The portal needs to show an agency which playlists it may post to. New read surface on the
security primitive, built with write-path rigor: the confinement query lives in
lib/agency-targets.js (own token + bound workspace only) and is bite-tested four ways -
own targets yes; another token's, outside the allowlist, and cross-workspace all NO;
neutralizing the t.token_id filter makes it go red. Real-path wiring + the portal's
graceful 401 trigger asserted in the integration suite. No :playlistId, so router.param
doesn't apply - the query is the seam.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agency capability behind the proven off-ladder/agencyGate primitive:
- agencyGate is now SCOPE-only at the mount; the per-target check is router.param
('playlistId') in routes/agency.js - it fires WITH the param before the handler, so no
:playlistId route can skip it (drift-proof). A mount-level target check was silently
bypassed (Express populates req.params only at route match); the integration bite-suite
caught it - this is the fix.
- routes/agency.js: POST /content (shared ingest) + POST /playlists/:id/items (date-bounded
#74/#75 item; lands as draft so the admin's re-publish is the approval gate).
- tokens.js: issue scope='agency' tokens bound to a non-empty in-workspace playlist
allowlist (atomic); PUT /:id/targets re-designates (JWT-only -> can't self-widen).
- server.js: AGENCY_ROUTERS mounted bearerAuth + resolveTenancy + agencyGate.
Full bite-suite (test/agency.test.js) GREEN and re-proven to bite on the SHIPPING path:
neutralizing the router.param check makes non-designated->403 go red. Four assertions at
three seams: target (router.param), off-ladder (tokenScopeGate), can't-widen (tokens
JWT-only), issuance cross-workspace (create validation). 139 suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
routes/content.js POST / processing (thumbnail/dimensions/duration) + insert moved to
lib/content-ingest.js so the agency router produces byte-identical first-class content.
content.js POST / is now a thin caller; behavior-preserving - the 52 content regression
tests (api/operator-permissions/config-paths) pass unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The capability/target-restricted token model for the agency portal (#73 option B),
proven before any endpoint sits on it:
- 'agency' scope value is OFF the read/write/full ladder, so the existing tokenScopeGate
rejects it on every public router by construction (auto-confinement, no new code).
- api_token_targets join table: which playlists an agency token may act on.
- agencyGate: THE single seam - agency-scope-only + (playlist in this token's allowlist
AND in the bound workspace), one query enforcing target + cross-workspace isolation.
- AGENCY_ROUTERS category in config/api-surface.js (mounted with agencyGate, not
tokenScopeGate) - declared; router/mount land with the endpoints.
Both bite-tested: spine (agency 403s on tokenScopeGate; read/write still pass) and the
gate (non-designated/cross-workspace/non-agency/JWT -> 403; neutralizing the target check
goes red). NARROW - not the general capability-scope system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review caught the encrypted TOTP secret riding in the login/verify response body:
issueSession receives a SELECT * user row and only destructured out password_hash, so
totp_secret_enc (and the internal replay counter totp_last_step) leaked. Encrypted, so
not catastrophic, but it regresses the API work's "secrets never in responses" rule.
Strip both in issueSession (covers /login and /totp/verify); add an assertion that a
verify response carries no totp_secret_enc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unit: the mfa_pending BITE (db-injected so removing the rejection goes red), lockout, replay,
recovery-hash, decrypt-null graceful. Integration: enrollment, login->mfa_required, route-level
bite, recovery single-use, API-token bypass, verify lockout. Key-rotation: enroll under key A,
reboot under key B -> recovery still works, TOTP fails cleanly (no 500).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two-token login: /login returns an mfa_pending token when TOTP is on; requireAuth/optionalAuth
REJECT mfa_pending (tightening #1 - else password-alone is a session). /totp/verify exchanges
it + a TOTP or recovery code for a full session (per-user lockout; recovery checked
independently of the decryptable secret). Enrollment: setup -> enable (confirm-then-enable) ->
recovery codes shown once; disable/regenerate require re-auth; regenerate replaces atomically;
status surfaces codes-remaining (tightening #3). API tokens + SSO bypass TOTP by construction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
app.use('/api/auth/login', rateLimit(...)) etc. keyed on req.path, which Express strips to
'/' for mounted middleware - so /login, /register, /totp/verify shared ONE per-IP counter
