api_tokens.auto_publish (DEFAULT 0 = draft, the fail-safe). Admin sets it at token creation
in the designate UI (checkbox, agency scope only). The agency endpoint reads it from the
TOKEN ROW via req.apiToken (apiTokenAuth attaches it) - NEVER from req.body, so an agency
can't opt itself out of approval. 0 -> markDraft; 1 -> the shared publishPlaylist path.
Tests (integration): draft is the default; a draft token with auto_publish:true IN THE BODY
still lands draft (body ignored); an auto-publish token goes live; manual publish still works
(extraction regression). i18n across all 5 locales. 141 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agency capability behind the proven off-ladder/agencyGate primitive:
- agencyGate is now SCOPE-only at the mount; the per-target check is router.param
('playlistId') in routes/agency.js - it fires WITH the param before the handler, so no
:playlistId route can skip it (drift-proof). A mount-level target check was silently
bypassed (Express populates req.params only at route match); the integration bite-suite
caught it - this is the fix.
- routes/agency.js: POST /content (shared ingest) + POST /playlists/:id/items (date-bounded
#74/#75 item; lands as draft so the admin's re-publish is the approval gate).
- tokens.js: issue scope='agency' tokens bound to a non-empty in-workspace playlist
allowlist (atomic); PUT /:id/targets re-designates (JWT-only -> can't self-widen).
- server.js: AGENCY_ROUTERS mounted bearerAuth + resolveTenancy + agencyGate.
Full bite-suite (test/agency.test.js) GREEN and re-proven to bite on the SHIPPING path:
neutralizing the router.param check makes non-designated->403 go red. Four assertions at
three seams: target (router.param), off-ladder (tokenScopeGate), can't-widen (tokens
JWT-only), issuance cross-workspace (create validation). 139 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The capability/target-restricted token model for the agency portal (#73 option B),
proven before any endpoint sits on it:
- 'agency' scope value is OFF the read/write/full ladder, so the existing tokenScopeGate
rejects it on every public router by construction (auto-confinement, no new code).
- api_token_targets join table: which playlists an agency token may act on.
- agencyGate: THE single seam - agency-scope-only + (playlist in this token's allowlist
AND in the bound workspace), one query enforcing target + cross-workspace isolation.
- AGENCY_ROUTERS category in config/api-surface.js (mounted with agencyGate, not
tokenScopeGate) - declared; router/mount land with the endpoints.
Both bite-tested: spine (agency 403s on tokenScopeGate; read/write still pass) and the
gate (non-designated/cross-workspace/non-agency/JWT -> 403; neutralizing the target check
goes red). NARROW - not the general capability-scope system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce the public API's token layer and make the router partition data-driven.
- api_tokens table: SHA-256 hashed secret, st_ prefix, workspace-bound, read/write/full scope.
- middleware/apiToken.js: bearerAuth front door (Bearer st_ -> token auth, else the
unchanged requireAuth); apiTokenAuth acts as the owner with platform powers stripped
to 'user' and the workspace binding made authoritative (X-Workspace-Id ignored);
tokenScopeGate (read=GET, write=mutations) + requireScope('full') for commands.
- config/api-surface.js: single source of truth for the PUBLIC (token front door) vs
JWT-ONLY (requireAuth) router partition. server.js mounts from these lists so the
mount list and the partition firewall test cannot drift.
- device-groups: operational group commands (reboot/shutdown) require the full scope.
A Bearer st_ token fails jwt.verify on the JWT-only routers (401), so privileged
surfaces (admin, workspaces, ai, provision, white-label) are unreachable by exclusion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
