screentinker/frontend
ScreenTinker fbf55f842c Close the third QA round: limiter bypass, stored XSS, break-glass, org placement
Four HIGH findings. Two were mine, and one was a composition of two of my own fixes.

ONE EXTRA SLASH DEFEATED EVERY /api/auth LIMITER

`/api/auth//login` still reaches the login handler — Express normalises the mount
boundary for the router — but `app.use('/api/auth/login', rateLimit(...))` does not
match it, so the limiter never runs. A review got a real session after 60 unthrottled
password attempts. Same for //totp/verify (unlimited 6-digit brute force),
//forgot-password (unlimited reset mail to any address) and //sso/discover (the
customer-enumeration cap, gone). Fixing the limiter KEY could never help, because the
middleware was never invoked: the path is now collapsed to one canonical form before
routing. Pre-existing, and it falsified this file's own warning about walking past the
login limiter.

STORED XSS: I ESCAPED ONE COPY OF THE TABLE

My earlier fix patched views/admin.js line 357 and missed line 372 in the same
function — and missed views/settings.js entirely, which renders a SECOND copy of the
platform users table from the same endpoint, including the email in a raw text node.
The write path was `POST /api/admin/users`, whose EMAIL_RE barred only whitespace, so
an org or workspace admin (not a platform admin) could choose an address that executed
in the operator's session. Both tables escaped, both regexes tightened to reject markup
characters, verified against 11 address shapes.

I KILLED THE BREAK-GLASS WHILE CLOSING AN ORACLE

Hoisting the domain check above the account lookup — my fix for the enumeration oracle
— made `user.role !== 'platform_admin'` unreachable for enforced domains. On a
self-host the operator IS the org owner, and my would_lock_out_actor guard GUARANTEES
their address is inside the enforced set, so the recovery loop closed on itself:
approving a removal request needs a signed-in platform admin. Both properties hold now
by letting the operator through on a CORRECT PASSWORD only — every wrong answer is the
identical 403 whether the address exists, does not exist, or is theirs. Verified: 200 /
403 / 403 / 403.

Also fixed: enabling SSO-only locked out every password-holding member including the
admin who pressed the button (password refused by policy, SSO refused by
account_exists_local). An org provider now adopts a password account at a domain it has
PROVED by DNS when the org requires SSO — which is what a verified domain means, and
what every hosted identity product does.

SSO USERS WERE LANDING IN A PERSONAL ORG

The membership write added organization_members but no workspace_members, and
ensureDefaultOrgForUser looks at workspaces — so it minted each SSO user a private
organization and made it their current one. The customer's Members page read
"Members (1)" while their staff signed in successfully and were invisible.

ALSO: bcrypt on a NULL password_hash 500'd with a stack (and was an oracle for accounts
a provider deletion had returned to local); stranded_members was returned by the server
and discarded by the UI; a provider with zero domains was the one useless state with no
warning; two limiter shapes were missing (removal-request shared the garbage bucket —
an unauthenticated flood could deny the SSO break-glass path); doubled mail subject
prefixes; a DELETE that toasted "Saved"; a decided request left in the DOM with live
listeners; and a confirm dialog promising "immediately" when sessions already open
survive.

1609 tests, three clean runs. Limiter, break-glass, oracle parity and null-password all
verified against a running server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bvjey4FNam49MN7ybjcq6A
2026-08-11 11:25:11 -05:00
..
assets Landing: replace iframe mock with dashboard screenshot 2026-04-21 19:47:13 -05:00
compare feat(seo): strengthen integrations internal linking + drop public status link (#178) 2026-07-13 12:11:30 -05:00
css Preview a rotated display the way people see it, not the way its framebuffer is 2026-08-06 09:38:31 -05:00
guides Pi installer: stop advertising what was never installed (#245) 2026-08-10 10:50:34 -05:00
integrations feat(seo): strengthen integrations internal linking + drop public status link (#178) 2026-07-13 12:11:30 -05:00
js Close the third QA round: limiter bypass, stored XSS, break-glass, org placement 2026-08-11 11:25:11 -05:00
legal docs(privacy): disclose error and diagnostic telemetry from players 2026-05-15 15:31:21 -05:00
vendor test(api): fix spec scope drift + guard it in CI; Redoc provenance 2026-06-12 18:45:09 -05:00
41498e6c84045d9d187f4504c122e54f.txt feat(seo): IndexNow + landing-page optimization (schema, FAQ, CWV, content) (#177) 2026-07-13 11:22:37 -05:00
agency.html feat(agency): per-token upload folder — auto-created, subtree-confined (#158) (#171) 2026-07-12 21:23:25 -05:00
api-docs.html docs(api): OpenAPI spec, Redoc at /docs, CI spec-lint 2026-06-12 18:45:09 -05:00
index.html Preview a rotated display the way people see it, not the way its framebuffer is 2026-08-06 09:38:31 -05:00
landing.html feat(seo): strengthen integrations internal linking + drop public status link (#178) 2026-07-13 12:11:30 -05:00
manifest.json Initial open source release 2026-04-08 12:14:53 -05:00
robots.txt SEO: add meta tags, sitemap, robots.txt, comparison pages, guides, internal linking 2026-04-28 20:54:32 -05:00
sitemap.xml feat(seo): IndexNow + landing-page optimization (schema, FAQ, CWV, content) (#177) 2026-07-13 11:22:37 -05:00
sw-admin.js fix(sw): stop the admin service worker from breaking video playback 2026-06-08 23:08:13 -05:00