screentinker/server/package.json
ScreenTinker 2ad9f54b8e test(api): token partition + threat-model + device WS coverage
A dedicated public-API suite (boots the real server as a subprocess) so CI green proves
the token layer, not just the pre-existing tests:

- Partition firewall, derived from the SAME config/api-surface.js server.js mounts from:
  every JWT-only router 401s a token; a public-surface snapshot fails if any router is
  added to the token door; known-privileged routers asserted JWT-only.
- Threat model: role-strip gates, workspace-binding both directions (token ignores
  X-Workspace-Id, JWT honors it), the scope ladder, the render bypass, token lifecycle,
  and JWT no-regression.
- Device WS round-trip via socket.io-client (added as a devDep): valid device_token
  registers + receives its playlist; wrong token rejected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 18:45:09 -05:00

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{
"name": "screentinker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"description": "ScreenTinker - Digital Signage Management Server",
"main": "server.js",
"scripts": {
"start": "node --env-file-if-exists=.env server.js",
"dev": "node --watch --env-file-if-exists=.env server.js",
"test": "node --test"
},
"dependencies": {
"@azure/msal-node": "^5.2.1",
"archiver": "^7.0.1",
"bcryptjs": "^3.0.3",
"better-sqlite3": "^9.4.3",
"cors": "^2.8.5",
"express": "^4.18.2",
"express-rate-limit": "^8.3.1",
"google-auth-library": "^10.6.2",
"helmet": "^8.1.0",
"jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.3",
"multer": "^1.4.5-lts.1",
"sharp": "^0.33.2",
"socket.io": "^4.7.2",
"stripe": "^20.4.1",
"unzipper": "^0.12.3",
"uuid": "^14.0.0"
},
"devDependencies": {
"socket.io-client": "^4.8.3"
}
}