screentinker/server/middleware/auth.js
ScreenTinker ba3e2cc785 fix(security): patch quick-win findings from the codebase review
Five low-risk, high-value fixes surfaced by the security review:

#3 Branding lockdown — `custom_domain`/`custom_css` (which feed the PUBLIC,
   pre-auth branding resolver and the login-page <style>) are now settable only
   by platform admins; a workspace_admin can no longer hijack the platform login
   page by claiming its domain. The public /api/branding (+ /domain) now return
   only presentational fields via publicBranding() (no id/user_id/workspace_id/
   custom_domain/timestamps leak).

#6 Strip device_token — the device WS auth secret (validated with
   timingSafeEqual) was returned in device list/get/update + pairing responses
   (SELECT d.* / *). New lib/device-sanitize.js strips it everywhere; prevents
   device impersonation by any workspace user.

#7 must_change_password enforced server-side — was a frontend-only redirect, so
   a provisioned temp password worked indefinitely via the API. requireAuth now
   403s every route except GET/PUT /api/auth/me (the password change, which
   clears the flag) and logout while the flag is set.

#8 XSS — escape user data interpolated into innerHTML in teams.js, kiosk.js,
   layout-editor.js (team/page/layout/zone names, member name/email, kiosk
   config fields). scriptSrcAttr 'unsafe-inline' made these exploitable via
   injected event handlers, not just markup.

#9 Thumbnail IDOR — /api/content/:id/thumbnail had no auth/scope gate (any UUID
   served any tenant's thumbnail). Now mirrors the /file route's playlist/widget
   workspace-scoped reference check.

Tests: new test/security-fixes.test.js (device strip, publicBranding field
allowlist, must_change_password gate). Full suite 41/41. Verified live against a
prod-data copy: device_token absent from /api/devices, /api/branding trimmed.

Not addressed here (tracked for follow-up): Android OTA signature verification
(Critical), public widget-render XSS, token revocation/logout, pairing-code
strength, validateRemoteUrl hardening, import quota.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 19:02:19 -05:00

