screentinker/server/test/agency-gate.test.js
ScreenTinker c8a24d2243 feat(api): agency-token security primitive - off-ladder scope + agencyGate (#73)
The capability/target-restricted token model for the agency portal (#73 option B),
proven before any endpoint sits on it:
- 'agency' scope value is OFF the read/write/full ladder, so the existing tokenScopeGate
  rejects it on every public router by construction (auto-confinement, no new code).
- api_token_targets join table: which playlists an agency token may act on.
- agencyGate: THE single seam - agency-scope-only + (playlist in this token's allowlist
  AND in the bound workspace), one query enforcing target + cross-workspace isolation.
- AGENCY_ROUTERS category in config/api-surface.js (mounted with agencyGate, not
  tokenScopeGate) - declared; router/mount land with the endpoints.

Both bite-tested: spine (agency 403s on tokenScopeGate; read/write still pass) and the
gate (non-designated/cross-workspace/non-agency/JWT -> 403; neutralizing the target check
goes red). NARROW - not the general capability-scope system.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 21:30:38 -05:00

40 lines
2.3 KiB
JavaScript

'use strict';
// #73 THE SEAM: agencyGate is the single place capability+target restriction is enforced.
// Prove it confines before any endpoint is built behind it. Removing the api_token_targets
// condition in agencyGate makes "non-designated -> 403" go red (the bite).
const { test } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const Database = require('better-sqlite3');
const mem = new Database(':memory:');
mem.exec(`
CREATE TABLE api_token_targets (token_id TEXT, playlist_id TEXT, PRIMARY KEY(token_id, playlist_id));
CREATE TABLE playlists (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, workspace_id TEXT);
INSERT INTO playlists (id, workspace_id) VALUES ('plA','wsA'), ('plB','wsA'), ('plC','wsB');
INSERT INTO api_token_targets (token_id, playlist_id) VALUES ('tok1','plA'), ('tok1','plC');
`); // tok1 is allowlisted for plA (wsA, its bound ws) and plC (wsB, a DIFFERENT ws)
require.cache[require.resolve('../db/database')] = {
id: require.resolve('../db/database'), loaded: true, exports: { db: mem },
};
const { agencyGate } = require('../middleware/apiToken');
function gate(over = {}) {
const req = { viaToken: true, tokenScope: 'agency', apiToken: { id: 'tok1' }, jwtWorkspaceId: 'wsA', params: {}, body: {}, ...over };
let status = 200, nexted = false;
const res = { status(s) { status = s; return this; }, json() { return this; } };
agencyGate(req, res, () => { nexted = true; });
return { status, nexted };
}
test('#73 agencyGate: only agency tokens, only allowlisted playlists, only the bound workspace', () => {
assert.equal(gate({ params: { playlistId: 'plA' } }).nexted, true, 'designated playlist in bound ws -> passes');
assert.equal(gate({ params: { playlistId: 'plB' } }).status, 403, 'NON-designated playlist -> 403 (target restriction)');
assert.equal(gate({ params: { playlistId: 'plC' } }).status, 403, 'designated but CROSS-workspace -> 403');
assert.equal(gate({ tokenScope: 'write', params: { playlistId: 'plA' } }).status, 403, 'non-agency token -> 403');
assert.equal(gate({ viaToken: false, params: { playlistId: 'plA' } }).status, 403, 'JWT -> 403');
// body.playlist_id is honored too (create-item path), so the seam covers both routes
assert.equal(gate({ body: { playlist_id: 'plB' } }).status, 403, 'non-designated via body -> 403');
});