js SCOPES). Like 'agency' it is NOT
on the read<write<full ladder, so tokenScopeGate rejects a billing token on every
PUBLIC_ROUTER and JWT-only routers reject any st_ token -> the scope grants billing-read
and NOTHING else.
- DUAL-PATH gate requireBillingRead (middleware/apiToken.js), written as an EXPLICIT OR:
authorize if (billing:read token) OR (platform-admin session). Admins keep read access
but are NOT required to; the token path doesn't lock out admins or vice versa. Billing
route now mounted with bearerAuth (token OR JWT front door) + requireBillingRead (was
requireAuth + requirePlatformAdmin).
- MINTING is platform-admin only (stricter than read/write/full/agency, which any
workspace member may mint) since a billing:read token grants GLOBAL billing-read. Note:
no finer "owner" tier exists here (#14 collapsed superadmin->platform_admin), so
PLATFORM_ROLES is the top level required.
Tests (5, test/billing-authz.test.js): dual-path positive (token AND admin session both
200) + negative (user 403 / anon 401); scope isolation (billing token 403 on /api/devices,
401 on /api/admin; read token 200 on devices but 403 on billing); minting owner-only
(user + ordinary-admin 403, platform-admin 201); revocation -> 401. Existing token
firewall/partition suite (api.test.js) + billing-endpoint tests unchanged & green. Reused
the exact SHA-256 token-verification path (no bcrypt/new mechanism). Suite 306/306.
NOTE: spec described bcrypt + JSON `scopes` + an analytics:read precedent; this codebase
actually uses SHA-256 + a single `scope` TEXT column + 'agency' as the off-ladder
precedent. Implemented faithfully to the real system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
