White-label is stored per-workspace (white_labels.workspace_id); unbranded and
new workspaces - and the login page - fell back to hardcoded ScreenTinker. Add a
single platform default that everything inherits beneath the per-workspace layer.
Resolution (lib/branding.js): workspace row -> custom-domain match -> platform
default -> hardcoded ScreenTinker. Row-level override: a workspace with its own
row keeps it (current behavior); only row-less workspaces inherit the default,
so editing the default propagates instantly (no row-copying at creation).
The platform default is a white_labels row with a FIXED id ('platform-default'),
not a "workspace_id IS NULL" sentinel - legacy pre-multitenancy rows can also
have a null workspace_id, which would be ambiguous.
- routes/admin.js: GET/PUT /api/admin/branding (requirePlatformAdmin) to read/
upsert the single platform-default row; audit-logged.
- server.js: public GET /api/branding (domain match -> platform default ->
hardcoded) for pre-login/pre-workspace contexts.
- routes/white-label.js: authed GET now falls back to the platform default
(was hardcoded) for row-less workspaces.
- Frontend: login page resolves + applies branding (logo, name, colors, favicon,
custom CSS) pre-auth; Admin page gets a "Default branding" form.
Tests: resolver order incl. legacy null-ws safety; admin GET/PUT (single row,
upsert, platform-admin-only 403). Full suite 37/37. Verified end-to-end:
public + authed + login-page all inherit the platform default; per-workspace
override preserved.
Closes#15.
The Workspace column on the platform Users page could only move a 0/1-workspace
user and showed a dead "N workspaces" label for multi-membership users. Replace
it with a "Manage workspaces" modal that handles the full picture.
Backend (routes/admin.js, requirePlatformAdmin):
- GET /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces list memberships (+org/ws names, role)
- POST /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces add to a workspace (upsert role)
- PUT /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces/:wsId change role in a workspace
- DELETE /api/admin/users/:id/workspaces/:wsId remove (last one allowed -> unassigned)
Roles validated against WORKSPACE_ROLES; each mutation writes an audit row.
Frontend:
- Workspace cell is now a summary (Unassigned / <name> / N workspaces /
"Platform (all)" for staff) + a Manage button.
- New admin-user-workspaces-modal: lists every membership with an inline role
dropdown + Remove, plus a type-to-filter "Add to workspace" picker (org-grouped,
excludes current memberships) with a role select. Staff get a note that they
already have platform-wide access. Refreshes the table on close if changed.
- Removed the old single-select inline move control (superseded by the modal).
Tests: 6 added (add to multiple workspaces, per-workspace role change, upsert,
remove incl. last->unassigned, validation 400/404, non-platform-admin 403).
Full suite 33/33. Verified headless: Manage opens, lists memberships, filtered
picker, add/role-change/remove round-trips persist (throwaway user, cleaned up).
The #18 user-delete bug was the first symptom of a broader gap: 13 tables
reference workspaces(id) (and activity_log also organizations(id)) with NO
ACTION, so deleting a workspace or organization fails the same FK wall once it
holds any content. SQLite can't ALTER an FK action, so this migration rebuilds
each table (the create-copy-rename pattern the assignments/schedules migrations
already use), changing only the tenant FK clause:
workspace_id -> ON DELETE CASCADE (resources belong to the workspace)
activity_log.workspace_id / organization_id -> ON DELETE SET NULL (keep audit)
user_id FKs are intentionally left as-is - user deletion stays handled app-side
by lib/user-deletion.js (the #18 fix).
- lib/tenant-cascade-migration.js: pure, idempotent core (table-existence
guarded; transforms the stored CREATE text, copies rows verbatim, recreates
indexes; fixes activity_log's AUTOINCREMENT sequence; baseline-vs-after
foreign_key_check so pre-existing orphan rows don't abort it but a botched
rebuild does).
- db/database.js: boot wrapper owns the pre-migration snapshot + process.exit
on failure, matching the other heavy migrations.
Tests (node:test): reproduces the workspace-delete FK failure, applies the
migration, verifies FK actions (CASCADE / SET NULL), index recreation, data
preserved, and that workspace/org delete now cascades (activity_log preserved).
Full suite 27/27. Verified on a copy of a real DB: 13 tables rebuilt,
integrity_check ok, workspace delete cascades, no new FK violations.
DELETE /api/auth/users/:id ran a bare `DELETE FROM users`, but 23 columns
reference users(id) and only 4 cascade, so with foreign_keys=ON the delete
fails the moment the user is referenced anywhere - and a real user always is
(owns an org, created a workspace, has login activity). Reproduces on a fresh
DB, exactly as reported.
