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252854d31e
The OAuth support that was here could not work and would not have been safe if it had. It could not work: the login page called google.accounts.oauth2 and new msal.PublicClientApplication, and NEITHER SDK WAS EVER LOADED by any page in this app — no script tag, no dynamic import, nothing. Both buttons threw ReferenceError on click. Even had they loaded, the CSP allows scripts only from 'self' and cloudflareinsights, and frames only from self and YouTube, so the libraries and their popups were blocked too. It would not have been safe: both endpoints authenticated with an ACCESS token and neither checked who it was issued for. POST /auth/google fell back to tokeninfo?access_token= and read the email out of the reply; POST /auth/microsoft handed the bearer token to Graph /me and trusted that. Graph and tokeninfo will both describe the user behind a token minted for SOMEBODY ELSE'S application, so any site a user signed into that requested `email` or `User.Read` could have replayed their token here and been issued a session as them. Both endpoints are deleted; nothing is lost, because nothing could reach them. Replaced by ONE generic flow — Authorization Code + PKCE (S256), run server-side, with the provider list resolved through a single function so per-organization SSO can extend it later without a second login path. Google and Microsoft become ordinary configured providers; Okta, Keycloak, Authentik, Auth0 and anything else that speaks OIDC now work with three env vars. Because the exchange happens server-side the browser never talks to the provider, so there is no SDK to load, no client id in the page, and no third-party origin needed in the CSP. Identity comes from an ID token that must survive: signature against the provider's JWKS (asymmetric algorithms only — alg:none and HMAC are refused outright, the latter because the only key we hold is public), `iss` exactly as discovered, `aud` and `azp` matching our client, `exp`, and a `nonce` this server minted for that login. State is compared in constant time against a value in an httpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie, so the callback is CSRF-protected and survives a restart mid-login. Account rules are the ones already in place: a verified email is required, an SSO login never takes over an account that has a password, and a changed `sub` for a known address is refused rather than handing the account to a recycled mailbox. 18 new tests, every one describing something the old code would have accepted: cross-audience tokens, azp mismatch, replayed nonces, alg:none, HMAC forgery, wrong signing key, expired tokens, a discovery document lying about its issuer, and a registry that never leaks a client id or secret to the browser. Verified end to end against Google's real discovery document: the redirect carries response_type=code, PKCE S256, state and nonce, and every callback guard rejects as intended (no cookie, wrong state, no code, provider refusal, unknown provider). ⚠️ TOTP is still not prompted on an SSO login, matching the documented behaviour of the previous SSO and API-token paths. That is a product decision and is left unchanged here rather than altered silently. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bvjey4FNam49MN7ybjcq6A |
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