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scripts/reset-admin.js mints a JWT carrying `recovery: true`, and middleware/auth.js
accepted that claim on its own with no database involvement. Three consequences:
- NOT REVOCABLE. The only way to invalidate an outstanding recovery token was to rotate
JWT_SECRET, which logs out every user on the instance.
- NOT ENUMERABLE. Nobody could answer "is a recovery token outstanding right now?"
- NOT AUDITED. The synthetic id ('recovery-<nonce>') is not a users row, so every
activity_log insert for it failed the user_id foreign key and was swallowed by a catch —
a break-glass session left no trace at all.
A `recovery_grants` row per minted token turns all three around: DELETE revokes, SELECT
enumerates, expires_at bounds, and used_at + source_ip record when and from where it was
first exercised. The migration is additive and idempotent, so re-running is a no-op and a
code-only rollback just leaves an unused table.
The grant is session-scoped, NOT single-use-per-request. Recovery means many requests —
load the dashboard, list users, reset a password — so consuming the grant on the first
would make break-glass unusable, a worse outcome than the narrow replay window it closes.
Revocation and expiry are the controls; used_at is the audit stamp.
Also fixed, because it is the mechanism that hid this: logActivity now rewrites a
'recovery-*' id to a NULL user_id with the identity in `details`, so break-glass actions
are actually recorded instead of failing the FK; and a dropped audit row now logs a loud
[AUDIT-DROP] line naming the action and increments a counter, rather than vanishing into
console.error.
The token is written to a 0600 file instead of stdout — under systemd or Docker, printing
it meant journald captured a live admin credential well past its lifetime. Added --list
and --revoke-all.
In-flight recovery tokens minted before this change stop working; they live one hour and
were unrevocable, which is the problem being fixed. Minting already required a working DB,
so redeeming against one is not a new dependency.
test/session-token-resolution.test.js now mints a real grant for its recovery token, so
its assertions keep testing that break-glass is refused on those surfaces for lack of a
users row — not for the unrelated new reason that the token is invalid.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| .. | ||
| agency-layouts.js | ||
| agency-targets.js | ||
| apk-cache.js | ||
| apk-signature.js | ||
| app-settings.js | ||
| billing-token.js | ||
| billing.js | ||
| branding.js | ||
| chunked-prune.js | ||
| command-queue.js | ||
| content-ack-limiter.js | ||
| content-ingest.js | ||
| device-identity.js | ||
| device-sanitize.js | ||
| device-settings.js | ||
| emailVerify.js | ||
| flap-limiter.js | ||
| ghcr-check.js | ||
| image-gen.js | ||
| incident-classify.js | ||
| liveness.js | ||
| log-coalescer.js | ||
| media-orientation.js | ||
| ota-breaker.js | ||
| ota-download-guard.js | ||
| pair-lockout.js | ||
| permissions.js | ||
| player-media-health.js | ||
| reconnect-throttle.js | ||
| recovery-grant.js | ||
| rolling-counter.js | ||
| safe-socket.js | ||
| schedule-eval.js | ||
| schema-check.js | ||
| secretbox.js | ||
| session-settle.js | ||
| socket-rooms.js | ||
| ssrf-guard.js | ||
| status-log-writer.js | ||
| tcp-keepalive.js | ||
| tenancy.js | ||
| tenant-cascade-migration.js | ||
| totp-lockout.js | ||
| totp.js | ||
| transition-bundle.js | ||
| transition-config.js | ||
| user-deletion.js | ||
| wgt-cache.js | ||
| zone-validate.js | ||