screentinker/server/routes/workspaces.js
ScreenTinker 159a36ed99 fix(workspaces): use APP_URL env var for invite-accept URL generation
Slice 1+3 (c4fbd2b) introduced PUBLIC_URL as the env var name for the
public-facing origin used to construct invite-accept URLs. The README
has long documented APP_URL as the canonical name for this concept
(used for Stripe callbacks in the existing codebase). The new code
should have read APP_URL from the start; PUBLIC_URL was unintentional
naming drift.

Caught during prod-deploy survey on 2026-05-17: APP_URL was set on the
production systemd unit and documented in the README, but read by no
code path on origin/main. PUBLIC_URL was read by slice-1 code but set
nowhere. The bug was masked in 99% of cases by the request-derived
fallback (${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}) which produces the
correct URL when invites are triggered from browsers behind Cloudflare.
It would have manifested for any future non-browser-triggered invite
path.

README updated to note APP_URL covers both Stripe callbacks and
invite-accept URL generation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 15:26:07 -05:00

355 lines
15 KiB
JavaScript

const express = require('express');
const router = express.Router();
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { db } = require('../db/database');
const { canAdminWorkspace, canAccessWorkspace } = require('../lib/permissions');
const { sendEmail } = require('../services/email');
// Workspace management routes. Operates on a target workspace specified by
// URL param, NOT the caller's currently active workspace - so this router
// does NOT use resolveTenancy. Permission is gated via canAdminWorkspace() /
// canAccessWorkspace() which evaluate against the target workspace, not
// req.workspaceRole.
const NAME_MAX = 80;
const SLUG_MAX = 60;
const SLUG_RE = /^[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$/;
const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;
const WORKSPACE_ROLES = ['workspace_admin', 'workspace_editor', 'workspace_viewer'];
// Operational policy - env-configurable with conservative defaults. Restart
// required to take effect. The guarded parseInt rejects garbage strings
// (e.g. INVITE_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR=fifty) so an operator typo surfaces as
// "default fired" rather than silently sticking. Future cleanup: DB-backed
// platform_settings + admin UI for runtime tuning; env vars become fallback
// defaults when that lands. See handoff doc.
const INVITE_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR = (() => {
const parsed = parseInt(process.env.INVITE_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR, 10);
return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : 50;
})();
const INVITE_EXPIRY_DAYS = (() => {
const parsed = parseInt(process.env.INVITE_EXPIRY_DAYS, 10);
return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : 7;
})();
// Rename a workspace. MVP scope: name + slug only. Permission: platform_admin,
// org_owner/admin of the parent org, or workspace_admin of the target ws.
router.patch('/:id', (req, res) => {
const ws = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM workspaces WHERE id = ?').get(req.params.id);
if (!ws) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Workspace not found' });
if (!canAdminWorkspace(db, req.user, ws)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' });
}
// Stamp the target workspace_id so activityLogger captures the right
// tenant attribution. This route doesn't use resolveTenancy (operates on
// a URL-param target, not the caller's active workspace), so req.workspaceId
// would otherwise be undefined and the audit row would have NULL workspace.
req.workspaceId = ws.id;
const updates = [];
const values = [];
if (req.body.name !== undefined) {
const name = String(req.body.name).trim();
if (!name) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Name cannot be empty' });
if (name.length > NAME_MAX) return res.status(400).json({ error: `Name must be ${NAME_MAX} characters or fewer` });
updates.push('name = ?');
values.push(name);
}
if (req.body.slug !== undefined) {
// Empty string -> NULL (workspace has no slug). Otherwise normalize +
// validate against the URL-safe segment pattern.
const raw = String(req.body.slug || '').trim().toLowerCase();
if (raw === '') {
updates.push('slug = NULL');
} else {
if (raw.length > SLUG_MAX) return res.status(400).json({ error: `Slug must be ${SLUG_MAX} characters or fewer` });
if (!SLUG_RE.test(raw)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Slug must be lowercase letters, digits, and hyphens (no leading/trailing/double hyphens)' });
}
updates.push('slug = ?');
values.push(raw);
}
}
if (updates.length === 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No fields to update' });
}
updates.push("updated_at = strftime('%s','now')");
values.push(req.params.id);
try {
db.prepare(`UPDATE workspaces SET ${updates.join(', ')} WHERE id = ?`).run(...values);
} catch (e) {
if (e.code === 'SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_UNIQUE' || /UNIQUE/i.test(e.message)) {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Slug already used in this organization' });
}
throw e;
}
const updated = db.prepare('SELECT id, name, slug, organization_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = ?').get(req.params.id);
res.json(updated);
});
// ==================== Members / invites ====================
// Load workspace by req.params.id and verify caller has the required level
// of access. Returns the workspace row on success. On failure, sends the
// appropriate response and returns null - caller bails on null. Also stamps
// req.workspaceId so the activityLogger middleware captures the right
// tenant attribution (mirrors the rename pattern).
function loadWorkspace(req, res, requireAdmin) {
const ws = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM workspaces WHERE id = ?').get(req.params.id);
if (!ws) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Workspace not found' });
return null;
}
const allowed = requireAdmin
? canAdminWorkspace(db, req.user, ws)
: canAccessWorkspace(db, req.user, ws);
if (!allowed) {
res.status(403).json({ error: requireAdmin ? 'Admin access required' : 'Workspace access required' });
return null;
}
req.workspaceId = ws.id;
return ws;
}
function countWorkspaceAdmins(workspaceId) {
return db.prepare(
"SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM workspace_members WHERE workspace_id = ? AND role = 'workspace_admin'"
).get(workspaceId).c;
}
// Members listing: direct workspace_members + the org_owner/admin users who
// reach this workspace via org-level access.