(coupled limits; the new /totp/verify brute-force limit was not actually independent). Key
on originalUrl instead. Also adds the /api/auth/totp/verify 10/min limit (tightening #2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
lib/totp.js: otplib wrapper; secret stored via secretbox (must be reversible to recompute
codes); recovery codes SHA-256-hashed (api_tokens discipline); verifyCode returns the
matched step and blocks intra-window replay via totp_last_step; decrypt failures return
null (no throw). lib/totp-lockout.js: per-user lockout for /totp/verify (#87 model).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
users.totp_secret_enc (secretbox-encrypted, reversible) + totp_enabled + totp_last_step
(replay guard), and the totp_recovery_codes table (SHA-256 hashed, single-use). Migrations
default everything off so existing accounts are untouched. otplib pinned ^12 (v13 is a
breaking plugin-rewrite with no authenticator/checkDelta).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
After the OTA installs, PACKAGE_REPLACED kills the old process and nothing brought
MainActivity back, so updating screens dropped to the launcher (the 1.9.0 fleet bug). Add a
MY_PACKAGE_REPLACED receiver that relaunches via a shared Relauncher cascade (extracted from
BootReceiver so boot + post-update share one path):
1. overlay-direct startActivity (SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW) - legal on all versions when granted
2. full-screen-intent notification - auto-launches <14; on 14+ (USE_FULL_SCREEN_INTENT
revoked) degrades to a VISIBLE, tappable "tap to resume" prompt - fail loud, never a
silent dark screen
Emulator-proven on Android 16: MY_PACKAGE_REPLACED -> Relauncher[update] -> overlay-direct
(BAL_ALLOW_SAW_PERMISSION) -> MainActivity on the new version. Accessibility re-binds across
the package-replace (Service connected fires post-relaunch), so sequential OTAs keep their
auto-confirm.
Unattended OTA requires accessibility (auto-confirm the install) + overlay (relaunch); the
setup wizard grants both. A device where they're skipped degrades to the visible prompt.
Closes#96.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
UpdateChecker.tryPackageInstaller built the INSTALL_COMPLETE status PendingIntent with
FLAG_MUTABLE and an implicit intent. On Android 14+ (target SDK 34) that combination is
disallowed - getBroadcast() throws, the inner catch swallows it, and the PackageInstaller
session is never committed. Result: every OTA silently fails to install on a 14+ device
(download succeeds, version never changes). Make the intent explicit via setPackage(),
keeping FLAG_MUTABLE so PackageInstaller can still write EXTRA_STATUS back.
Emulator-proven on Android 16 (API 36): "Package installer session committed" and the
update applies. Distinct from the relaunch bug - this is install-on-14+.
Part of #96.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The OTA was invisible server-side: /api/update/check and /download/apk returned without
logging, which is part of why the 1.9.0 auto-relaunch failure went unseen. Log every
version check (client version vs latest, update_available, whether an APK is staged) and
every APK download (a device actually applying an OTA), keyed on the CF-aware getClientIp
so production logs show the real per-device IP behind Cloudflare, not the edge.
Observability for the #96 auto-relaunch work (this is how we'll watch the OTA fire during
the relaunch testing). Part of #96.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 6-digit pairing code is generated client-side, so the server can't raise its entropy
without a player change. Instead, harden server-side (no client change):
- lib/pair-lockout.js: lock an IP out of POST /api/provision/pair after 5 failed claims
(15-min lockout), and expire stale provisioning codes after 15 min so a code is not
claimable indefinitely. A successful claim resets the IP.
- /pair enforces both. Only an UNKNOWN code (404) counts toward the lockout (a real guess);
an EXPIRED code (410) is a legitimate-but-stale code and does NOT count, so a slow bulk
rollout from one shared-NAT IP can't lock itself out. getClientIp is Cloudflare-aware
(CF-Connecting-IP validated against a trusted edge peer), so the lockout keys on the real
per-client IP, never a shared edge.
Unit-tested deterministically with injected time, incl. the bulk-rollout-never-locks case.
Closes#87
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/provision was a second pairing endpoint that paired a device by code but,
unlike POST /api/provision/pair, did NOT assign a workspace, enforce checkDeviceLimit, or
emit device:paired / dashboard:device-added - a silently-diverging duplicate that no
client ever called. It now returns 410 Gone and points callers at /pair, so
/api/provision/pair is the single, fully-protected pairing endpoint. The mount stays in
the JWT-only partition, so a Bearer st_ token still gets 401 (requireAuth) before the 410.
