plus misc similar technically-incorrect addq usages;
most of these don't matter in practice since they'll
never get a url with a hash, but makes the intent clear
and make sure hashes never get passed around
like they're part of a dirkey, harmless as it is
counterpart of `--s-wr-sz` which existed already
the default (256 KiB) appears optimal in the most popular scenario
(linux host with storage on local physical disk, usually NVMe)
was previously 32 KiB, so large uploads should now use 17% less CPU
also adds sanchecks for values of `--iobuf`, `--s-rd-sz`, `--s-wr-sz`
also adds file-overwrite feature for multipart posts
the default (256 KiB) appears optimal in the most popular scenario
(linux host with storage on local physical disk, usually NVMe)
was previously a mix of 64 and 512 KiB;
now the same value is enforced everywhere
download-as-tar is now 20% faster with the default value
it is now possible to grant access to users other than `${u}`
(the user which the volume belongs to)
previously, permissions did not apply correctly to IdP volumes due to
the way `${u}` and `${g}` was expanded, which was a funky iteration
over all known users/groups instead of... just expanding them?
also adds another sanchk that a volume's URL must contain a
`${u}` to be allowed to mention `${u}` in the accs list, and
similarly for `${g}` / `@${g}` since users can be in multiple groups
if building from an untagged git commit, the third value in the
VERSION tuple (in __version__.py) was a string instead of an int,
causing the version to compare and sort incorrectly
the volflags of `/` were used to determine if e2d was enabled,
which is wrong in two ways:
* if there is no `/` volume, it would be globally disabled
* if `/` has e2d, but another volume doesn't, it would
erroneously think unpost was available, which is not an
issue unless that volume used to have e2d enabled AND
there is stale data matching the client's IP
3f05b665 (v1.11.0) had an incomplete fix for the stale-data part of
the above, which also introduced the other issue
this commit partially fixes the following issue:
if a client manages to escape real-ip detection, copyparty will
try to ban the reverse-proxy instead, effectively banning all clients
this can happen if the configuration says to obtain client real-ip
from a cloudflare header, but the server is not configured to reject
connections from non-cloudflare IPs, so a scanner will eventually
hit the server IP with malicious-looking requests and trigger a ban
copyparty will now continue to process requests from banned IPs until
the header has been parsed and the real-ip has been obtained (or not),
causing an increased server load from malicious clients
assuming the `--xff-src` and `--xff-hdr` config is correct,
this issue should no longer be hitting innocent clients
the old behavior of immediately rejecting a banned IP address
can be re-enabled with the new option `--early-ban`
* add readme section on using amazon/aws s3 as storage
* mention http/https confusion caused by incorrectly configured cloudflare
* improve custom-font notes
* docker: ftp-server howto
* docker: suggest moving hist-folders into the config path
and switch the idp docker-compose files to use the
main image, in anticipation of v1.11