//
// Response shape contract: entries with via_org=true are READ-ONLY from the
// workspace context. They cannot have their role changed or be removed via
// these endpoints because they aren't managed via workspace_members - their
// access lives in organization_members. UI must render them with reduced
// affordances (no role select, no remove button). The role field on a
// via_org entry reflects their ORG role (org_owner / org_admin), not a
// workspace role - it's display-only.
function listMembers(workspaceId, organizationId) {
const direct = db.prepare(`
SELECT u.id AS user_id, u.email, u.name, wm.role, wm.joined_at
FROM workspace_members wm
JOIN users u ON u.id = wm.user_id
WHERE wm.workspace_id = ?
ORDER BY wm.joined_at ASC
`).all(workspaceId);
const directIds = new Set(direct.map(r => r.user_id));
const viaOrg = db.prepare(`
SELECT u.id AS user_id, u.email, u.name, om.role, om.joined_at
FROM organization_members om
JOIN users u ON u.id = om.user_id
WHERE om.organization_id = ? AND om.role IN ('org_owner', 'org_admin')
`).all(organizationId);
const out = direct.map(r => ({ ...r, via_org: false }));
for (const r of viaOrg) {
if (directIds.has(r.user_id)) continue;
out.push({ ...r, via_org: true });
}
return out;
}
function buildInviteEmail({ workspaceName, organizationName, inviterName, role, acceptUrl }) {
const subject = `You've been invited to ${workspaceName} on ScreenTinker`;
const roleLabel = role.replace(/^workspace_/, '');
const text = [
`${inviterName || 'A ScreenTinker user'} invited you to join ${workspaceName}`
+ (organizationName ? ` (${organizationName})` : '') + ` as ${roleLabel}.`,
'',
`To accept, sign in to ScreenTinker and open:`,
acceptUrl,
'',
`This invite expires in ${INVITE_EXPIRY_DAYS} days.`,
].join('\n');
return { subject, text };
}
// GET /:id/members - any member (or org-level/platform admin) of the workspace
router.get('/:id/members', (req, res) => {
const ws = loadWorkspace(req, res, false);
if (!ws) return;
res.json(listMembers(ws.id, ws.organization_id));
});
// GET /:id/invites - admin only. Pending (non-expired) rows.
router.get('/:id/invites', (req, res) => {
const ws = loadWorkspace(req, res, true);
if (!ws) return;
const invites = db.prepare(`
SELECT i.id, i.email, i.role, i.expires_at, i.created_at,
inv.email AS invited_by_email
FROM workspace_invites i
LEFT JOIN users inv ON inv.id = i.invited_by
WHERE i.workspace_id = ? AND i.expires_at > strftime('%s','now')
ORDER BY i.created_at DESC
`).all(ws.id);
res.json(invites);
});
// POST /:id/invites - admin only. Rate-limited (per-user, per-workspace,
// hour window). Idempotent against in-flight duplicate invites via a
// transaction-bounded collision check (workspace_invites has no UNIQUE
// constraint on (workspace_id, email), so the txn is what prevents the
// TOCTOU race between two simultaneous POSTs).
router.post('/:id/invites', async (req, res) => {
const ws = loadWorkspace(req, res, true);
if (!ws) return;
const email = String(req.body?.email || '').trim().toLowerCase();
const role = String(req.body?.role || '').trim();
if (!email || !EMAIL_RE.test(email)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Valid email required' });
}
if (!WORKSPACE_ROLES.includes(role)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Role must be workspace_admin, workspace_editor, or workspace_viewer' });
}
// Block invite to existing direct member of this workspace. (Org-level
// members are not "members" of this specific workspace via workspace_members,
// so they're allowed to also be invited as direct members if desired.)
const existingMember = db.prepare(`
SELECT 1 FROM workspace_members wm
JOIN users u ON u.id = wm.user_id
WHERE wm.workspace_id = ? AND lower(u.email) = ?
`).get(ws.id, email);
if (existingMember) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'User is already a member of this workspace' });
}
// Rate limit: per-(inviter, workspace), hour window, counts rows actually
// created. Generic 429 message - don't echo the configured limit value
// (info leak about deployment policy).
const recentCount = db.prepare(`
SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM workspace_invites
WHERE invited_by = ? AND workspace_id = ?