Closes#90
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The non-security gaps named in the public-API self-review:
- gap-fix: zone_id (playlist items) + layout_id (device PUT) accepted and returned on read,
INCLUDING the cross-tenant rejection (the is_template OR workspace_id guard - the
security-relevant one).
- docs serving: /openapi.yaml serves the spec, /docs returns the Redoc page.
- i18n drift-guard: apitoken.* keys have full parity across en/es/fr/de/pt (a key missing
in one locale fails CI).
- token lifecycle branches: token-create workspace-membership validation and last_used_at
stamping (integration), plus the must_change_password gate (unit test via the in-memory
DB injection - cross-process WAL visibility is unreliable for that branch in-process).
119 tests total (was 108), all in the existing node --test job.
Closes#92
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-review follow-ups, kept as a separate commit so the review trail is honest.
- Spec drift: POST /widgets/preview was documented scope 'read' but the method-based
tokenScopeGate enforces 'write' for any POST, so a read-token integrator following the
published docs would hit a surprise 403. The code is right; fix the SPEC to match it.
- Guard it forever: test/openapi-contract.test.js cross-checks every spec operation's
x-required-scope against the enforcement rule, and that every documented path is a
public (token-reachable) router - both derived from the same config/api-surface.js.
Adds js-yaml (devDep) to parse the spec. Spec/enforcement drift now fails CI.
- Vendored Redoc: add frontend/vendor/README.md (library, version 2.3.9, source, update
steps) and drop the dangling //# sourceMappingURL line so /docs doesn't 404 in devtools.
Remaining (non-security) test-coverage gaps tracked in #92.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated public-API suite (boots the real server as a subprocess) so CI green proves
the token layer, not just the pre-existing tests:
- Partition firewall, derived from the SAME config/api-surface.js server.js mounts from:
every JWT-only router 401s a token; a public-surface snapshot fails if any router is
added to the token door; known-privileged routers asserted JWT-only.
- Threat model: role-strip gates, workspace-binding both directions (token ignores
X-Workspace-Id, JWT honors it), the scope ladder, the render bypass, token lifecycle,
and JWT no-regression.
- Device WS round-trip via socket.io-client (added as a devDep): valid device_token
registers + receives its playlist; wrong token rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- docs/openapi.yaml: the public, token-reachable surface only, with the auth model
(Bearer st_) and a per-operation x-required-scope (read<write<full). JWT-only routers
are excluded by design.
- Serve /openapi.yaml + /docs (Redoc via a vendored standalone bundle, no CDN so it
works air-gapped; /docs is CSP-exempt). docs/ is bundled into the release tarball.
- CI: redocly lint + a public-only guard that fails loudly if a JWT-only path ever leaks
into the spec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- playlists: accept zone_id on item create + update, validated against a template or a
layout in the playlist's workspace (no cross-tenant zone reference).
- devices: accept layout_id on PUT /api/devices/:id (symmetry with the layouts route),
validated the same way; null clears it. Both are already returned in the GET SELECTs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- routes/tokens.js: create (returns the full secret once), list (never the secret),
revoke. Mounted JWT-only via api-surface.js so an API token can never mint, list or
revoke tokens - no self-escalation.
- Settings "API Tokens" section: create form (name + read/write/full scope), one-time
secret reveal with copy, token list, revoke; i18n across en/es/fr/de/pt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce the public API's token layer and make the router partition data-driven.
- api_tokens table: SHA-256 hashed secret, st_ prefix, workspace-bound, read/write/full scope.
- middleware/apiToken.js: bearerAuth front door (Bearer st_ -> token auth, else the
unchanged requireAuth); apiTokenAuth acts as the owner with platform powers stripped
to 'user' and the workspace binding made authoritative (X-Workspace-Id ignored);
tokenScopeGate (read=GET, write=mutations) + requireScope('full') for commands.
- config/api-surface.js: single source of truth for the PUBLIC (token front door) vs
JWT-ONLY (requireAuth) router partition. server.js mounts from these lists so the
mount list and the partition firewall test cannot drift.
- device-groups: operational group commands (reboot/shutdown) require the full scope.
A Bearer st_ token fails jwt.verify on the JWT-only routers (401), so privileged
surfaces (admin, workspaces, ai, provision, white-label) are unreachable by exclusion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/provision (the routes/provisioning.js router endpoint) pairs a device
by pairing_code with no rate limit - the limit at server.js:287 was bound only to
the /api/provision/pair override. An authenticated user could brute-force 6-digit
pairing codes against the bare endpoint to claim devices in the unclaimed pool.
