Follow-up to the cache/backoff loop fix (aa23cf0): make a device that can't
self-install visible to operators, and fix the signature-verify bug that kept the
whole #139 fix from engaging on the actual Fire OS target.
Dashboard surface (Phase 2):
- devices gains ota_status / ota_target_version / ota_attempts / ota_updated_at
via the idempotent ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN migration (non-destructive,
default-backfilled, idempotent on re-run).
- The device reports ota_status (OtaThrottle.statusFor -> none | pending |
manual_update_required) in device_info; the server persists it on register
(the reconnect backstop). devices d.* already surfaces it to the dashboard.
- Dashboard shows a non-blocking amber badge when manual_update_required
("Update available (vX) - install failed N times, manual update required");
i18n key in en.js (non-en inherits via the en fallback). Server suite +1 test.
Event-driven status (Option B):
- New device:ota-status WS message, emitted on STATE TRANSITIONS only
(enter-backoff -> manual_update_required, clear -> none), so the badge updates
promptly without waiting for a reconnect and without per-poll/heartbeat chatter.
Server handler persists the same fields; an unknown/forged device_id is a safe
no-op. The register-path persist stays as the reconnect backstop.
Signature-verify fix (the critical piece):
verifyApkSignature read the downloaded APK's signer via
getPackageArchiveInfo(GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES).signingInfo, but that field is
null for ARCHIVE files on API 28/29 (populated only from API 30). On Fire OS 8
(Android 9 / API 28) - the actual deployment target - this returned 0 certs from
a correctly-signed APK, so every OTA was refused as "tampered," the cache was
deleted, and the full APK re-downloaded every check cycle. This was the real
cause of the #139 re-download loop, NOT a silent-install failure: the cache and
backoff added in this branch sit behind this verify gate and never engaged on
the target.
Fix: below API 30, read the archive's signer via the legacy GET_SIGNATURES +
.signatures (its v1/JAR cert, which IS populated on 28/29). Keep
GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES + signingInfo for API >= 30 and for the installed-app
read (which works on 28+). The archive's signer is still extracted and compared
to the installed app's signer; a mismatch or zero-cert APK is still rejected.
This reads the cert correctly on old APIs - it does not weaken verification.
Verified on emulators:
- API 28: verify now passes for a legit APK (was: 0 certs, refused). Full backoff
then engages - 8.5MB pulled once, cache-hit on retries, backoff after 3,
manual_update_required emitted once; clears on successful update.
- API 28 negative: a re-signed (different-key) APK is still refused on cert
MISMATCH - no hole opened.
- API 30: unchanged path still passes (no regression).
- server suite 173/173, OtaThrottleTest 7/7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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