screentinker/server/test
ScreenTinker ba3e2cc785 fix(security): patch quick-win findings from the codebase review
Five low-risk, high-value fixes surfaced by the security review:

#3 Branding lockdown — `custom_domain`/`custom_css` (which feed the PUBLIC,
   pre-auth branding resolver and the login-page <style>) are now settable only
   by platform admins; a workspace_admin can no longer hijack the platform login
   page by claiming its domain. The public /api/branding (+ /domain) now return
   only presentational fields via publicBranding() (no id/user_id/workspace_id/
   custom_domain/timestamps leak).

#6 Strip device_token — the device WS auth secret (validated with
   timingSafeEqual) was returned in device list/get/update + pairing responses
   (SELECT d.* / *). New lib/device-sanitize.js strips it everywhere; prevents
   device impersonation by any workspace user.

#7 must_change_password enforced server-side — was a frontend-only redirect, so
   a provisioned temp password worked indefinitely via the API. requireAuth now
   403s every route except GET/PUT /api/auth/me (the password change, which
   clears the flag) and logout while the flag is set.

#8 XSS — escape user data interpolated into innerHTML in teams.js, kiosk.js,
   layout-editor.js (team/page/layout/zone names, member name/email, kiosk
   config fields). scriptSrcAttr 'unsafe-inline' made these exploitable via
   injected event handlers, not just markup.

#9 Thumbnail IDOR — /api/content/:id/thumbnail had no auth/scope gate (any UUID
   served any tenant's thumbnail). Now mirrors the /file route's playlist/widget
   workspace-scoped reference check.

Tests: new test/security-fixes.test.js (device strip, publicBranding field
allowlist, must_change_password gate). Full suite 41/41. Verified live against a
prod-data copy: device_token absent from /api/devices, /api/branding trimmed.

Not addressed here (tracked for follow-up): Android OTA signature verification
(Critical), public widget-render XSS, token revocation/logout, pairing-code
strength, validateRemoteUrl hardening, import quota.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 19:02:19 -05:00
..
admin-users.test.js feat(admin): manage a user's workspace memberships (multi + per-workspace role) 2026-06-08 16:24:52 -05:00
branding.test.js feat(branding): instance-level default white-label branding (#15) 2026-06-08 16:55:22 -05:00
operator-permissions.test.js fix(roles): make platform_operator assignable + add deny/assign regression tests 2026-06-05 12:44:39 -05:00
security-fixes.test.js fix(security): patch quick-win findings from the codebase review 2026-06-08 19:02:19 -05:00
tenant-cascade-migration.test.js fix(db): cascade tenant resources on workspace/org delete (#18 follow-up) 2026-06-08 16:01:52 -05:00
user-deletion.test.js fix(admin): user deletion failed with FOREIGN KEY constraint (#18) 2026-06-08 10:51:32 -05:00