Bind the rate limit to the /api/provision mount so it covers both pairing paths.
Verified: 6 rapid POSTs to /api/provision now 429 on the 6th (was unlimited);
/api/provision/pair still 429s on the 6th.
Closes#88
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tagging a pre-release (e.g. v1.9.0-rc1) was unsafe. Four fixes:
1. bump-version.sh writes a numeric-only x.y.z to tizen/config.xml (strips a
-rc1/-beta.N suffix) so the .wgt still signs/installs; the full VERSION
(with the suffix) still drives server/Android/package.json.
2. release.yml flags the GitHub Release --prerelease for a -suffix version
(keeps it off "Latest" and out of the /releases/latest API).
3. release.yml moves docker :latest only for final releases - a pre-release no
longer repoints :latest onto untested code.
4. upgrade.sh excludes pre-release tags from its default selection - GNU
`sort -V` ranks 1.9.0-rc1 above the final 1.9.0, so the unfiltered default
would silently pick an RC (which then auto-OTAs to field kiosks). An explicit
`upgrade.sh v1.9.0-rc1` still works.
Verified the strip, tag selection, prerelease/tags logic, and YAML validity in
isolation.
Closes#80
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A multi-zone layout's zone rendered its image from the local content cache
only. If the content wasn't cached yet at first render (first-sync download
still in flight, or the preloader hadn't fetched that zone's content), the
zone drew blank - and a static (single, unscheduled) zone has no rotation
timer to redraw, so it stayed blank until the app was restarted.
Mirror the video branch: when getCachedFile returns null, load the image
straight from the server (the item's remote_url, else /api/content/<id>/file)
instead of leaving the zone blank.
Verified live on a 2-zone layout with two single-unscheduled items and fresh
content: both zones render with no restart, with only one item actually in
the on-device cache (the other displayed via the URL fallback).
Closes#78
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The settings "About" section hardcoded "ScreenTinker v1.4.1", so it never
reflected the running build (#/admin already showed the correct version).
Fetch /api/version in the async settings render — the same unauthenticated
endpoint the admin view uses — and render it (blank-safe on fetch failure).
Closes#83
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
minSdk 26 makes AGP default the v1 (JAR) signature off, so the release APK is
v2-only. Some MDM-managed commercial signage (MAXHUB via the Pivot MDM) silently
removes a v2-only app on the next reboot because its boot integrity check expects
a v1 signature — screens that power-cycle nightly lose the app and fall back to
the setup screen.
`enableV1Signing = true` has no effect at minSdk >= 24 (verified: still v2-only).
Instead, finalize assembleRelease with a `resignReleaseV1` task that re-signs via
apksigner with --v1-signing-enabled true and a low --min-sdk-version, emitting v1
alongside v2/v3. Verified: v1+v2+v3 at min-sdk 19, verifies at API 36, and the
re-signed APK installs and runs on a live API 36 emulator.
Closes#81
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each playlist item can carry schedule blocks (active days, start/end
time-of-day, optional start/end dates). An item plays when the screen's
local "now" matches at least one block; an item with no blocks always
plays. #74 covers time-of-day/day-of-week windows including overnight
wrap; #75 covers inclusive date ranges (auto-expiry). Evaluation is
on-device, so dayparting and expiry work offline.
- Shared evaluator contract: shared/schedule-vectors.json (39 vectors —
DST US+AU, overnight-wrap anchoring, timezone correctness, date
boundaries). Canonical JS evaluator in server/lib/schedule-eval.js;
Kotlin and Tizen ports kept in lockstep by drift guards (Tizen byte-diff
test, Kotlin JUnit reads the shared JSON, new android-test CI job).
- All three players (web, Android, Tizen) filter by schedule against their
own clock, idle with a "Nothing scheduled" message + 30s re-check when
everything is filtered, and fail open on any evaluator error.
- Editor: per-item schedule modal + row badge in the playlist editor;
client validation mirrors the server; editing marks the playlist draft.
- Part B (behaviour change): device/group schedule overrides now evaluate
in each device's effective timezone instead of server-local time.
- Device detail shows the reported timezone + a clock-skew warning.
- i18n for en/es/fr/de/pt across all new strings (namespaced itemsched.*
to avoid colliding with the device-schedule calendar's schedule.*).
