ScreenTinker d41bd1f27d fix(android): verify OTA APK signature before install + disable backup (Critical) ... The updater fetched download_url from the server JSON and installed it via PackageInstaller with NO verification, over cleartext (usesCleartextTraffic, no pinning). A network MITM or compromised server could return a malicious APK and have it silently installed (REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES) → full device RCE. Fix: before install, verify the downloaded APK (a) is our own package and (b) shares a current signing certificate with the installed app (GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES on P+, GET_SIGNATURES below). An attacker can't forge our signing key, so this holds even over an untrusted/cleartext transport. Fail-closed on any parse/verify error; the APK is deleted on mismatch. Gates both the session-install and intent-fallback paths. Also set android:allowBackup="false" so adb backup can't exfiltrate the device token / config. Compile-checked + signed debug APK builds. NOT verified on-device - needs a real update cycle on a device (valid update installs; a wrong-signed APK is rejected) before merge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>		2026-06-08 19:19:55 -05:00
..
src/main	fix(android): verify OTA APK signature before install + disable backup (Critical)	2026-06-08 19:19:55 -05:00
build.gradle.kts	Android: bump to 1.7.8 + fix safeOn return type	2026-04-28 15:45:18 -05:00
proguard-rules.pro	Initial open source release	2026-04-08 12:14:53 -05:00