screentinker/server/test/brightsign-package.test.js
ScreenTinker 30a71c1319 autorun.zip must be STORED and opened with roBrightPackage
A BrightSign consultant ran our v1.9.29-rc2 autorun.zip through BSN.cloud's
automated deployment. The archive reached the player and then could not be
opened — reported as invalid. Two causes, both ours.

1. COMPRESSION. We built with default deflate. The player bootstrap extracts
   autozip.brs by itself before any script runs, and roBrightPackage supports a
   specific set of methods, of which "no compression" is the universally safe
   one. Both builders now store: scripts/build-autorun-zip.sh passes -0, and the
   server-side package builder used archiver level 9 — maximum deflate — so
   EVERY self-update package it produced would have failed the same way, silently
   and in the field.

2. THE UNPACK API. We used roUnzip; BrightSign's own tooling uses
   roBrightPackage. Converted in autozip.brs and in the self-update path.

This is the failure mode worth naming: a compressed package uploads, downloads
and deploys perfectly, then fails to open on the player. It reads as a broken
deployment rather than a broken zip, so it gets debugged everywhere except where
the bug is. Both builders now ASSERT the property rather than trusting the flag —
the build script walks `unzip -v` and refuses a compressed member, and a test
walks the local file headers of the server-built package checking method 0.
Verified by negative control: re-enabling compression fails the test.

Also adopted the shipped volume-discovery pattern in autozip.brs — probe
USB1:/SD:/SSD:/FLASH: for the archive instead of guessing two volumes. The unit
that drove this port boots from FLASH because its card interface is dead, and
extracting to a volume that does not exist fails silently.

1056 pass.

Reported by giyokun, who was right about both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uaeo9MvzKoyXuN6ZsbhtkL
2026-08-05 11:36:18 -05:00

111 lines
5.7 KiB
JavaScript

'use strict';
// The manifest and the download must describe the SAME bytes.
//
// Advertising a version whose checksum does not match the file actually served is the classic
// OTA-loop condition: the player downloads, fails verification, retries, forever. It is also the
// easiest mistake to make, because the natural implementation computes the manifest from one source
// (a VERSION file, a build record) and serves the file from another (a path on disk that some
// deploy replaced). These tests pin the invariant that makes that impossible here: one buffer,
// hashed once, read by both routes.
const { test } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const crypto = require('node:crypto');
const pkgLib = require('../lib/brightsign-package');
test('THE OTA LOOP: the advertised checksum is the hash of the bytes that are served', async () => {
const pkg = await pkgLib.getPackage();
assert.ok(pkg, 'package should build from brightsign/');
// sha256 because that is what BrightScript's roMessageDigest can compute — a checksum the player
// cannot verify is an unverifiable package.
const actual = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(pkg.buffer).digest('hex');
assert.equal(pkg.sha256, actual, 'a mismatch here loops every player in the fleet');
assert.equal(pkg.size, pkg.buffer.length);
});
test('the package is byte-identical on rebuild — otherwise every deploy re-flashes the fleet', async () => {
// Zip entries carry timestamps. Left at "now" the archive changes on every server restart, the
// checksum changes with it, and every player decides it has an update waiting.
const first = await pkgLib.getPackage();
pkgLib._reset();
const second = await pkgLib.getPackage();
assert.equal(second.sha1, first.sha1);
});
test('the archive contains exactly the payload, at its ROOT with no wrapper directory', async () => {
// A player extracts to the storage root. A wrapper folder puts autorun.brs where the player never
// looks and the card silently does nothing — the failure mode is "blank screen", not an error.
const pkg = await pkgLib.getPackage();
const names = [];
// Minimal central-directory walk: entry names follow the 0x02014b50 signature at offset +46.
const buf = pkg.buffer;
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length - 4; i++) {
if (buf.readUInt32LE(i) === 0x02014b50) {
const nameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(i + 28);
names.push(buf.slice(i + 46, i + 46 + nameLen).toString('utf8'));
}
}
assert.deepEqual(names.sort(), pkgLib.PACKAGE_FILES.slice().sort());
for (const n of names) {
assert.ok(!n.includes('/'), `${n} must be at the archive root, not nested`);
}
});
test('autorun.brs and autozip.brs are both present — either missing is a dead panel', async () => {
// autorun.brs missing: nothing to run after extraction.
// autozip.brs missing: nothing extracts the archive in the first place.
assert.ok(pkgLib.PACKAGE_FILES.includes('autorun.brs'));
assert.ok(pkgLib.PACKAGE_FILES.includes('autozip.brs'));
});
test('THE BACK-DOOR LOOP: the shipped autorun.brs reports the version the manifest advertises', async () => {
// Ship it unstamped and the player applies the update, still reports the old version, and is
// offered the same package on every check — forever. The loop arrives even though the checksum
// was correct and the download was clean.
const unzipper = require('unzipper');
const pkg = await pkgLib.getPackage();
const dir = await unzipper.Open.buffer(pkg.buffer);
const entry = dir.files.find((f) => f.path === 'autorun.brs');
assert.ok(entry, 'autorun.brs must be in the package');
const text = (await entry.buffer()).toString('utf8');
const m = text.match(/return "([^"]*)"\s*' ST_PACKAGE_VERSION/);
assert.ok(m, 'the ST_PACKAGE_VERSION marker must survive — it is what the stamp anchors on');
assert.equal(m[1], pkg.version, 'stamped version must equal the advertised version');
});
test('the version comes from VERSION, so the manifest matches the release it shipped with', async () => {
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const expected = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'VERSION'), 'utf8').trim();
const pkg = await pkgLib.getPackage();
assert.equal(pkg.version, expected);
});
// A BrightSign consultant's automated deployment copied our first autorun.zip onto a player and
// then reported it invalid. Two causes: the archive was DEFLATED, and we opened it with roUnzip
// rather than roBrightPackage. The player bootstrap extracts autozip.brs by itself before any
// script runs, and roBrightPackage supports a specific set of methods — "no compression" is the
// universally safe one.
//
// This is the failure mode that hurts: a compressed package uploads, downloads and deploys
// perfectly, then fails to open on the player. It reads as a broken deployment, not a broken zip,
// so it gets debugged everywhere except where the bug is.
test('THE DEPLOYMENT BUG: every member of the package is STORED, never deflated', async () => {
const pkg = await pkgLib.getPackage();
const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(pkg) ? pkg : (pkg && (pkg.buffer || pkg.bytes || pkg.zip));
assert.ok(Buffer.isBuffer(buf), 'getPackage must yield the archive bytes');
// Walk the local file headers: signature PK\x03\x04, compression method at offset +8.
let found = 0;
for (let i = 0; i + 30 <= buf.length; i++) {
if (buf.readUInt32LE(i) !== 0x04034b50) continue;
const method = buf.readUInt16LE(i + 8);
const nameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(i + 26);
const name = buf.slice(i + 30, i + 30 + nameLen).toString();
assert.equal(method, 0, `${name} is compressed (method ${method}); the player cannot open it`);
found++;
}
assert.ok(found > 0, 'no entries found — the walk itself is wrong, not the archive');
});