- CHANGELOG documents the feature, the Part B change, the fail-open
guarantee, and the scheduled-single-video re-render tradeoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A socket reconnecting with a device_id that no longer exists in `devices`
(e.g. the row was deleted server-side) hit the device_fingerprints insert
with an unknown foreign key. INSERT OR IGNORE does NOT suppress FOREIGN KEY
violations, so it threw a caught-but-noisy "Fingerprint tracking error" on
every such reconnect. Null out an unknown device_id before the insert; a
genuinely fresh device sends no device_id and was always fine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A never-visited org had no cached white-label, so brand-prime fell through to the
ScreenTinker default baked into the static index.html and flashed it before
branding.js fetched the org brand. Now the /app route injects the resolved
instance / custom-domain branding into the shell as a <meta name="ssr-brand">
(CSP blocks inline <script>, so a meta carries it), and brand-prime applies that
as the fallback when the per-workspace brand is not cached yet - so the page
paints the configured brand on first load instead of ScreenTinker.
- server.js: /app resolves branding (publicBranding strips internal columns) and
injects the HTML-escaped JSON as a meta tag; falls back to plain sendFile on
any error so branding can never break the app shell.
- brand-prime.js: read meta[name=ssr-brand] when there is no rd_branding_<ws>.
Verified: the meta carries the resolved brand (default ScreenTinker and a
platform-default white-label), internal columns do not leak, 66 unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bump-version.sh matched `<?xml version="1.0" ...?>` - the XML format version,
which has a leading space before version= just like the widget attribute - and
rewrote it to the app version, producing invalid XML that breaks the Tizen .wgt
build: 'XML version "X.Y.Z" is not supported, only XML 1.0 is supported'. (CI did
not catch it because the no-Tizen-CLI build path just zips the files without
validating the XML.)
- bump-version.sh: skip the `<?xml` declaration line in the tizen version sed.
- tizen/config.xml: restore the declaration to version="1.0" (prior bumps had
corrupted it to 1.8.2).
The widget version and tizen:application required_version are still updated /
left alone correctly (verified with a dummy bump + an XML parse).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Comparison table (landing + the 3 compare pages): correct cells against each
vendor's current pricing/docs (verified June 2026). Delete the inaccurate
Platforms, Content Designer, and Hardware Lock-in rows; relabel "Remote
Control" to "Live screen view + remote key presses" with an Android/permission
caveat; fix Video Wall, Kiosk, Free tier, White Label and remote cells for
Yodeck, ScreenCloud and OptiSigns. Add an "as of June 2026 / report errors"
footnote with a GitHub issues link.
- Compare pages: drop the false "supports more platforms than X" claims; correct
Yodeck (Windows/ChromeOS, web player, kiosk), OptiSigns (free tier, video wall,
white label, remote); add the same footnote + caveat.
- Mobile fix: .screenshot img now has max-width:100% / height:auto / display:block
so the dashboard preview no longer distorts on phones (no desktop effect).
- CSS bug: restore the dropped @media (max-width:768px) wrapper (braces were
102 { vs 103 }) so the mobile overrides stop leaking to desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- scripts/upgrade.sh: upgrade a self-hosted instance to a tagged release
(default latest). Backs up the db (.backup), checks out the tag, npm ci
--omit=dev, restarts the service (SERVICE_NAME override), reports the version.
- README: replace the git-pull update flow with scripts/upgrade.sh (latest or a
pinned tag); keep main as the bleeding-edge option. Add a Samsung Tizen entry
to device setup (URL Launcher -> /player).
- tizen/README: point path A at the server's built-in /player, and explain why
the released .wgt is unsigned (Samsung distributor certs are DUID-locked).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- release.yml: build the Tizen .wgt before the source tarball and bundle it in
(ScreenTinker.wgt at the tarball root). The signed Android APK is added by the
local finalize step (the keystore stays off CI).
- scripts/finalize-release.sh: after the release workflow publishes a tag, build
the signed APK locally, pull the CI-built unsigned .wgt from the release,
assemble a complete tarball (source + apk + wgt at the root, where /download/apk
resolves the apk after extraction), and upload the apk + complete tarball.
- .gitignore: ignore *.wgt and *.tar.gz so finalize temp files cannot be committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- .github/workflows/release.yml: on a v* tag - verify the tag matches VERSION
(fail-fast guard), run tests, build a source tarball + the unsigned Tizen .wgt
and publish a GitHub Release with generated notes, and build+push a multi-arch
(amd64 + arm64) image to ghcr.io/screentinker/screentinker:<version> + :latest.
