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A second attack round defeated three of the previous fixes and found a regression I
introduced. Each is reproduced-then-refused against a live server.
MEMBERSHIP: organization_members IS NOT HOW PEOPLE JOIN
Only three places write that table and nothing deletes from it — every INVITED user,
every admin-created account and every workspace assignment lands in workspace_members
and nowhere else. So keying enforcement on organization_members covered org owners and
people who had already used SSO: exactly the set the domain check already caught. A
reviewer invited an outside address into an SSO-only tenant, kept password login, read
the member list and content, and used it to invite more. Enforcement now asks whether
the user is in ANY workspace belonging to an SSO-only organization.
THE INTERLOCK ASKED THE WRONG QUESTION, TWICE
It fired only when a domain list became EMPTY, and it counted PROVIDERS. So:
- replacing acme.test with decoy.test removed every proof and sailed through — two
PUTs, and the customer's domain enforced nothing, with sso_only still reading true;
- with two providers you could disable the one owning your staff's domain, because
the other one, covering a domain nobody signs in at, still "enforced".
The question that matters is per-DOMAIN: after this change, is every domain that
enforces today still enforcing? Losing one needs the operator, whichever route gets you
there. The refusal now names the domain that would stop being covered.
REGRESSION I CAUSED: THE HAPPY PATH LOCKED THE OWNER OUT
Sign up with a personal address, create the org, verify the company domain, turn this
on — and enforcement covers you (you are a member) while your own address is outside
the verified domains, so passwords are refused AND your org's provider will not assert
for you either. No route removes a membership; reset succeeds but login still refuses.
Recovery meant a platform admin turning SSO off for the whole tenant. Enabling now
refuses when the actor's own address is not covered, naming it, and REPORTS everyone
else who will be stranded instead of letting them be discovered by support ticket.
ALSO
- POST /api/admin/users gated only on the target workspace, so you could mint
cfo@theircompany.test into your OWN workspace: login refused, but the row now has a
password_hash and an SSO login will not adopt one — permanently locking a real
person out of their own address. Now gated on the address's domain too.
- `ceo@acme.test.` (trailing root dot) slipped the registration gate.
- two rate-limited sub-paths were still unfolded because the generic org-id fold ate
`sso-only` as an organization id; the specific shapes are matched first now.
1609 tests, three clean runs. Verified live: invited outsider 403, swap refused,
sibling-disable refused, squat 400, self-lockout refused with the address named, and an
on-domain admin gets `stranded_members` back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bvjey4FNam49MN7ybjcq6A
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| .. | ||
| activity.js | ||
| admin.js | ||
| agency.js | ||
| ai.js | ||
| assignments.js | ||
| auth.js | ||
| billing.js | ||
| contact.js | ||
| content.js | ||
| device-groups.js | ||
| devices.js | ||
| folders.js | ||
| kiosk.js | ||
| layouts.js | ||
| media.js | ||
| org-sso.js | ||
| pip.js | ||
| player-debug.js | ||
| playlists.js | ||
| provisioning.js | ||
| reports.js | ||
| schedules.js | ||
| status.js | ||
| stripe.js | ||
| subscription.js | ||
| teams.js | ||
| tokens.js | ||
| video-walls.js | ||
| white-label.js | ||
| widgets.js | ||
| workspaces.js | ||