148 lines
6.3 KiB
JavaScript

const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const config = require('../config');
const { db } = require('../db/database');
// Phase 2.1: JWT now optionally carries the user's current workspace_id so
// the tenancy middleware can resolve scope without an extra DB lookup on
// every request. Callers that don't know the workspace yet (legacy paths,
// recovery tokens) pass null and the tenancy resolver falls back to the
// user's first accessible workspace.
function generateToken(user, currentWorkspaceId) {
return jwt.sign(
{ id: user.id, email: user.email, role: user.role, current_workspace_id: currentWorkspaceId || null },
config.jwtSecret,
{ algorithm: 'HS256', expiresIn: config.jwtExpiry }
);
}
function verifyToken(token) {
return jwt.verify(token, config.jwtSecret, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
}
// Synthetic user record for recovery tokens (scripts/reset-admin.js). Not
// persisted; only exists for the lifetime of the request.
function recoveryUser(decoded) {
return {
id: decoded.id,
email: decoded.email || 'admin@localhost',
name: 'Recovery Admin',
role: decoded.role || 'platform_admin',
auth_provider: 'recovery',
avatar_url: null,
plan_id: 'enterprise'
};
}
// Express middleware - requires valid JWT
function requireAuth(req, res, next) {
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
if (!authHeader || !authHeader.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required' });
}
try {
const token = authHeader.split(' ')[1];
const decoded = verifyToken(token);
if (decoded.recovery) {
req.user = recoveryUser(decoded);
req.jwtWorkspaceId = null;
return next();
}
const user = db.prepare('SELECT id, email, name, role, auth_provider, avatar_url, plan_id, email_alerts, must_change_password FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(decoded.id);
if (!user) return res.status(401).json({ error: 'User not found' });
req.user = user;
// Tenancy middleware reads this on the resolver step.
req.jwtWorkspaceId = decoded.current_workspace_id || null;
// #7: enforce the forced first-login password change SERVER-SIDE (was a
// frontend-only redirect, so a provisioned temp password worked indefinitely
// via the API). While the flag is set, allow only reading/updating one's own
// profile (the password change is PUT /api/auth/me, which clears the flag)
// and logout; block everything else.
if (user.must_change_password) {
const url = (req.originalUrl || '').split('?')[0].replace(/\/$/, '');
const allowed = url === '/api/auth/me' || url === '/api/auth/logout';
if (!allowed) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'password_change_required' });
}
next();
} catch (err) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid or expired token' });
}
}
// Optional auth - sets req.user if token present, continues either way
function optionalAuth(req, res, next) {
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
if (authHeader && authHeader.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
try {
const token = authHeader.split(' ')[1];
const decoded = verifyToken(token);
req.user = decoded.recovery
? recoveryUser(decoded)
: db.prepare('SELECT id, email, name, role, auth_provider, avatar_url, plan_id FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(decoded.id);
req.jwtWorkspaceId = decoded.current_workspace_id || null;
} catch (err) {
// Token invalid, continue without user
}
}
next();
}
// Phase 2.1: role rename. Phase 1 renamed 'superadmin' to 'platform_admin' and
// dropped the in-between 'admin' role. These two guards are widened to accept
// either spelling so existing callers keep working without per-route edits.
// New code should prefer requirePlatformAdmin / requireOrgAdmin / workspace
// role guards from server/lib/permissions.js.
//
// Issue #14 (role normalization): the data migration in db/database.js collapses
// any legacy 'superadmin' -> 'platform_admin' and 'admin' -> 'user'. 'superadmin'
// is kept in PLATFORM_ROLES purely as back-compat belt-and-suspenders (recovery
// tokens, stray strings) - no row should carry it post-migration. Owner-level
// power lives here in PLATFORM_ROLES; anything not in this set is denied.
const PLATFORM_ROLES = ['superadmin', 'platform_admin'];
const ELEVATED_ROLES = ['admin', 'superadmin', 'platform_admin'];
// isPlatformRole: single predicate for "is this string a platform-owner role".
// Use this instead of a bare `role === 'platform_admin'` so a stray 'superadmin'
// is never silently treated as lower-privileged (the act-as bug fixed in #14).
// NOTE: this is the OWNER tier only - it deliberately does NOT include
// 'platform_operator' (issue #13), which is cross-org staff, not an owner.
function isPlatformRole(role) {
return PLATFORM_ROLES.includes(role);
}
// Issue #13: platform_operator is cross-org STAFF - it can see and act-as into
// every org and read/write workspace-scoped resources there, but holds NO
// owner-level power (no billing, no org/workspace deletion, no user/role
// management, no shared/template asset curation, no branding). The owner powers
// stay gated on PLATFORM_ROLES / isPlatformRole, which operator is deliberately
// NOT a member of - so every owner capability is deny-by-default for operators,
// and any NEW owner endpoint added later inherits that denial automatically.
//
// PLATFORM_STAFF / isPlatformStaff is the union used ONLY for cross-org
// VISIBILITY + act-as + workspace-scoped read/write. It must never gate an
// owner action.
const PLATFORM_STAFF = ['superadmin', 'platform_admin', 'platform_operator'];
function isPlatformStaff(role) {
return PLATFORM_STAFF.includes(role);
}
function requireAdmin(req, res, next) {
if (!req.user || !ELEVATED_ROLES.includes(req.user.role)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' });
}
next();
}
function requireSuperAdmin(req, res, next) {
if (!req.user || !PLATFORM_ROLES.includes(req.user.role)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Platform admin access required' });
}
next();
}
// Preferred alias for new code.
const requirePlatformAdmin = requireSuperAdmin;
module.exports = { generateToken, verifyToken, requireAuth, optionalAuth, requireAdmin, requireSuperAdmin, requirePlatformAdmin, isPlatformRole, isPlatformStaff, PLATFORM_ROLES, PLATFORM_STAFF, ELEVATED_ROLES };