The Release (artifacts) and the docker push are independent jobs, so an
arm64/QEMU docker failure does not block the GitHub Release and is re-runnable.
Nothing deploys to prod. APK-build-in-CI left as a TODO (keystore secret).
- Dockerfile + .dockerignore: multi-stage node:20-slim image with server +
frontend + VERSION + scripts; DATA_DIR=/data volume for db/uploads/jwt-secret.
Verified to build, boot, serve the dashboard + web player, and persist state.
- docker-compose.example.yml: /data volume, SELF_HOSTED, a node-fetch healthcheck
against /api/status, and an admin-lockout recovery note (reset-admin.js).
- server.js: resolve the OTA APK from DATA_DIR first (a container can mount one
at /data/ScreenTinker.apk), fall back to the legacy in-repo path, 404 gracefully.
- ci.yml: bump checkout/setup-node to v6 (clears the Node-20 action deprecation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- test job: node 20, npm ci + npm test in server/ (66 tests).
- smoke job: boot the server against a fresh SQLite db with SELF_HOSTED, then
assert /api/status is ok and reports exactly the VERSION file (proves the
single-source-of-truth wiring end to end).
- triggers: push and PR to main, plus manual workflow_dispatch. Concurrency
cancels superseded in-flight runs per ref.
- upgrade-path job left as a TODO (needs a release tag earlier than HEAD).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- server/version.js: shared version helper that reads the root VERSION file once
(fallback 0.0.0). Replaces the stale hardcoded 1.2.0 / 1.5.1 / 1.0.0 fallbacks
in /api/version, /api/update/check, and /api/status.
- config.js: DATA_DIR / DB_PATH / UPLOADS_DIR / CERTS_DIR env overrides for the
db, uploads, and certs/jwt-secret locations. Unset resolves to exactly the
legacy in-repo paths, so existing installs (including production) are
byte-for-byte unchanged. Guarded by test/config-paths.test.js.
- package.json: rename remote-display-server -> screentinker (+ lockfile name).
- scripts/bump-version.sh: one-shot bump across VERSION, package.json (+lock),
android (versionName and versionCode + 1), and the tizen widget version; makes
one commit plus an annotated tag; prints the push command, never pushes.
- .gitignore: global *.db / *.db-wal / *.db-shm / *.db.* so no database file
(including .db.devbak backups, at any path) can be committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dashboard exposes landscape / portrait / landscape-flipped / portrait-flipped
and the README promises rotation, but neither player ever read the device's
orientation field - it was hardcoded landscape. Reported by a customer testing
Firestick + Samsung signage.
Rotate the CONTENT in software, not the panel: Fire TV / Android TV / Tizen are
fixed-landscape and ignore setRequestedOrientation (can't physically rotate).
- Android (MainActivity): applyOrientation() resizes rootView to the rotated
dimensions, recenters, and rotates 0/90/180/270. rootView is the shared
container for single-zone AND multi-zone, so both are covered. Driven from the
playlist-update payload.
- Tizen (app.js): CSS transform on the stage (rotate + swapped 100vh/100vw),
same four values, from the playlist payload.
Verified on an Android 16 emulator: device set to portrait -> 'Applied
orientation: portrait (rotation=90, swap=true)' and the video renders rotated.
Adds scripts/backup.sh — atomic SQLite .backup + hard-linked point-in-time
content snapshots, daily (7) + monthly (12) retention, and an error log.
Env-configurable (SCREENTINKER_DIR/BACKUP_DIR/DB/UPLOADS/*_KEEP*) so any
self-hoster can use it; defaults target a /opt/screentinker install.
Hardens two real failure modes found in production:
- Content snapshots EXCLUDE uploads/screenshots/ and use rsync --link-dest
instead of cp -al. The per-device *_latest.jpg screenshots are rewritten
24/7; cp -al aborts when a file mutates mid-copy and the prior script
swallowed the error with 2>/dev/null, silently breaking content snapshots
for ~8 weeks. rsync --link-dest hard-links unchanged files but tolerates
in-flight changes; errors now go to backup.log.
- Retention sorts by NAME, not mtime: rsync -a / cp -al preserve the source
dir's (frozen) mtime, so ls -dt treated fresh snapshots as oldest and pruned
them. The timestamp is in the dir name, so name-sort is chronological.
README Backups section documents the cron setup + env knobs. Verified on prod.