AND created_at > strftime('%s','now') - 3600
`).get(req.user.id, ws.id).c;
if (recentCount >= INVITE_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR) {
return res.status(429).json({ error: 'Invite rate limit reached - try again later' });
}
// Transaction-bounded collision-check-then-insert. Closes the race where
// two simultaneous POSTs both pass the SELECT and both INSERT.
const inviteId = crypto.randomUUID();
const expiresAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + (INVITE_EXPIRY_DAYS * 86400);
const txn = db.transaction(() => {
const dupe = db.prepare(`
SELECT id FROM workspace_invites
WHERE workspace_id = ? AND lower(email) = ? AND expires_at > strftime('%s','now')
`).get(ws.id, email);
if (dupe) return { collision: true };
db.prepare(`
INSERT INTO workspace_invites (id, workspace_id, email, role, invited_by, expires_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
`).run(inviteId, ws.id, email, role, req.user.id, expiresAt);
return { collision: false };
});
const txnResult = txn();
if (txnResult.collision) {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'An invite for this email is already pending' });
}
// Build accept URL. APP_URL env var (when set) pins the public-facing
// origin regardless of how the request arrived - recommended in prod so
// invites triggered from non-browser sources (curl, future API automation)
// always carry the canonical origin. Same env var the rest of the codebase
// uses for Stripe callbacks (see README env-var table). Falls back to
// request-derived for local dev and when APP_URL isn't set; with trust
// proxy on, req.protocol + req.get('host') reflect Cloudflare-forwarded
// X-Forwarded-Proto + Host. Path is /app#/accept-invite/<id> - the SPA
// lives at /app, so a bare /#/accept-invite/<id> would land on the
// marketing landing page in dev (and rely on the DISABLE_HOMEPAGE
// redirect in prod). /app is explicit.
const publicBase = process.env.APP_URL || `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}`;
const acceptUrl = `${publicBase}/app#/accept-invite/${inviteId}`;
const org = db.prepare('SELECT name FROM organizations WHERE id = ?').get(ws.organization_id);
const { subject, text } = buildInviteEmail({
workspaceName: ws.name,
organizationName: org?.name || '',
inviterName: req.user.name || req.user.email,
role,
acceptUrl,
});
const sendResult = await sendEmail({ to: email, subject, text });
// Rollback rule: only graph_error (real send attempted, Graph rejected)
// deletes the row. not_configured and dev_restricted are intentional
// non-sends - keep the row, count against the rate limit, allow local
// accept-invite testing to proceed.
if (sendResult.reason === 'graph_error') {
db.prepare('DELETE FROM workspace_invites WHERE id = ?').run(inviteId);
return res.status(502).json({ error: 'Email send failed - invite not created' });
}
res.status(201).json({ id: inviteId, email, role, expires_at: expiresAt });
});
// DELETE /:id/invites/:inviteId - admin only. Cancels a pending invite.
router.delete('/:id/invites/:inviteId', (req, res) => {
const ws = loadWorkspace(req, res, true);
if (!ws) return;
const invite = db.prepare('SELECT id FROM workspace_invites WHERE id = ? AND workspace_id = ?')
.get(req.params.inviteId, ws.id);
if (!invite) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Invite not found' });
db.prepare('DELETE FROM workspace_invites WHERE id = ?').run(invite.id);
res.json({ success: true });
});
// PUT /:id/members/:userId - admin only. Change role.
router.put('/:id/members/:userId', (req, res) => {
const ws = loadWorkspace(req, res, true);
if (!ws) return;
const newRole = String(req.body?.role || '').trim();
if (!WORKSPACE_ROLES.includes(newRole)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Role must be workspace_admin, workspace_editor, or workspace_viewer' });
}
const member = db.prepare('SELECT role FROM workspace_members WHERE workspace_id = ? AND user_id = ?')
.get(ws.id, req.params.userId);
if (!member) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Member not found' });
if (member.role === 'workspace_admin' && newRole !== 'workspace_admin') {
if (countWorkspaceAdmins(ws.id) <= 1) {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Cannot demote the last admin' });
}
}
db.prepare('UPDATE workspace_members SET role = ? WHERE workspace_id = ? AND user_id = ?')
.run(newRole, ws.id, req.params.userId);
res.json({ user_id: req.params.userId, role: newRole });
});
// DELETE /:id/members/:userId - admin only. Removes the workspace_members
// row. Blocks (a) removing the parent-org's org_owner via the workspace path,
// since their access comes from org_members anyway, and (b) removing the
// last workspace_admin which would leave the workspace headless.
router.delete('/:id/members/:userId', (req, res) => {
const ws = loadWorkspace(req, res, true);
if (!ws) return;
const member = db.prepare('SELECT role FROM workspace_members WHERE workspace_id = ? AND user_id = ?')
.get(ws.id, req.params.userId);
if (!member) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Member not found' });
const orgOwner = db.prepare(
"SELECT 1 FROM organization_members WHERE organization_id = ? AND user_id = ? AND role = 'org_owner'"
).get(ws.organization_id, req.params.userId);
if (orgOwner) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cannot remove the organization owner' });
}
if (member.role === 'workspace_admin' && countWorkspaceAdmins(ws.id) <= 1) {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Cannot remove the last admin' });
}
db.prepare('DELETE FROM workspace_members WHERE workspace_id = ? AND user_id = ?')
.run(ws.id, req.params.userId);
res.json({ success: true });
});
module.exports = router;