The schema also lacks cascades from workspaces -> tenant resources, so the DB
can't clean up on its own. New lib/user-deletion.js resolves every reference in
one transaction (defer_foreign_keys=ON for forgiving order; table-existence
guard for resilience):
- Refuse (409) if the user OWNS an organization that has other members -
don't nuke a shared tenant; transfer ownership first.
- Hard-delete the organizations they SOLELY own (workspaces + all contents).
- In orgs they don't own, PRESERVE resources: SET NULL the nullable
creator/inviter columns, and reassign the NOT NULL legacy creator user_id to
the resource's org owner (fallback: the acting admin).
- Memberships (organization_members/workspace_members/team_members/
content_folders) cascade on the user delete; pending invites they sent and
legacy teams they own are removed.
The handler now 404s an unknown id and 409s the shared-org case.
Tests (node:test): reproduces the FK failure, then verifies provisioned-member
delete (resources preserved + unlinked/reassigned), solo-org-owner cascade,
shared-org refusal (409), self-delete 400, non-superadmin 403, unknown 404.
Full suite 22/22. Verified end-to-end on a copy of a real DB: deleted a user
owning 2 solo orgs, foreign_key_check clean.
Closes#18.
Adds a "Workspace" column (after Plan) to the platform Users admin table so a
platform_admin can see and reassign a user's workspace inline, alongside the
Role/Plan dropdowns. Single-workspace move/assign model.
Backend:
- GET /api/auth/users (platform branch): one aggregate query adds
workspace_count and, for exactly-one membership, the workspace id/name + org
name (no N+1).
- PUT /api/admin/users/:id/workspace (requirePlatformAdmin - operator excluded):
move (1 membership) or assign (0) into the chosen workspace, default role
workspace_viewer, in a transaction; no-op if already there; REFUSES (400) a
user with >1 membership (manage in the members view). logActivity
admin_set_user_workspace.
Frontend (admin.js):
- Editable <select> only for a 'user' with 0/1 membership; multi-membership ->
read-only "N workspaces", platform staff -> read-only "Platform (all)".
- Options grouped by org via <optgroup>, built ONCE from /me's
accessible_workspaces (same source as the Add User picker) and reused per row.
- Picking "Unassigned" or the same workspace is a no-op so a stray pick can't
strip a membership. Success -> toast + refresh. EN i18n only.
Tests: 4 added (single-membership move 200 + changed, zero-membership assign
200, multi-membership 400 refused, non-platform-admin/operator 403). npm test
16/16. Verified headless: column renders, selected value correct, "Platform
(all)" for staff, and a dropdown move persisted (throwaway user, cleaned up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bug: #13 added 'platform_operator' to the frontend role dropdown
(PLATFORM_ROLE_OPTIONS) but #14's PUT /api/auth/users/:id/role whitelist
(ASSIGNABLE_PLATFORM_ROLES) only listed ['user','platform_admin'], so
selecting "Platform operator" returned 400 "Invalid role" - the role was
unassignable via the UI.
Fix: add 'platform_operator' to ASSIGNABLE_PLATFORM_ROLES. One line; the
self-demote guard is intentionally left untouched (a platform_admin still
cannot self-assign the non-owner operator role and lock themselves out).
Tests (node:test, isolated in-memory DB injection - no DB_PATH change):
- admin-users.test.js: platform_admin can PUT role=platform_operator on a
target user -> 200 and the row persists as platform_operator (regression
guard for the whitelist gap).
- operator-permissions.test.js (new): verify-then-test of the highest-blast
-radius deny. Operator CAN update/delete a workspace-scoped content row
(cross-org write works) but is denied (403) updating or deleting a shared
(workspace_id IS NULL) row - proving the separate PLATFORM_ROLES gate in
content.js's checkContentWrite still holds after canWrite was broadened to
isPlatformStaff.
Verified read-only (no leak): the other shared-asset write sites keep their
PLATFORM_ROLES gate that excludes operator - kiosk.js:57, widgets.js:110,
folders.js:31, layouts.js:59/117/133.
cd server && npm test -> 12 pass / 0 fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds server/test/admin-users.test.js and a `npm test` (node --test) script.
No DB_PATH override: the suite mounts the real routers against an isolated
in-memory better-sqlite3 instance injected into the require cache, seeded by
the test itself. Node v20 built-ins only (node:test, node:assert, fetch).
Covers: Add User success (response omits password/hash, hash stored not
plaintext, membership written, hosted lifecycle sentinels stamped, audit row
without the password), duplicate-email 409 (no overwrite), non-admin 403,
platform_operator denied (403), org_admin scoped to their own org only,
input validation, and the must_change_password lifecycle (set on create,
surfaced on login, cleared on PUT /api/auth/me).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
